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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the transparency of the Swedish stock market with regards to the new, eased 
regulation on quarterly reporting. The study investigates whether insider trading and analysts’ 
recommendations could be alternative sources of information to quarterly reports. Consistent with prior 
research, it finds the magnitude of informativeness of insider buys being greater than for insider sells.  
The study finds no strong sign of informativeness of analysts’ recommendations, but a direct market 
reaction is found as a response to analysts’ sell recommendations. The obtained results suggest that 
insider trades and analysts’ recommendations are slightly informative, but not informative enough to be 
regarded as substitutes to quarterly reports. The conclusion is that the amount of publicly available 
information sources are reduced if firms hand out less quarterly reports, which could lead to increased 
information asymmetries and thereby a decreased transparency of the Swedish market. 
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Definition List 
Accurate recommendation When the future stock price turns out to be precisely as 
recommended 
Analyst   Registered analysts working for banks and news papers 
Analyst coverage  The number of analysts following a certain stock 
Bias   A predisposition towards error 
Gambler’s fallacy The tendency to rely on inaccurate estimations of the 
probabilities for different outcomes causing biased decisions 
Herding behaviour The tendency to mimic friends, family or colleagues in a 
decision to trade  
Heuristic Rules-of-thumb used in decision making 
Hot-hand-fallacy The tendency to put too much reliance upon past trends when 
estimating the future outcome of for example a stock or a firm 
causing biased decisions  
Information asymmetry A situation where one party has more or superior information 
compared to another 
Information gap Differences in the information available between groups of 
people, in this study the word refers to the gap between: 
• Insiders vs. analysts  
• Insiders and analysts vs. investors and other market 
participants 
Information gathering costs Costs associated with gathering information 
Informativeness Insiders’ and analysts’ ability to correctly predict future stock 
movements, as this implicates that there is information 
valuable to investors incorporated in insider trading and 
analysts’ recommendations 
Insider A person that per definition is, or should be, registered as 
insider at the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority 
Overconfidence Valuing your own ability higher than what is rational and 
accurate, leading to ineffective decision-making 
Post-Earnings-Announcement-Drift The stocks of firms giving rise to positive earnings surprises 
experience positive drift after the announcement, while stocks 
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of firms giving rise to negative earnings surprises experience 
negative drift after the announcement 
Private information Information that is available only to some people at a cost 
Public information Information that is available to the general public at no cost 
Representativeness People make judgements based on stereotypic thinking, asking 
how representative an object or idea is for the class to which it 
belongs  
Transparency Transparency in this study refers to what extent market 
participants are able to find sufficient public information about 
the listed firms’ financial situations and future outlooks 
(through financial reports, disclosures or other information 
sources) to make accurate forecasts 
Optimal transparency A level of transparency where investors can gain sufficient 
amounts of information to be willing to invest without 
incurring too high costs for current shareholders  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This section introduces the reader to the transparency of the Swedish stock market and covers the 
current discussion of the new and eased regulation of quarterly reports. Headlines such as problem 
discussion, purpose, delimitations and study outline are included. 
 
1.1. Background 
A major obstacle preventing investors from yielding abnormal returns is their ability to make accurate 
investment decisions. In making those decisions, transparency and information is important for the 
rational investor, who wants to base his or her investments on fundamental analyses. However, there is a 
crucial difference between public and private information, as public information is available at no cost to 
all market participants but private information is available only to some at a cost (Forssbæck and 
Oxelheim, 2014). Two important sources of public information are quarterly reports handed out by listed 
firms and the complementary press releases, which are two of the few sources of financial insight an 
ordinary investor can get of the firms at no cost. Listed firms are obliged to provide those two sources of 
information and their content is regulated by the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority to establish a 
certain informational standard. Conversely, the transparency of the Swedish stock market could now 
potentially be at risk, as since the first of January 2014, the regulation of quarterly reports handed out by 
listed firms on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm was eased. The new and more flexible regulation infer that 
firms can choose to release reports in accordance to the Interim Financial Reporting IAS 34 twice a year 
instead of four times a year, as of formerly.  
 
The proposal to the regulatory change arose from discussions between various market participants with 
the aim to reduce managements’ time spent on reports, in favour of a stronger focus on pure business 
and long-term growth. Nasdaq OMX Stockholm desiderates to attract more firm enlistments due to the 
eased regulation (Affärsvärlden, 2013(a, b and c)). Great Britain initiated an eased regulation on financial 
reporting with the objective to minimize the critical short-term investment horizons shareholders tended 
to have on British listed firms. Denmark later imitated Great Britain and also initiated eased regulations 
on quarterly reporting (Lekvall, 2014). This year, Sweden follows in their path.  
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“This is our interpretation of what the participants think. It is obvious that the listed firms experience it as an 
administrative burden to write the quarterly reports and all that comes to it in forms of presentations and road shows. It has 
developed as a praxis containing more and more information.” 1 - Magnus Billing, Chief of Nasdaq OMX 
Stockholm to Nyhetsbyrån Direkt (Affärsvärlden, 2013(b)). 
 
Denmark has a similar corporate governance structure as Sweden, but as there is no previous study 
found having investigated what effects the eased regulation on quarterly reporting had on the 
transparency in Denmark, it is not possible to predict what effect it might have in Sweden. Recalling that 
at the initiation of obligatory quarterly reports in Sweden ten to fifteen years ago, it was seen as a great 
step towards an increased transparency of the market (Lekvall, 2014), it is noteworthy that the discussion 
today is reverse. The potential risk associated with fewer quarterly reports available is that the possibility 
for investors to gain accurate public information decreases and hence also their possibility to make 
reasonable forecasts and profitable investments. It may moreover alter analysts’ contingency to make 
accurate stock recommendations, as these recommendations largely are based on the quarterly reports. A 
survey performed by the Swedish communication and consulting firm Hallvarsson and Halvarson in 
November 2013 reveal that almost 70 per cent of the analysts participating in the survey allege that 
quarterly reports are very important to them, but that other ways to gain information exists.  
 
“It is one of the few opportunities except meeting with the firms where one can get an insight in the business” 2 – An 
analyst on how important quarterly reports are (Hallvarsson and Halvarson, 2013) 
 
Swedish Shareholders’ Association, an independent organisation protecting the Swedish shareholders’ 
rights by observing the market objectively, declared their criticism to the eased regulations early on. 
When the discussion of quarterly reports being a burden for firms was introduced in the summer of 
2012, Swedish Shareholders’ Association published an article clearly stating that the primary purpose of 
quarterly reports is to provide the market with regular financial information of the firm performance, and 
that Swedish shareholders need those reports regardless of how time-consuming they may be for 
management (Swedish Shareholders’ Association, 2012). Firms utilising the regulation change will 
obviously result in fewer financial reports available to analysts and investors, but the real question is what 
effects it will that have on the overall transparency? 
                                                
1 Translated by the authors of this study 
2 Translated by the authors of this study 
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1.2. Problem discussion 
The new regulation amount to several potential problems because, given that the listed firms will actually 
hand out fewer reports, the information gap and information asymmetry on the market will increase and 
investors will consequently need access to other sources of public information. But what other 
information sources are there really available at no cost for all market participants?  
 
Besides quarterly reports and press releases, analysts’ recommendations3 and insider trading are two 
alternatives advocated by the authors of this study. Both insiders4 and analysts5 already play an important 
role in sharing and transferring information to the market. Insiders hold by definition private 
information about their firms’ financial wealth and future cash flows, hence insider trading6 is argued to 
be an essential signalling factor to observe in order for an investor to gain information. Analysts on the 
other hand do not possess any private information per se, but can more easily access this information 
than an ordinary investor by exclusive meetings with the firms’ management teams. As analysts then 
provide the market with their recommendations and reports, they help minimizing the information gap. 
Consequently, insider trading and analysts’ recommendations are considered to be potential substitutes 
to quarterly reports.  
 
One fundamental difference between the two actors is however analysts’ informational disadvantage due 
to higher information gathering costs, pursuing researchers to question whether insiders may eventually 
crowd out analysts (Gilbert, Tourani-Rad and Wisniewski, 2005). The eased regulation with fewer reports 
does not only implicate potentially higher costs for analysts, who need to work harder to attain the 
information, but it also lengthens the open periods7 for insiders to trade. This gives insiders an even 
greater advantage and hence increases the risk of crowding out and minimizing the analyst coverage on 
the Swedish stock market. This should be of concern as Ravina and Sapienza (2009) find that higher 
analyst coverage reduces the information gap between insiders and the market. Their study proves higher 
                                                
3 Only analyst recommendations that have reached the whole market, as the recommendations only given to the analysts’ clients are 
classified as private information 
4 This study defines insiders as the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (n.d.) does. Hence, an insider is a person who through his or 
her position has access to inside information about a company.  
5 This study includes both news letter analysts and analysts working for banks 
6 Insider trading is when an insider trades the stock of “his or her” company. It also includes trades by closely related parties of the insider, 
such as relatives or legal advisors to the person holding an insider position. Only insider trades reported to Swedish Financial Supervisory 
Authority are included in this study.  
7 Insiders in Sweden are not allowed to trade thirty days prior to the release of an interim report, the release day in question included, and all 
trading that takes place need to be reported to the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority, Swedish Act (2000:1087). Violation of these 
regulations can result in prison for up to two years and high penalty fees, Swedish Act (2005:377). Every change in insider holdings in 
Sweden needs to be reported to the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority within five calendar days from the date of the transaction. 
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analyst coverage to bring on smaller abnormal returns yielded by insiders compared to the market, 
eventuating in an increased market transparency.  
 
Firms listed on small cap and mid cap generally already publish fewer press releases, has a lower analyst 
coverage and fewer insider trades than large cap firms. The survey by Hallvarsson and Halvarson (2013) 
reveals that analysts fear firms listed on small and mid cap are most likely to utilise the new regulations. 
Imaginably, analysts will consequently favour large cap stocks even more, reducing the analyst coverage 
on mid and small cap further. The risk of fewer quarterly reports could accordingly have a stronger 
negative effect on the transparency of mid and small cap stocks.  
 
But is transparency optimal? To whom is less transparency a problem? Previous researchers discuss the 
possibility of low transparency being beneficial to some shareholders (Forssbæck and Oxelheim, 2014; 
Greenstone, Oyer and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2006; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). The reasoning behind this 
trade-off is that the benefit gained by reducing the information gap towards new and current investors 
must exceed the loss of revealing competitive advantages to competitors. Competitive advantages are 
important to all firms, but more crucial to some, such as start-ups and high-technology firms, than others 
and therefore such firms are rationally motivated to be less transparent than others. The complex 
difficulty for a firm and its current shareholders is that less transparency will potentially detract investors’ 
willingness to invest, explained by the adverse selection problem causing new uninformed investors to 
fear others have more beneficial private information and will make a higher profit than them. The 
financial cost of less transparency is therefore illiquidity followed by the capital market’s unwillingness to 
invest, which needs to be compensated for by issuing more debt. This increases the total cost of capital 
for the firm and its current shareholders (Forssbæck and Oxelheim, 2014). Regarding the new regulation, 
the drawback with quarterly reports was never firms revealing competitive advantages, but by quarterly 
reports stealing precious time from management that could be spent more efficiently within the business. 
This means that, arguing in line with Forssbæck and Oxelheim (2014), utilising the regulation should 
rather be motivated by managements’ time being spent so efficiently within the business that it 
compensates for the increased cost associated with less transparency.  
 
Great Britain is seen as a paragon for the Swedish financial reporting system, which could have 
implications due to differences in the respective countries’ corporate governance systems. Compared to 
Great Britain, Sweden is dominated by fewer but larger shareholders influencing the market. Therefore, 
investors on the Swedish market can become dependent on information from fewer insiders as opposed 
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to investors on the British market (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Schleifer, 2008). There are several 
corporate governance aspects that will be discussed more thoroughly later on in this study, but it should 
be emphasized that they ought to be of concern.  
 
Summing up, it is yet unclear whether the alternative public information sources, insider trading and 
analysts’ recommendations, contain any valuable information for investors in Sweden. A majority of 
prior studies on the subject have been performed in America, hence there is a research gap as those 
findings might not be directly applicable to a country such as Sweden, due to the differences in the 
corporate governance systems. Because of the regulatory change in Sweden, this research gap has now 
become even more important to fill in order to make any predictions about the consequences the eased 
regulations might have, to give any policy recommendations for firms and to provide investors with 
answers of how to adapt to a potential new information shift.  
 
1.3. Purpose 
This study aims to investigate what effects the eased regulation will have on the transparency of the 
Swedish stock market and if insider trading and analysts’ recommendations could potentially be 
substitute information sources. It also aims to chart insiders’ and analysts’ opinions and expectations of 
the new regulation in order to clarify what to expect from the regulatory change and how to adapt to it.  
 
1.4. Delimitation 
The focus of this study is the Swedish market. It covers insider trading and analysts’ recommendations of 
all firms listed on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm during the time period of 2011 to 2013. 
 
1.5. Study Outline 
The second section of this study covers the theoretical frame of reference, where focus is on traditional 
and behavioural theories of corporate finance. In addition, the hypotheses of this study, formed by 
previous research, are presented here. 
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In the third section, the methodology section, the research approach and research population are 
presented. The data collection is explained and excluded observations are reported and motivated. This is 
followed by a presentation and motivation of the method and the regressions used. The section ends 
with a discussion on the validity and reliability of the methodology.   
 
Section four presents and evaluates the results of the performed regressions and the survey. The results 
are presented in separate size groups in the following order: large cap, mid cap and small cap.  
 
The fifth section contains the analysis of the results with regard to their informativeness and in the light 
of theories and earlier research within the area. The results are also discussed with regard to the eased 
regulation on quarterly reports in Sweden. 
 
In the last section, section six, the results of this study are summarised and the final conclusions from 
this study are presented. Proposals to further research are also given. 
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2. THEORETICAL FRAME OF REFERENCE 
This section starts with a description of the differences and influences of corporate governance and 
covers relevant theories within traditional and behavioural corporate finance. Finally, previous empirical 
findings and the hypotheses are presented.  
 
2.1. Corporate Governance 
Almost all other studies found investigating the informativeness of analysts’ recommendations and 
insider trading are concentrated to the American market (Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski, 2010; Wu and 
Zhu, 2011; Ravina and Sapienza, 2009; Hsieh, Ng and Wang, 2005; Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser, 2003; 
Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). Several features distinguish Sweden from America, which may have an 
impact on the informativeness of the markets respectively. The regulatory disparities are summarised in 
Appendix A.1, but what is argued to be the dominating differencing feature in regard to the transparency 
and informativeness of insider trades and analysts’ recommendations is the corporate governance 
systems.  
 
The American and British market is characterised by a common law legal system, whereas Sweden is a 
civil law origin country. As proved by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Schleifer (2008), legal rules and 
legal origins in terms of common law or civil law do matter for the corporate governance structure in a 
country, which in turn influence several factors such as insider trading, shareholder protection, 
ownership control et cetera. Hence, it is not optimal for civil law countries to directly apply findings of 
studies conducted in common law countries or to have the British model of financial reporting as a 
paragon (Lekvall, 2014). Common law countries are characterised by high investor and shareholder 
protection and low ownership concentration, giving the country a strong corporate governance function, 
while civil law countries are defined by the opposite (Lekvall, 2014; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Schleifer, 2008). A high ownership concentration implicates that few but large owners hold most of a 
firms’ shares, which reduces the market transparency in civil law countries (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes 
and Schleifer, 2008; Bushman, Piotroski and Smith, 2003).  
 
Disparities in the board systems potentially also affect the findings of informativeness of insider trading. 
Common law countries allow managers on board and accept CEO duality, whereas civil law origin 
countries like Sweden and Denmark do not (Lekvall, 2014; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Schleifer, 
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2008). Inferring that managers in America and Great Britain potentially are more informed about the 
future of their company than Swedish managers, hence American and British insiders’ trades could be 
more informative and profitable to mimic.  
 
Corporate governance has by earlier research been demonstrated to affect the informativeness in insider 
trading. Fidrmuc, Korczak and Korczac (2010) find evidence that good corporate governance 
contributes to price informativeness, because stronger investor protection improves the incorporation of 
information into stock prices and that stocks in these countries thereby reflect the fundamental value of 
the firms better. Their results are in line with the theory of Verrecchia (2001), that the positive 
relationship between investor protection and information content of insider trading comes from stronger 
and more precise signals. In countries with weaker corporate governance functions insiders are also able 
to make higher returns than those in countries with stronger. The market reaction is on the other hand 
greater to insider trading in strong corporate governance markets, than in weak ones (Fidrmuc, Korczak 
and Korczak, 2010; Ravina and Sapienza, 2009). Civil law origin countries like Sweden and Denmark 
thereby lack the market functions that can improve market transparency and facilitate information 
sharing (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Schleifer, 2008). Prior research has found that there is a positive 
relationship between the quality of information systems and transparency, implying that high quality 
financial reporting leads to a better transparency (Bushman, Piotroski and Smith, 2003).  
 
2.2. Traditional and Behavioural Finance Theory 
Most previous research within corporate finance is based on traditional finance theory and thus 
assumptions that market participants such as investors, analysts and insiders are fully rational and 
accordingly their preferences, expectations and behaviour. Investors are assumed to develop unbiased 
forecasts and to make decisions that serve in their best logical interest. This means that according to 
traditional finance theory, markets are assumed to be efficient (Baker and Wurgler, 2013). Behavioural 
finance theory is an approach that has become academically recognized just in recent years, finding 
evidence for market participants acting more irrationally and causing opportunistic mispricings in the 
market. Behavioural corporate finance therefore suggests the market to be inefficient (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2013; Shefrin, 2000).  
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2.2.1. Market efficiency 
The efficient market hypothesis was introduced by Fama (1970) and concludes that unexploited 
investment opportunities are directly incorporated into the market, hence mispricings do not hold for 
long. Implying that investors cannot rationally expect to make abnormal returns by exploiting such 
opportunities arising from differences in information. The only way a rational investor can expect 
abnormal returns according to traditional theory is to take on more systematic risk.  
 
Robert Merton is another recognized name within the field of market efficiency. In his study from 1987, 
Merton describes many different ways of unthreading the signs of market inefficiency; one way is to see 
whether professionals with an information advantage consistently manage to beat the market. If strong 
market efficiency holds and mispricings do not exist, then the analysts’ stock recommendations ought to 
be worthless, implying one of the major services brokerage firms and banks offer would be useless. 
Merton (1987) finds that the brokerage firms indeed have proven to beat the market, which indicates 
them to be better informed than the market. However, the results consist a lot of noise. Merton’s 
findings suggest markets to be inefficient, with mispricings and information gaps that can be used in 
order to make abnormal returns. The traditional finance theory would explain these opportunistic 
mispricings to simply be a consequence of analysts recommending riskier stocks in terms of beta, size 
and price-to-book ratios, whereas a behaviourists would reason that those mispricings arise from 
irrational investor behaviour (Shefrin, 2000). The uncertainty of whether the market is efficiency or not 
allows for a discussion between behaviourists and traditionalists about the market anomalies presented in 
the next paragraphs.  
 
2.2.2. Post-earnings-announcement-drift 
A common anomaly found on the market is the post-earnings-announcement-drift, which is a post 
reaction to earnings announcements, causing a drift in prices (Michaely, Thaler and Womack, 1995). 
Several different theories explaining the post-earnings-announcement drift have been publicised. Daniel, 
Hirschleifer and Subrahamanyam (1998) suggest overconfidence about the precision of private 
information and self-attribution error among investors and analysts to be two explanations to the drift. 
They conclude that if investors and analysts are overconfident about their ability to forecast abnormal 
returns in combination with self-attribution error, they will underestimate their forecast errors. It will also 
lead investors and analysts to underreact to information obtained from public sources and overreact to 
private information or analyses they come up with on their own. But, as more public information 
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becomes available, their recommendations will adjust closer towards a price reflecting the information. 
Stock price will in other words reflect overreactions to private information and underreactions to public 
information.  News of insider trades is similar to news of earnings or news of analysts’ 
recommendations, hence a drift in stock prices can be expected following insider trades as well. 
 
Momentum and winner-loser effect are two other potential explanations to the drift. Shefrin (2007, 2000) 
states that post-earnings-announcement-drift features the anomaly momentum with a continuing stock 
price drift for a year, to be followed by a reversal after that year, called winner-loser effect. Momentum 
and winner-loser effect will be discussed more thoroughly in the next two paragraphs. 
 
2.2.3. Momentum 
The momentum effect refers to the fact that short-term winners, in terms of stock price, are likely to 
continue being short-term winners and short-term losers to continue being short-term losers. Therefore 
investors can expect yielding higher returns by adopting a short-term strategy of buying recent winners 
(Shefrin, 2007). Jegadeesh and Titman (2001, 1993) find the effect to be strongest when using prior six-
month returns to forecast the returns of the upcoming six-month. The results show that half the excess 
returns of those past winners and losers dissolve within the following two years, and cannot be described 
only by delayed stock price reactions (Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001, 1993).  
 
Behaviourists have several explanations to the momentum effect. It could be caused and boosted by 
analysts and investors underreacting to new information or by investors being overconfident in their 
investments and assuming recent profitable stock performance to persist (Shefrin, 2007; Jegadeesh and 
Titman, 1993). Relying too much upon past trends when creating forecasts cause biased expectations 
about the future stock movements as the stock performance follows a random walk, one should 
therefore not be able to predict the future based on past performance. The tendency to rely excessively 
on recent information is referred to as extrapolation bias or hot-hand-fallacy. Investors who are victims 
of the hot-hand-fallacy are also exposed to the closely related bias called gamblers’ fallacy, which is the 
tendency to rely on inaccurate probabilities. Hot-hand fallacy thereby leads to gambler’s fallacy and 
causes people to make biased decisions, which in turn causes market anomalies such as the momentum 
effect (Rabin and Vayanos, 2009). Traditionalists, on the other hand, view momentum to simply be an 
effect of short-term winners being riskier than short-term losers (Shefrin, 2007).  
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2.2.4. The Winner-Loser effect 
The winner-loser effect refers to a reversal of past losers outperforming past winners in the long run and 
vice versa, in contrast to the short-term anomaly momentum. The winner-loser effect originates from the 
findings of De Bondt and Thaler (1987, 1985), who find that over a three to five year period, stocks that 
have performed poorly over the prior three to five years generate higher return than those that 
performed well in the same prior horizon. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find that the winner-loser effect 
holds in a shorter time horizon of one year as well. Their results show that past winners realize higher 
returns around the earnings announcement in seven months than past losers, but that in the following 
thirteen months past losers realize higher returns than the past winners. This finding suggests a 
contrarian trading strategy of buying past losers and selling recent winners to be profitable.  
 
A behaviourist’s explanation to the winner-loser effect is that investors overreact to prior earnings, 
causing past losers to be undervalued by the market and past winners to be overvalued, facilitating for 
past losers to beat market expectations and yield abnormal returns in the long run (Shefrin, 2007, 2000). 
The traditionalists, however, claim that the winner-loser effect reflects differential risk and that past 
losers are more risky and should therefore also yield a higher return. The argument of traditionalists is 
statistically proven true by the Fama-French Three Factor Model (Shefrin, 2007).  
 
2.2.5. Information asymmetries 
Information asymmetries arise when insiders and other market participants, such as investors and 
analysts, do not possess the same amount of information. This asymmetry does in turn lead to agency 
and adverse selection problems creating an uncertainty among investors, which produces an 
unwillingness to invest and trade, resulting in market illiquidity (Admati and Pfleiderer, 2000). Agency 
problems originate from a conflict of interests in the relationship between the firms’ management (agent) 
and their stockholders (principal). Information asymmetries lead to difficulties for the principal to 
determinate whether the agent is acting in the principal’s interest, as the principal lacks information about 
the agent’s motive. Adverse selection problems arise from the fact that an investor find it hard to 
differentiate “good stocks”, generating high returns, from “bad stocks”, generating low returns, due to 
lack of information concerning the firms financial wealth and future outlooks. The financial reports 
reduce the information asymmetries and the information gap between management and shareholders 
(Healy and K. Palepu, 2001). As a reduction in information asymmetry leads to an increased transparency 
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(Forssbæck and Oxelheim, 2014), the eased regulation being utilised could decrease the transparency on 
the Swedish market.  
 
2.2.6. Signalling  
The theory of Akerlof (1970), emphasizing the problem of separating cherries from lemons, is often 
applied on the stock market. It states that in order for a firm to separate itself from the “bad” stocks, 
firms consequently take actions to signal them being a “good” stock. Dividends, share repurchases and 
issuance of new shares are some examples of signalling actions. Insider trading is another (Gelb, 2000). 
Although it is illegal in Sweden for insiders to trade with the purpose to manipulate the market, it cannot 
be ignored that any trading by an insider, theoretically, do has some signalling value as it is a decision 
based on superior information.  
 
Nevertheless, investors have reasons to doubt the signals of insider transactions. Firstly, insiders could 
have incentives to buy just to signal positive outlooks, and investors will not know whether a certain 
transaction is based on such signalling motive or on pure expectations of the company’s future. 
Secondly, insiders are commonly argued to suffer from biases in their decision to trade. For example, 
according to a survey performed by Financial Executives International and Baruch College, The City 
University of New York in 2013, there is evidence that insiders, just as investors, may be victims of the 
hot-hand fallacy. Furthermore, the survey suggests the majority of the participating executives to be 
overconfident and affected by representativeness. Representativeness implicate that insiders, in their 
decision-making, question whether an object is representative for the entire area to which it belongs, in 
other words applying rules of thumb. Neither rules of thumb nor overconfidence are good features when 
making future stock predictions or forecasting, as it leads to biased decisions. In turn, insiders’ biased 
decisions leads to irrational investments, sending the market wrongful signals. Overconfidence also often 
causes insiders to overreact to market fluctuations, by becoming very optimistic when the market is 
going up, and very pessimistic when the market is going down.  
 
Analysts additionally constantly signal their market expectations through their stock recommendations, 
but they are also affected by biases causing inefficiencies in the markets. One bias is what Shefrin (2000) 
refers to as the recommendation game, implying that analysts do not always mean what they say. A 
recommendation of hold could actually mean sell and a recommendation of buy could actually mean 
hold. A vast selection of reasons for analysts not sending the right signal are discussed under paragraph 
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2.3.2., but the bias implicates that investors would not obtain the underlying message signalled by the 
analysts, which causes mispricings in the market.  
 
2.2.7. Herding in stock markets 
Herding is a behavioural phenomenon where people mimic others when trading, making the stock 
increase or decrease in a way that does not merely reflect the available information, leading to 
inefficiencies in the market structure. Cipriani and Guarino (2012) have through their research concluded 
that on average on a day where public information such as quarterly reports are released two per cent of 
informed traders8 herd-buy or herd-sell. Furthermore they have found that in seven per cent of the days 
that information were released more than ten per cent of the increase/decrease could be related to herd-
trading, in total approximately four per cent of the movements in stock prices could be linked to herd-
trading (Cipriani and Guarino, 2012). Herding may thereby cause insiders and analysts to rely too much 
upon each other, leading to biased recommendations and trading strategies if these are not accurate. 
Conversely, in the study by Wall Street Journal and Zacks Investment Research (1997) no strong herding 
behaviour in brokerage houses’ recommendations can be found. In fact, the results show the opposite, as 
only a trickle of the 300 stocks recommended were consistently recommended by all (Shefrin, 2000).  
 
2.2.8. Analysts and insiders expect the opposite trade-off between risk and 
return 
Investors’, insiders’ and analysts’ attitudes towards risk do also affect their investment decisions. The 
traditional approach to risk and return is that investors are risk averse and therefore require 
compensation for the increased systematic risk they take on when holding riskier securities. The risk 
premium required is according to the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) the security’s beta deducted by 
the market risk. CAPM is a recognised method to measure the expected return but uses only one single 
factor to measure risk, the market risk premium. The Fama-French Three Factor Model is another more 
complex recognised measure that incorporates more factors to measure the firm specific risk. The risk is 
argued to increase the more sensitive the stock is to market movements, the smaller the firm size is or 
the more the stock behaves as a small-firm stock, and the higher the book-to-market is (Ogden, Jen and 
O’Connor, 2003). The relationship between risk and return is in other words positive according to both 
CAPM and the Fama-French Three Factor Model; when an investor takes on more risk, he or she can 
                                                
8 An investor trading on private information 
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then expect a higher return (Shefrin, 2007). Contrarious, earlier findings prove investors tend to favour 
large and liquid stocks and are consistently found to expect large value-stocks to outperform small 
growth-stocks (Gilbert, Tourani-Rad and Wisniewski, 2005).  
 
Insiders are, as well as investors, found to rely more on representativeness in the sense that they expect 
stocks of “good” companies, also called value-stocks, to yield the highest return. Inferring that insiders 
and investors expect the relationship between risk and return to be negative (Shefrin, 2007) and hence 
suffer from extrapolation bias (Rabin and Vayanos, 2009). Analysts, on the other hand, are argued to be 
more rational as they expect the relationship to be positive, in line with the traditional approach. They 
expect small-capitalisation stocks, or stocks behaving like them, to yield higher return than large-
capitalisation stocks in the long-term investment horizon. They also expect growth stocks to earn a 
higher return than value stocks (Shefrin, 2007). 
 
2.3. Earlier Empirical Findings 
2.3.1. Insiders and analysts influencing each other 
In order for this study to investigate whether insider trading or analysts’ recommendation could be 
considered alternative sources of information to quarterly reports, it is central to explore if they influence 
each other. Previous research conducted on the global and the American market infers that they do (Jin, 
Livnat and Zhang, 2013; Ravina and Sapienza, 2009; Hsieh, Ng and Wang, 2005; Pioroski and 
Roulestone, 2005). If similar evidence is found on the Swedish market, the potential of them being 
separate substitutes to quarterly reports partially diminish.   
 
The implication with analysts and insiders influencing each other is twofold. Firstly, analysts can choose 
which firms to follow, whereas insider trading by definition is bound to trades of a certain stock. As 
analysts tend to favour “glamour” stocks, in essence positive momentum, high growth, high volume, and 
relatively expensive and stocks from large and liquid firms (Gilbert, Tourani-Rad and Wisniewski, 2005; 
Jegadeesh et al., 2004; Lang and Lundholm, 1996), the analyst coverage of firms is not equally distributed 
in relation to insider trades. This implicates that a potential correlation between insiders and analysts will 
only concern some stocks. Secondly, if they depend on each other, analysts’ recommendations are not 
solely based on the analysts’ fundamental analysis of reports and meetings, and insiders’ trades are not 
solely based on the insiders’ expectations about the future performance. It is hence more problematic to 
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interpret the signals of the two actions separately. This reasoning form the basis of the two first 
hypotheses: 
 
H1: Insiders consider analysts’ recommendations in making their decision to trade 
H2: Analysts consider how insiders trade in making their recommendations  
 
2.3.1. The informativeness of insider trading 
Prior research conducted on the area of informativeness of insider trading solely show mixed results. 
Some find opportunistic insiders’ trades to be more informative than routine insiders’ trades9, some that 
insider trades are informative but not profitable and some discover insider trading to be both informative 
and profitable (Wu and Zhu, 2011; Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski, 2010; Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser, 
2003; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). Much of the uncertainty in insider trades’ informativeness originates 
from the ambiguity in insiders’ motives to trade. According to previous studies, insider trading could be 
done in favour of their own personal gains, to signal to the market their future expectations or to 
minimize effects of negative recommendations of the firm’s stock. For example, research has found that 
if an article or stock recommendation is published foreseeing future bad sales of a firm, insiders will 
conversely buy their own stock to minimize the negative publicity and to signal positive future 
expectations (Pioroski and Roulestone, 2005; Hsieh, Ng and Wang, 2005). As many insiders receive a 
large portion of ownership through stock grant programs, stockholdings are often an essential part of 
their wealth and salary. Hence, insiders have a great incentive to engage in signalling (Cohen, Malloy and 
Pomorski, 2010). If people, as Shefrin (2007) suggests, react stronger to negative news than to positive, it 
would give insiders a more legit reason to purchase as a response to negative analysts’ recommendations 
to smooth out the negative effects of such recommendations.  
 
The ambiguous motives make it hard for investors to interpret insider trade as informative or not. For 
that reason, earlier findings have found the informativeness to be lower in insider trades in comparison 
to analysts’ recommendations, among with stricter regulation on insider trading (Hsieh, Ng and Wang, 
2005). In line with this, Lakonishok and Lee (2001) conclude that the market seems to ignore 
information about insider trades, as there are very little actions around these trades. Regardless insiders’ 
motive to trade, there is clear evidence that insiders are able to time the market using a contrarian trading 
                                                
9 Insiders are classified as routine or opportunistic by Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski (2010) depending on their past trading history. Insiders 
that trade with a pattern are defined as routine insiders and all other insiders as opportunistic. 
- Is the transparency of the Swedish stock market at risk? -  
 23 
model (Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser, 2003), implying that insider trading do contain some valuable 
information. Ravina and Sapienza (2009) furthermore discover evidence of insiders having an ability to 
time the market and make abnormal profits not only explained by simple contradictory models of 
trading. They find that insiders with more information yield higher returns than those with less 
information, and hence draw the conclusion that the superior and private information insiders trade on 
actually contains valuable information. Insider buys are in most prior studies found to be more 
informative than insider sells (Wu and Zhu, 2011; Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski, 2010; Hsieh, Ng and 
Wang, 2005; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001) but the abnormal returns followed by insider stock purchases 
are not found to be especially significant due to transaction costs (Lorie and Niederhoffer, 1968; Seyhun, 
1986; Rozeff and Zaman, 1988, Lin and Howe, 1990).  
 
Similarly to this study, Wu and Zhu (2011) investigate the effects of a regulatory change on 
informativeness of insider trading, but on the American market. They establish that insider trades are 
more informative when firms are less transparent, reporting is timelier, media attention is lower and the 
perceived risk litigation is reduced. As they in addition find opportunistic insiders’ trades10 to be more 
informative than routine insiders’ trades, the conclusion is drawn that insiders do trade on superior 
private information. Eckbo and Smith (1998) find insiders on Oslo Stock Exchange to generate zero 
abnormal returns, in some cases even negative abnormal returns. They use a different method than the 
American researchers, which might impact their findings. It could also be a result of differences in 
corporate governance. Whether insider trading is informative or not on the Swedish market is yet 
unknown, leading up to the third and fourth hypotheses of this study. 
 
H3: Insider buys are informative 
H4: Insider sells are informative 
 
2.3.2. The informativeness of analysts’ recommendations 
The role analysts have as financial intermediaries in the market is very important (Cragg and Malkiel, 
1968). Analysts are often viewed as experts and therefore have a certain status when it comes to 
investment predictions, which makes them influential market participants, as people tend to value their 
advice more (Driskell and Mullen, 1990). Their two key contributions to the market in terms of 
information sharing are earnings forecasts and stock recommendations (Loh and Mian, 2006). 
                                                
10 Wu and Zhu use the same classification of routine and opportunistic insiders as Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski (2010).  
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Several studies concerning the informativeness and profitability of following analysts’ recommendations 
can be found, but the results are diverse (Womack, 1996). The same uncertainty concerning the 
underlying motive as discussed for insiders can be applied on analysts. The ambiguity of whether analysts 
engage in signalling or not, stems from research indicating that analysts are more prone to present 
positive recommendations than negative. Stanislawek (2012) has in his study measured the amount of 
positive recommendations published by analysts globally and concluded that almost 50 per cent are 
positive, 39 per cent neutral and only 12 per cent negative between the years of 2001 to 2012.  
 
Stanislawek (2012) presents some potential explanations to the domination of positive recommendations 
made by analysts working for investment banks. Equity markets generally tend to rise and companies 
expand in the long run, in consideration of such market factors it does not seem unreasonable to have 
more positive recommendations. He also points out that even if research departments in a bank officially 
must be independent from other departments, analysts working for banks might still be more likely to 
present a positive than negative recommendation when in doubt because it would more likely award the 
bank with a corporate mandate. A negative recommendation might also limit the analysts’ access to the 
important management meetings, if management as a response is unwilling to share information with the 
analyst.  
  
“(W)hen there’s an investment banking relationship, the analysts’ activities are almost always more optimistic than their 
fellow analysts. - Edward Keon, past editor of I/B/E/S Innovator, in an appearance with Wall Street Week 
with Louis Rukeyser on August the 1st 1997 (Shefrin, 2000).  
 
No statistical significant relevance of analysts’ recommendations in terms of stock performance is found 
in the study of Stanislawek (2012), but he points out the possibility of them being useful components to 
incorporate into a broader investment strategy. In line with this, Hall and Tacon (2010) conclude 
investors are unable to generate abnormal returns in following analysts’ recommendations. Their results 
are supported by other studies, arguing that analysts’ recommendations are based on ad hoc heuristic 
valuation models rather than fundamental analysis (Shefrin, 2007; Bradshaw, 2004; Jegadeesh et al., 2004; 
Cornell, 2001). On the contrary, Barber et al. (2001) show that investors are able to generate annual 
abnormal returns slightly above nine per cent in following stock recommendations, with the investment 
strategy to invest in stocks that has gotten a strong recommendation, indicating strong recommendations 
to be informative.  
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Previous research reveal that the informativeness in analysts’ recommendations differ depending on 
which analyst that gives the recommendation and whether the investors receive the recommendation 
prior or not to it becoming public. Loh and Mian (2006) find in their study that better ranked analysts 
have better earnings forecasts and more profitable stock recommendations, which is supported by 
Stickel’s (1995) findings that recommendations from brokerage houses with better reputation have a 
larger impact on stock prices. Green (2006) find that large abnormal returns at around 30 per cent could 
be expected by investors acting on subscribed recommendations, meaning private information is more 
profitable than public one. The available prior studies are primarily concentrated to the American market 
and hence it is yet unknown whether analysts’ recommendations of Swedish stocks are informative, 
resulting in the fifth and sixth hypotheses:  
 
H5:  Analysts’ buy recommendations are informative 
H6:  Analysts’ sell recommendations are informative 
 
 
2.3.4. Summary of hypotheses 
Hypothesis Relevant previous research 
H1: 
 
Insiders consider analysts’ recommendations in 
making their decision to trade 
 
Jin, Livnat and Zhang (2013), Ravina and Sapienza (2009), 
Pioroski and Roulstone (2005), Hsieh, Ng and Wang (2005) 
H2: Analysts consider how insiders trade in making 
their recommendations 
      
H3: Insider buys are informative Jin, Livnat and Zhang (2013), Wu and Zhu (2011), Cohen, Malloy 
and Pomorski (2010), Fidrmuc, Korczak and Korczak (2010), 
Hsieh, Ng and Wang (2005), Pioroski and Roulstone (2005), Jeng, 
Metrick and Zeckhauser (2003), Lakonishok and Lee (2001), 
Eckbo and Smith (1998), Rozeff and Zaman (1988), Lorie and 
Niederhoffer (1968) 
H4: Insider sells are informative 
      
H5: Analysts’ buy recommendations are informative 
Jin, Livnat and Zhang (2013), Stanislawek (2012), Hall and Tacon 
(2010), Loh and Mian (2006), Green (2006), Gilbert, Tourani-Rad 
and Wisniewski (2005), Jegadeesh et al. (2004), Bradshaw (2004), 
Cornell (2001), Barber et al. (2001), Lang and Lundholm (1996), 
Womack (1996), Stickel (1995), Driskell and Mullen (1990), Cragg 
and Malkiel (1968) 
H6: Analysts’ sell recommendations are informative 
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3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION 
In the methodology section, the research approach and population is presented. The data collection is 
explained and excluded observations reported and motivated. This follows by a presentation and 
motivation of the method and the regressions used in the analyses. The section ends with a discussion on 
the validity and reliability of the methodology.   
 
3.1. Research approach 
In order to assess whether the transparency is at risk, the methodology aims to empirically investigate 
and evaluate the informativeness in insider trading and analysts’ recommendations and test whether there 
are any connections between the two. The research is performed by the use of quantitative and 
qualitative methods.  
 
3.2. Population 
In order to evaluate the effects between firms of different sizes, find enough data and present results that 
applies to the entire Swedish market, the study investigates an entire population including all firms listed 
on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm during the years of 2011 to 2013. 
 
3.3. Data Collection 
3.3.1.  Primary Data 
The primary data in this study is obtained from two questionnaires, one sent out to analysts following 
stocks listed on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm and one sent to board members and management team 
members who are registered as insiders of firms listed on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm. 198 analysts are 
found to follow stocks listed on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm and all those are asked to answer the 
questionnaire. The number of board members and management team members contacted is 918, which 
are those who are found on respective companies’ webpages. The first questionnaire is answered by 35 
analysts, resulting in an answer ratio of 17,68 per cent. The second questionnaire is answered by 166 
insiders, resulting in an answer ratio of 18,08 per cent. 
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3.3.2  Secondary Data 
Market-to-book ratios, stock prices and market capitalisations at closing date for all stocks in the research 
population are attained from the database Datastream11. Stock prices are measured in SEK and market 
capitalisation in million SEK. The three indices, OMX Stockholm 3012, OMX Stockholm Mid Cap and 
OMX Stockholm Small Cap, used in calculating abnormal returns are also gathered from Datastream. 
The analyst recommendations used in this study are recommendations published on Privata Affärer’s 
website. They gather recommendations from analysts working for a selection of banks and newspapers. 
A summary of the collected recommendations can be found in appendix A.2.1. table 1. This is an 
information source accessible by the general public, an important aspect when studying alternative public 
information sources. The recommendations are given on a scale of five gradients (strong sell, sell, hold, 
buy, strong buy), which are then translated into numbers from one to five, a five being a strong buy.  
 
All legal insider transactions in Sweden are, or should be, recorded by the Swedish Financial Supervisory 
Authority. The data on insider transactions is attained from their publicly available register, a summary of 
the insider transactions collected can be found in appendix A.2.1. table 2. The respective release dates of 
interim and yearly reports for all companies listed at Nasdaq OMX Stockholm have been collected from 
Nasdaq OMX Nordic’s webpage and when these could not be found there, from respective companies’ 
webpages. Altogether, there are 295 stocks, representing 256 firms (as some firms have more than one 
stock listed on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm) being included in this study.  
 
3.3.3. Excluded observations 
Out of the total research population, 76 stocks are excluded because of lack of available data. Either 
information is missing of both insider trading and analyst recommendations on these stocks, or because 
the data provided by Datastream of stock price, market-to-book or market capitalisation were 
insufficient. This result in a sample of 219 stocks included. A complete list of firms included can be 
found in Appendix A.2., a shorter summary in table 3.3.3.1. below.  
 
 
                                                
11 Thomson Reuters Datastream is a professional and commonly used data source, applied by several earlier studies to collect financial 
information. 
12 OMX Stockholm 30, does not cover all firm on large cap, still it is considered the most appropriate index for all firms listed on large cap.  
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Table 3.3.3.1. 
Missing observations Large Cap Mid Cap Small Cap Total 
Total number of shares on market cap 87 91 117 295 
Nr of excluded stocks 24 28 24 76 
Nr of included stocks 63 63 93 219 
Nr of stocks included where information of insider trading is missing 2 4 5 11 
Nr of stocks included where information of analysts' recommendations is missing 2 5 21 28 
 
Information of insider trading within the observed period is missing on 11 stocks included in the sample 
and hence these are excluded in the regressions on informativeness of insider trading. Regarding analysts’ 
recommendations there are 28 stocks within the sample with no found analyst recommendations, thus 
these are excluded from the regressions on analysts’ recommendations. This results in an insider sample 
of 208 stocks and an analyst recommendation sample of 191 stocks. In the cases where firms have 
enlisted on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm within the research period of 2011 to 2013, the firms are excluded 
from the sample because enough data is not found. The shares excluded are spread relatively even in 
relation to total shares on each market cap and are not correlated, hence there is no reason to expect any 
biased affecting the results due to those. 
 
The regressions in this study are only run on ordinary shares, which means that preference shares, call 
options, share option rights et cetera are excluded from the population. Insider trading caused by sales to 
or purchases from endowment insurances are excluded from the sample since the shares then are only 
moved to another savings account belonging to the same owner. In addition, in the total sample of 
insider trading gathered from the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority’s webpage, it is quite often 
insiders sell off an amount of shares just to buy the same amount of shares again on the same day or 
some days after. Such transactions are likely motivated by insiders trying to avoid large tax payments. 
When realizing a profit by selling off shares, investors in Sweden need to tax on these profits. But if the 
investor at the same time realizes a loss, the total tax payment will decrease. Therefore, such sell-and-buy 
transactions occurring within a period of five days are excluded from the sample because they are argued 
to have another motive than the insider’s pure expectation of the future of the company. When 
occurring within a period longer than five days, it cannot for certain be argued that it is just simply 
because of tax avoidance, and hence these transactions are included in the sample. Firms that have 
enlisted or delisted on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm within the research period are excluded from the sample 
because enough data is not found.  
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3.4. Method 
Quantitative method is primarily applied. Regressions are run on the collected data in order to 
statistically test the six hypotheses stated in the theoretical frame of reference section. Firstly, regressions 
are run in order to test whether analysts’ recommendations are affected by insider trading or vice versa. 
Secondly, in assessing whether there is any informativeness of insider trading or analysts’ 
recommendations individually, the abnormal movements in stock prices as a response to the publication 
of analysts’ recommendations or insider trades are measured and evaluated. The questionnaires are sent 
to analysts and insiders in order to attain answers that can support and provide an understanding to the 
regression results. 
 
3.4.1. Regression analysis 
3.4.1.1. Dependent variable 
This study argues, in line with Lakonishok and Lee (2001), that given analysts’ recommendations and 
insider trades are informative and the market is efficient in responding to new information, a reaction to 
insider trading and analyst recommendations should be observed through stock price movements. 
Hence, the dependent variable in the regressions is the abnormal return of stock prices. The abnormal 
return is used to eliminate stock movements caused by macro economic factors or general industry 
movements. The abnormal return is calculated by subtracting the movement in the relevant index from 
the stock price movement and the relevant index is chosen depending on which market cap the 
companies in question are listed on. Small cap stock returns are subtracted by the returns of OMX 
Stockholm Small Cap index and mid cap stock returns are subtracted by OMX Stockholm Mid Cap 
index.  Large cap stock are subtracted by OMX Stockholm 30 index, as this is considered the most 
appropriate index available.  
 
The abnormal return is measured as the change in stock price since last quarterly report was published 
(quarterly abnormal return), since last two reports were published (half-year abnormal return), since last 
four quarterly reports were published (annual abnormal return) and finally since the last eight quarterly 
reports (two-years abnormal return). There are several reasons for measuring abnormal return in 
different time horizons. Firstly, analysts and insiders have different time horizons when forming their 
recommendations and investments. The informativeness of those is therefore expected to be observed 
through changes in stock prices at different times. Secondly, as discussed in the theory section, investors 
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sometimes react slower to news, causing a drift in market reaction and stock price movement. As it is yet 
uncertain whether a drift in market reaction is expected, running the regressions on different time 
horizons capture this potential anomaly. Thirdly, using abnormal return as dependent variable could raise 
complications, as stock prices are volatile and can vary from day to day. As the abnormal return is 
measured simply as a change in stock price from one day to another, the stock movements occurring 
within the reporting periods are ignored and important information could be lost. Measuring the returns 
in different time horizons alleviates these complications.  
  
ARri = the abnormal return on stock i since last quarterly report r  (a quarter) 
ARHYi = the abnormal return on stock i since two quarterly reports ago (half year) 
AR1Yi = the abnormal return on stock i since four quarterly reports (one year) 
AR2Yi = the abnormal return on stock i since eight quarterly reports (two years) 
 
(ARi = change in stock price – change in index) 
 
The choice to study insider trading and analysts’ recommendations occurring within the periods of one 
quarterly report being published to another, is motivated by the study’s aim to investigate any potential 
effect fewer reports might have on the transparency. Furthermore, as insiders are not allowed to legally 
trade until one day after those are published, it would be unwise to test for informativeness of insider 
trading occurring within other periods.  
 
3.4.1.2. Control variables  
In order to eliminate fluctuations in stock prices that are results of firm characteristics rather than insider 
trading and analysts’ recommendations, four control variables are included in the regression (firm size, 
momentum, winner-loser effect and market-to-book ratio). The Fama-French Three Factor Model is a 
recognised measure that incorporates factors to measure the firm specific risk. The risk is argued to 
increase the more sensitive the stock is to market movements, the smaller the firm size is or the more the 
stock behaves as a small-firm stock, and the higher the book-to-market is (Ogden, Jen and O’Connor, 
2003). Firm size (measured as market capitalisation) and market-to-book13 are used in the regression to 
capture such potential influences and to eliminate the abnormal return explained by the increased risk as 
argued by Fama French Three Factor Model. If the data is not normally distributed, this may cause biased 
                                                
13 Please note that market-to-book ratio is the reverse ratio used in Fama French Three Factor Model, meaning that a lower market-to-book is 
expected to increase the risk 
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results; therefore the natural logarithm is taken of market-to-book and market capitalisation to minimize 
extreme values.  
 
Insiders and analysts are sometimes found to make profits due to the market anomalies momentum and 
winner-loser effect (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). In examining whether insider trading and analysts’ 
recommendations are informative, it is important to adjust for this potential contrarian trading strategy, 
as it is not actually built upon financial information (Lakonischok and Lee, 2001). Therefore, control 
variables are included to capture these anomalies in the regression. Not considering and make 
adjustments to this in analysing insiders’ and analysts’ abilities to predict the market would substantially 
overstate their ability to beat the market (Lakonischok and Lee, 2001). Momentum is measured in 
percentage as the change in stock price from the date when the second last report was published to the 
current report date, capturing the past half-year return. Winner-loser effect is measured in percentage as 
the change in stock price from the report date one year ago to the current report date, capturing the past 
return in one year. In order to purify the effects of momentum and winner-loser from macro economic 
factors, the changes in respective market indices are subtracted from the stock price in these variables as 
well, resulting in an abnormal momentum and winner-loser effect to be used in the regressions. 
 
LMBRi = ln (market-to-book Ratio) 
LSIZEi = ln (market capitalisation in million SEK) 
ABRMOMi = abnormal return in the prior 6 months measured in percentages (momentum) 
ABRWLi = abnormal return in the prior one year, measured in percentages (winner-loser effect) 
 
3.4.1.3. Explanatory variables 
Insider trading and the analysts’ recommendations are captured through the two explanatory variables, 
Net Purchase Ratio (NPR) and Net Buy Recommendation (NBR).  
 
Measure of insider trading:  
NPRi = (Volume of shares bought within the quarter – Volume of shares sold within the quarter) / Total 
volume of shares traded within the quarter 
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Measure of analysts’ recommendation: 
NBRi = (Number of buy recommendations within the quarter - Number of sell recommendations within 
the quarter) / Total number of recommendations within the quarter14 
 
3.4.1.4. Dummy variables for strong signals 
A larger amount of shares bought or sold by insiders, as well as a larger amount of insiders buying or 
selling, are considered to send stronger signals to the market than regular buys. Therefore, dummies are 
included in the regressions to capture such strong signals. A detailed description can be found in the 
tables below (3.4.1.4.1. to 3.4.1.4.3.).  The same reasoning concerns analysts’ recommendations. A strong 
buy or strong sell recommendation, as well as more analysts recommending buy or sell, is considered to 
send a stronger signal to the market. Therefore, two dummies are included in the regressions to capture 
such strong sell and buy signals, specified in the tables below (3.4.1.4.4. to 3.4.1.4.6.). 
 
Table 3.4.1.4.1. Large Cap Dummies Insider Trading 
Dummy Stands for Top per cent Takes on a number of 1 if: 
SDVB Strong Dummy 
Volume Buy 
25 %  More than 53 000 number of shares are bought per quarter 
SDVS Strong Dummy 
Volume Sell 
25 %  More than 113 100 number of shares are sold per quarter 
SDNIB Strong Dummy 
Number of 
Insiders Buying 
18 %15 4 insiders or more are buying within the quarter 
SDNIS Strong Dummy 
Number of 
Insiders Selling 
25 % 3 insiders or more are selling within the quarter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
14 The total number of recommendations include hold recommendations 
15 25 % were in the middle of 3 and 4 number of different insiders buying, in the top 18 % 4 insiders or more are buying 
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Table 3.4.1.4.2. Mid Cap Dummies Insider Trading 
Dummy Stands for Top per cent Takes on a number of 1 if: 
SDVB Strong Dummy 
Volume Buy 
25 %  More than 69 000 number of shares are bought per quarter 
SDVS Strong Dummy 
Volume Sell 
25 %  More than 109 000 number of shares are sold per quarter 
SDNIB Strong Dummy 
Number of 
Insiders Buying 
18 % 17 4 insiders or more are buying within the quarter 
SDNIS Strong Dummy 
Number of 
Insiders Selling 
17 %16 3 insiders or more are selling within the quarter 
 
Table 3.4.1.4.3. Small Cap Dummies Insider Trading 
Dummy Stands for Top per cent Takes on a number of 1 if: 
SDVB Strong Dummy 
Volume Buy 
25 %  More than 100 000 number of shares are bought per quarter 
SDVS Strong Dummy 
Volume Sell 
25 %  More than 100 000 number of shares are sold per quarter 
SDNIB Strong Dummy 
Number of 
Insiders Buying 
23,7 % 17 3 insiders or more are buying within the quarter 
SDNIS Strong Dummy 
Number of 
Insiders Selling 
8,2 %18 3 insiders or more are selling within the quarter 
 
Table 3.4.1.4.4. Large Cap Dummies Analysts’ Recommendations 
Dummy Stands for Top per cent Takes on a number of 1 if: 
DSSA Dummy Strong 
Sell Analysts’ 
25 %  The recommendation is a one (strong sell) and/or the stock has two or more 
sell recommendations 
DSBA Dummy Strong 
Buy Analysts’ 
22,5% 19 The recommendation is a five (strong buy) and/or the stock has four or more 
buy recommendations 
 
Table 3.4.1.4.5. Mid Cap Dummies Analysts’ Recommendations 
Dummy Stands for Top per cent Takes on a number of 1 if: 
DSSA Dummy Strong 
Sell Analysts’ 
25 %  The recommendation is a one (strong sell) and/or the stock has two or more 
sell recommendations 
DSBA Dummy Strong 
Buy Analysts’ 
21,8 %20  The recommendation is a five (strong buy) and/or the stock has three or 
more buy recommendations 
                                                
16 25 % were in the middle of 3 and 4 number of different insiders selling, in the top 17 % 3 insiders or more are selling 
17 25 % were in the middle of 3 and 4 number of different insiders buying, in the top 23,7 % 3 insiders or more are buying 
18 25 % were in the middle of 3 and 4 number of different insiders selling, in the top 8,2 % 3 insiders or more are selling 
19 25 % were in the middle of 4 and 5 number of analysts recommending buy, in the top 22,5 % 4 analysts or more recommend buy 
20 25 % were in the middle of 3 and 4 number of analysts recommending buy, in the top 21,8 % 3 analysts or more recommend buy 
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Table 3.4.1.4.6. Small Cap Dummies Analysts’ Recommendations 
Dummy Stands for Top per cent Takes on a number of 1 if: 
DSSA Dummy Strong 
Sell Analysts’ 
24,6 % 21 The recommendation is a one (strong sell) and/or the stock has two or more 
sell recommendations 
DSBA Dummy Strong 
Buy Analysts’ 
25 %  The recommendation is a five (strong buy) and/or the stock has two or more 
buy recommendations 
 
3.4.1.5. Size groups 
The results of earlier conducted studies on insiders’ and analysts’ abilities to predict future stock 
movements have differed among firms of different size (Wu and Zhu, 2011; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). 
Therefore, the sample firms are divided into three different groups that correspond to whether the firms 
are listed on small cap, mid cap or large cap.  
 
3.4.1.6.  Regression formulas  
Analysts’ recommendations run individually: 
ARri = α1 + β1LMBRi + β2LSIZEi + β3ABRMOMi + β4ABRWLi  
+ β5NBRi + β6DSBAi + β7DSSAi 
 
ARHYi = α1 + β1LMBRi + β2LSIZEi + β3ABRMOMi + β4ABRWLi  
+ β5NBRi + β6DSBAi + β7DSSAi 
 
AR1Yi = α1 + β1LMBRi + β2LSIZEi + β3ABRMOMi + β4ABRWLi  
+ β5NBRi + β6DSBAi + β7DSSAi 
 
AR2Yi = α1 + β1LMBRi + β2LSIZEi + β3ABRMOMi + β4ABRWLi  
+ β5NBRi + β6DSBAi + β7DSSAi 
 
 
Insider trading run individually: 
ARri = α1 + β1LMBRi + β2LSIZEi + β3ABRMOMi + β4ABRWLi  
+ β5NPRi + β6SDVBi + β7SDVSi + β8SDNIBi + β9SDNISi 
 
ARHYi = α1 + β1LMBRi + β2LSIZEi + β3ABRMOMi + β4ABRWLi  
+ β5NPRi + β6SDVBi + β7SDVSi + β8SDNIBi + β9SDNISi 
                                                
21 25 % were in the middle of 2 and 3 number of analysts recommending sell, in the top 24,6 % 2 analysts or more recommend sell 
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AR1Yi = α1 + β1LMBRi + β2LSIZEi + β3ABRMOMi + β4ABRWLi  
+ β5NPRi + β6SDVBi + β7SDVSi + β8SDNIBi + β9SDNISi 
 
AR2Yi = α1 + β1LMBRi + β2LSIZEi + β3ABRMOMi + β4ABRWLi  
+ β5NPRi + β6SDVBi + β7SDVSi + β8SDNIBi + β9SDNISi 
 
 
Insider trading and analysts’ recommendations run jointly: 
ARri = α1 + β1LMBRi + β2LSIZEi + β3ABRMOMi + β4ABRWLi + β5NBRi + β6DSBAi  
+ β7DSSAi + β8NPRi + β9SDVBi + β10SDVSi + β11SDNIBi + β12SDNISi 
 
ARHYi = α1 + β1LMBRi + β2LSIZEi + β3ABRMOMi + β4ABRWLi + β5NBRi + β6DSBAi  
+ β7DSSAi + β8NPRi + β9SDVBi + β10SDVSi + β11SDNIBi + β12SDNISi 
 
AR1Yi = α1 + β1LMBRi + β2LSIZEi + β3ABRMOMi + β4ABRWLi + β5NBRi + β6DSBAi  
+ β7DSSAi + β8NPRi + β9SDVBi + β10SDVSi + β11SDNIBi + β12SDNISi 
 
AR2Yi = α1 + β1LMBRi + β2LSIZEi + β3ABRMOMi + β4ABRWLi + β5NBRi + β6DSBAi  
+ β7DSSAi + β8NPRi + β9SDVBi + β10SDVSi + β11SDNIBi + β12SDNISi 
 
3.4.1.7.  Insiders and analysts influencing each other 
In order to see whether there are any connections between analysts and insiders, similar regressions are 
run but with the explanatory variables Net Purchase Ratio and Net Buy Recommendation as dependent 
variables for each size group, inferring no differentiation in regard to time.  
 
Regression with insider trading as dependent variable: 
NPRi = α1 + β1LMBRi + β2LSIZEi + β3ABRMOMi + β4ABRWLi + β5NBRi + β6DSBAi + β7DSSAi 
 
Regression with analysts’ recommendations as dependent variable: 
NBRi = α1 + β1LMBRi + β2LSIZEi + β3ABRMOMi + β4ABRWLi + β5NPRi  
+ β6SDVBi + β7SDVSi + β8SDNIBi + β9SDNISi 
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3.4.1.8. Panel Data 
In this study, panel data is employed as it embodies information across both time and space and enables 
measures of quantity about the specific entities over time (Brooks, 2008). Panel data furthermore allows 
controlling for individual heterogeneity as it suggests the firms to be heterogeneous. Using time-series 
and cross-sectional series that do not control for this heterogeneity correctly exposes the regression to 
the risk of giving biased results. Panel data also provides the results of the regressions with more 
informative data, with more degrees of freedom, less collinearity and more efficiency (Baltagi, 2013).  
 
Within panel data there are two different models that can be employed: Fixed Effects Model (FE) and 
Random Effects Model (RE). The advantage of the FE-model is that it controls out for all higher-level 
variance by the higher-level entities themselves and hence the endogeneity problem is avoided and the 
exogeneity assumption becomes much more realistic (Bell and Jones, 2012). A disadvantage to the FE-
model is however that, because of the higher-level of variance being excluded, it only deals with lower-
level processes and looses a larger amount of information, which is normally the argument to use 
random effect models. Running both redundancy and Hausman tests on the data used, the redundancy 
tests imply that the FE-model is not necessary preferable in most regressions. The results of the 
Hausman tests suggest that RE-models should be used in many regressions, but the test does not have 
substantial statistical power to guarantee the RE-model to be completely free from bias (Clark and 
Linzer, 2012). As the variables in this study are time-variant and its scope is an entire population, the FE-
model is argued to be more plausible to use (Bell and Jones, 2012; Brooks, 2008). 
 
3.4.1.9. Test for suitability 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) is the most commonly used method, but in order for it to be suitable the 
data need to meet four assumptions implicating that the estimators are BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased 
Estimators). In order to test hypothesis, a fifth assumption must be used. The five assumptions are:  
1. The average value of the errors is zero [E(ut) = 0] 
2. Homoscedasticity [var(ut) = σ2 < ∞] 
3. No correlation between the error terms [cov(uj,uj) = 0] 
4. No correlation between the regressors and the error term [cov(uj,xj) = 0] 
5. Normality [Ut ~ N(0, σ2)] 
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Because constant terms are included in the regression equations, the first assumption can never be 
violated and does not need to be controlled for (Brooks, 2008). Performing a Breuch-Pagan-Godfrey test 
with squared residuals controls for the second assumption. In some size groups signs of 
heteroscedasticity were found, this was then corrected for by using the “white diagonal standard errors 
and covariance”. In the regression outputs, the Durbin-Watson statistics suggests some autocorrelation 
in the residuals possibly violating assumption three (Brooks, 2008). However, autocorrelation is foremost 
a problem when dealing with time-series data, rather than panel data. As the time dimension of the study 
is relatively short, autocorrelation is not likely very problematic, the DW-statistics may therefore be 
misleading and should not be given too much attention (Brooks, 2008). The fixed effect dummies 
account for all the higher-level variance and hence the error terms will be estimated as zero, solving for 
any potential violations of assumption four (Bell and Jones, 2012). The fifth assumption of normality is 
discussed further down concerning outliers.  
 
In accordance to Brooks (2008), there are three other problematic areas, which need to be considered in 
order to ascertain non-biased regressors. The problematic areas are: multicollinearity, non-linearity and 
outliers. A correlation-matrix is performed to control for correlation above 0,8. There is reason to 
suspect non-linearity within the parameters if they are multiplied together, divided, squared or cubed et 
cetera (Brooks, 2008), as this is not the case for the data in this study, linearity is assumed.  
 
Robustness is ascertained by running the regressions on different time horizons as well as regressing 
insider trading and analysts’ recommendations individually and together. The data is controlled for 
outliers by plotting the residuals as a boxplot where any extreme values are marked as circles or stars, 
which reveals that several outliers are present in the variables abnormal return, abnormal winner-loser 
and abnormal momentum. The presence of outliers is also known through the significance of the Jarque-
Bera test, indicating non-normality. Including the outliers makes the standard deviations in the 
descriptive statistics less suitable for comparison with the coefficients in the test results, as outliers cause 
the mean to shift towards the extreme values. There is a trade-off between outliers having a negative 
effect on the OLS estimates, suggesting they should be removed and the notion that every point 
represents a piece of valuable information, which will be lost if removed (Brooks, 2008). The outliers in 
this study are values representing high abnormal returns, as abnormal returns is the primary factor that is 
measured and analysed in assessing whether there is any information in insider trading and analysts’ 
recommendation, removing those values would implicate a loss of very critical information. According to 
Brooks (2008) the justification to remove outliers should come from the researchers knowledge that an 
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extreme event may have influenced the results causing the outliers, making them highly unlikely to be 
repeated. The stock market is very volatile and some high abnormal returns can possibly be repeated. 
Not removing the outliers and thereby allowing for the distribution to be non-normal violates the fifth 
OLS assumption but if the sample size is significantly large a violation of this assumption will be virtually 
inconsequential and the estimators are still BLUE (Brook, 2008). Over a thousand observations are used 
for each size-group in this study, which is considered a significantly large population and hence it is 
concluded that the outliers do not constitute a problem.  
 
3.4.2. Survey through questionnaires 
To complement the secondary data with primary data and provide a more thoroughly and deep analysis 
of the behaviour of analysts and insiders, a survey is performed. The survey is constituted by electronic 
questionnaires sent out to analysts and insiders of Nasdaq OMX Stockholm. The questions and their 
answers are enclosed in appendix A.3. and A.4. The questionnaires are composed of ten questions each, 
the relatively short length is chosen from the background that longer questionnaires may have caused 
reluctance to participate due to a shortage of time. The characteristics of questionnaires are very similar, 
in order to make analysts’ and insiders’ answers comparable. By complementing the quantitative analysis 
with a qualitative one, it is expected that the results from the regressions can be supported and better 
understood.  
 
3.5. Methodological problem discussion  
3.5.1. Reliability 
Reliability is argued to be established, as the results are expected to correspond if the regressions were to 
be run again and no knowledge exists of random factors affecting the results (Bryman and Bell, 2013). 
Regarding the quantitative methods in this study, reliability is closely connected to the consistency of the 
variables in the regressions. Therefore it is necessary to test whether the assumptions on OLS hold for all 
variables and for potential econometrical problems. One could possibly argue that the research period of 
three years is quite small. It is however motivated by these years being relatively stable in a macro 
economic perspective without any crises affecting the results. It is also motivated by the collected data 
being composed of several thousands observations, which is regarded as enough in order to run all tests 
and draw proper conclusions from.  
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Concerning the reliability of the qualitative part of the study, the primary data is considered to be less 
reliable. The two questionnaires only consist of a few questions and the answer ratio is relatively low. If 
the survey instead were to consist of more questions and to be answered twice by all participants, the 
answers could arguably be more reliable. The reason for this study not to pursue this approach and 
ascertain reliability is because a higher answer ratio is argued to be more valuable. Furthermore, some of 
the questions answered by analysts are be supported by the previous questionnaire performed by 
Hallvarsson and Halvarson (2013) mentioned in the introductory section and therefore considered more 
reliable. 
 
3.5.2. Validity 
The validity in this study is supported by several previous studies using the same methods to collect data 
and construct regression equations, for example Lakonischok and Lee (2001), and therefore the method 
is argued to measure what it is supposed to (Bryman and Bell, 2013).  
 
The questions asked in the survey are expressed and formed in a similar way as many other surveys of 
the same kind and is hence considered valid. All participants in the survey give their answers 
anonymously, inferring less reason to expect biased answers. However, the possibility that the 
participants may have answered what they think they are supposed to, rather than what they actually 
think, cannot be ignored. The main reason that a large number of people choose not to participate in the 
survey is most likely because they do not have time or their firm has a general rule that their employees 
should not participate in such surveys. No connection between the analysts and insiders not answering 
can be found. 
 
As always when using secondary data, researchers can never be completely certain of the validity in the 
information given. But as insiders are forced by Swedish law to report their trading to the Swedish 
Financial Supervisory Authority, the data collected from their webpage is considered to be valid. As 
mentioned, data on analysts’ recommendations are collected from Privata Affärer’s webpage. This 
secondary data is considered less valid than the data on insider trading, because it is manually gathered 
and published by Privata Affärer as a source alone. On the other hand, Privata Affärer publish 
recommendations given by various analysts, Swedish and international as well as analysts working for 
newspapers and banks, which results in a large number of data that may have been hard to collect in 
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other ways. Hence, Privata Affärer is considered a more valid source to attain information from. As the 
total number of recommendations given on all listed firms on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm published by 
Privata Affärer during this three-year period result in a number of 5400 recommendations, this secondary 
data is considered to provide a representative sample of the total number of recommendations. If the 
study instead were to consider only those recommendations reaching the customers of the banks that not 
has spread to the general market, the informativeness in them would very likely differ and reasonable 
contain more information about mispricings to benefit from.  
 
The definition of insiders and analysts could also be a possible aspect reducing the validity of this study, 
no tests are performed to assure whether the results are still robust if the definition of insiders and 
analysts are broadened or narrowed. Further, as all outliers are argued to be valuable sources of 
information included in the data by purpose, they are considered genuine.  
 
3.6. General Remarks 
As opposed to R-square, adjusted R-square takes into account the loss of degrees of freedom associated 
with adding an extra variable to a regression and is hence a better measure of the explanatory level of the 
regressions in this study, as the regressions contains different number of variables on the right hand side 
(Brooks, 2008). The variables with a significance level of five per cents or lower are primarily discussed, 
as those with a higher significance level are regarded to be weak and not reliable enough to draw 
conclusions from. The word significance means econometrical or statistical significance, and not 
economical significance.  
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4. RESULTS AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
In this section, the results are presented and evaluated as separate size groups in the following order: 
large cap, mid cap and small cap. The section ends with a summary of the answers from the survey.  
4.1.  Insiders and analysts influencing each other 
On small cap stocks, the regression run on insider trading as dependent of analysts’ recommendations is 
weak and analysts’ recommendations as dependent of insider trading is insignificant (see table 4.1.1. and 
4.1.2.). On mid cap, several signs of significance can be found. In the regression where insiders are 
influenced by analysts’ recommendations, significance is detected in NBR, indicating that insiders may be 
influenced by analysts’ recommendations. In the regression run with analysts’ recommendations as 
dependent on insiders’ trading, significance at one per cent level arises in the dummy capturing a large 
amount sold (see SDVS in table 4.1.2.). Implying that analysts following mid cap stocks likely incorporate 
the signals of a large amount of shares sold by insiders when forming a sell recommendation. In the 
same regression, the dummy capturing plenty insiders selling (SDNIS) is significant at a one per cent 
level but as it indicates that many insiders selling more likely generate buy recommendations, this result is 
not considered robust. For stocks listed on large cap, analysts are not found to be influenced by insider 
trading. On the other hand, the significance in DSBA indicates that when analysts recommend buy of 
large cap stocks, this slightly affects insiders’ decision to trade (see table 4.1.1.).  
 
Some significant results demonstrate that analysts do consider insider trading in some cases and vice 
versa, however these results are not found to be very robust. Additionally, the explanatory adjusted R-
square reveals that the regressions do not explain much on any market cap, reflecting a weak connection 
between insider trading and analysts’ recommendations. 
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4.2. Large Cap 
4.2.1. Results of the informativeness of insider trading and analysts’ 
recommendations on large cap stocks 
Some signs can be found of analysts’ recommendations and insider trading of large cap stocks being 
informative to investors. The significant test results are summarized in paragraph 4.2.2., while the 
complete test results can be found in Appendix A.5.1. 
 
The aligned significance in SDNIB in the two regressions run on the informativeness of insider trading, 
individually and together with variables capturing analyst recommendations, robustly prove that if four 
insiders or more are buying shares within a quarter, it contains some information about the abnormal 
share price in two years (see table 4.2.2.2. and 4.2.2.3.). The net volume bought by insiders (NPR) show 
no significance in the two regressions, neither do the dummies capturing strong signals of large volume 
bought (SDVB) or sold (SDVS) by insiders within a quarter. Hence, the conclusion is that the volume 
bought or sold by insiders of firms listed on large cap is not informative for investors when forecasting 
the share price in any time horizon. 
 
4.1.1 Insider Trading dependent on analysts' recommendations 
  Size 
Group LMBR LSIZE ABRMOM ABRWL NBR DSBA DSSA Adj. R
2 
Large Cap -0.6915** - -0.7955** - - -0.2951** - 0,2966*** 
Mid Cap -0.5370** - - 0.2894** 0.1855* - - 0,3254*** 
Small Cap -1.2211** - - - - - - 0,2660** 
 
4.1.2. Analysts' recommendations dependent on insider trading 
    Size 
Group LMBR LSIZE ABRMOM ABRWL NPR 
SDNI
B SDNIS SDVB SDVS Adj. R
2 
Large Cap - - 0.4141* - - - - - - 0,2296*** 
Mid Cap - - - - - - 0.2871* - -0.4651*** 0,2139*** 
Small Cap - - - - - - - 0.5218* - - 
 
*** = Significance at 1% **= Significance at 5% *= Significance at 10% - = No significant results 
Description of variables: 
 LMBR= Natural logarithm of market to book ratio, LSIZE = natural logarithm of market capitalisation, ABRMOM = abnormal momentum, ABRWL = 
abnormal winner-loser, NPR = Net Purchase Ratio, SDNIB = strong dummy number of insiders buying, SDNIS = strong dummy number of insiders 
selling, SDVB = strong dummy volume bought, SDVS = strong dummy volume sold, NBR = Net Buy Recommendations, DSBA = strong dummy buy 
recommendations, DSSA = strong dummy sell recommendations 
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Turning to analysts’ recommendations, the significance in DSSA in the regression run on 
informativeness of analysts’ recommendations solely, as well as when run jointly with variables capturing 
insider trading strongly prove that when a stock get a strong sell recommendation or has two or more 
ordinary sell recommendations from different analysts, this affects the stock price within the quarter 
(table 4.2.2.1. and 4.2.2.3.). The net buy recommendations (NBR) and strong dummy capturing strong 
buy signals (DSBA) show some significance in the tests, but as these significant findings do not hold in 
both regressions, they are not considered to be robust enough to draw conclusions from. Therefore, only 
strong sell signals from analysts are argued to contain valuable information about the stock price within a 
quarter, when it comes to stocks listed on large cap.  
 
Significance in the control variables imply that investors should consider size in terms of market 
capitalisation when making investments longer than a quarter, as the test results prove larger firms to be 
more likely to generate abnormal returns within this time horizon. The market-to-book ratio has a 
negative effect on the abnormal returns in six months to a year, which means that if the firms have a 
high market value compared to their book value, the share price is likely decrease within this time 
horizon. The theory of Fama French Three Factor Model that high book-to-market shall increase the return 
is thereby supported. 
 
All regressions indicate that momentum effect is significant for time horizons up to a year, and hence 
that past winners continues to be winners during this time period and vice versa for losers. The aligned 
test results in all three regressions (table 4.2.2.1. to 4.2.2.3.) also robustly indicate that the winner-loser 
effect is strongest for a time period of longer than a year. The abnormal winner-loser effect is found to 
have some positive effect on the abnormal return over the quarter, suggesting that shares having 
performed well in the last year are likely to perform well over the following quarter as well. One should 
however be careful to read too much into this finding, as it is not significantly supported when running 
the regression on analysts’ recommendations alone, which it is expected to be if the variable is robust. 
The adjusted R-square reveals that the explanatory variables together explain the abnormal return on 
stocks listed on large cap in one year better than the other time horizons. 
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4.2.2. Table of summarised significant test results for large cap stocks 
 
 
 
4.2.2.1. Regression of analysts’ recommendations 
LARGE Regression LMBR LSIZE ABRMOM ABRWL NBR DSBA DSSA Adj. R2 
Analysts' Quarterly - - 0.4127*** - - 0.0197* -0.0228** 0.4493*** 
Recom. Half year -0.4804*** 0.4337*** -0.2073*** - - - - 0.4907*** 
Alone One year -0.5007*** 0.5139*** 0.8264*** - - - - 0.7614*** 
 
Two years - 0.5593*** - 0.8205*** - - - 0.7254*** 
 
4.2.2.2. Regression of insider trading 
LARGE Regression LMBR LSIZE ABRMOM ABRWL NPR SDNIB SDNIS SDVB SDVS Adj. R2 
Insider Quarterly - - 0,4399*** 0,0999*** - - - - - 0.5790*** 
Trading Half year -0,5032*** 0,5011*** -0,1530** - - - - - - 0.4907*** 
Alone One year -0,5677*** 0,5641*** 0,8971*** - - - - - - 0.7464*** 
 Two years - 0,7187*** - 0,9360*** - 0,1067** - 0,0751* - 0.7193*** 
 
4.2.2.3. Regression of analysts’ recommendations and insider trading together 
LARGE Regression LMBR LSIZE ABRMOM ABRWL NPR SDNIB SDNIS SDVB 
Analysts' Quarterly - - 0.4402*** 0.1051*** - - - - 
and Half year -0.4961*** 0.4874*** -0.1281*** - - - - - 
Insiders One year -0.5691*** 0.5575*** 0.9326*** - - - - - 
Together Two years - 0.6809*** - 0.8087*** - 0.1241** - - 
 
Continuing… Regression SDVS NBR DSBA DSSA Adj. R2 
Analysts' Quarterly 0.0337** - - -0.0408*** 0.6009*** 
and Half year - 0.0405** - - 0.4949*** 
Insiders One year - 0.0525** - - 0.7518*** 
Together Two years - - 0.1359*** - 0.7294*** 
 
*** = Significance at 1% **= Significance at 5% *= Significance at 10% - = No significant results 
Description of variables: 
 LMBR= Natural logarithm of market to book ratio, LSIZE = natural logarithm of market capitalisation, ABRMOM = abnormal momentum, ABRWL = 
abnormal winner-loser, NPR = Net Purchase Ratio, SDNIB = strong dummy number of insiders buying, SDNIS = strong dummy number of insiders selling, 
SDVB = strong dummy volume bought, SDVS = strong dummy volume sold, NBR = Net Buy Recommendations, DSBA = strong dummy buy 
recommendations, DSSA = strong dummy sell recommendations 
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4.3. Mid Cap 
4.3.1. Results of the informativeness of insider trading and analysts’ 
recommendations on mid cap stocks 
Analysts’ recommendations of stocks listed on mid cap contain no significant information of the future 
abnormal return in any time horizon of one quarter up to two years. Insider trading contains no 
significant information about the future abnormal returns in one quarter and provides significantly weak 
signs of informativeness about the future returns in half a year to one year. The volume of shares bought 
minus the volume sold by insiders in one quarter (NPR) is recognized to contain some information of 
the future abnormal return in two years (see table 4.3.2.2. and 4.3.2.3.). Significance is also seen in the 
variables capturing analysts’ strong signal to buy, several insiders buying and extra large amount of 
volume bought by insiders (see DSBA, SDNIB and SDVB in table 4.3.2.2. and 4.3.2.3.). 
 
The control variable abnormal momentum show significance in most regressions, indicating that past 
winners will continue to realise profits. After one year, investors can expect the profitability of recent 
winners to cease. When having an investment horizon of two years, investors of stocks on mid cap can 
potentially expect the same recent winners to have recovered and begin to generate positive abnormal 
returns again. Although, one should be careful applying this finding into an investment strategy, as the 
findings are not argued to be adequately robust. Higher market-to-book has a negative effect on the 
abnormal return, statistically strongest in the half year and one year future. Larger firms in terms of 
market capitalisation are more likely to generate abnormal returns in the time horizon of half a year to 
two years.  
 
All in all, the variables in the regressions contain more information of the abnormal return in the longer 
run of one and two years, which is supported by the rise in adjusted R-square. The complete test results 
can be found in Appendix A.5.2. 
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4.3.2. Table of summarised significant test results for mid cap stocks 
 
 
4.3.2.1. Regression of analysts’ recommendations 
MID Regression LMBR LSIZE ABRMOM ABRWL NBR DSBA DSSA Adj. R2 
Analysts' Quarterly - - 0.3843*** 0.1003*** - - - 0.4338*** 
Recom. Half year -0.6124*** 0.4670*** - - - - - 0.3746*** 
Alone One year -0.4831*** 0.5621*** 1.2219*** -0.1352*** - - - 0.8253*** 
 Two years - 1.0343*** - - - - - 0.7335*** 
 
4.3.2.2. Regression of insider trading 
MID Regression LMBR LSIZE ABRMOM ABRWL NPR SDNIB SDNIS SDVB SDVS Adj. R2 
Insider Quarterly - - 0,3731*** - - - - - - 0.5916*** 
Trading Half year -0,5999*** 0,5206*** - - - -0,0387* - - - 0.1673*** 
Alone One year -0,3832*** 0,4944*** 1,5222*** -0,1050*** - - - 0,1296* - 0.8290*** 
 Two years -0,3845** 0,9652*** 0,5444*** 0,3184*** 0,1196*** - - - - 0.7393*** 
 
4.3.2.3. Regression of analysts’ recommendations and insider trading together 
MID Regression LMBR LSIZE ABRMOM ABRWL NPR SDNIB SDNIS SDVB 
Analysts' Quarterly - - 0.3042*** 0.1046*** - - - - 
and Half year -0.6194*** 0.4594*** 0.1660** - - - - - 
Insiders One year -0.4516*** 0.5831*** 1.4344*** - 0.0620** 0.1191* - - 
Together Two years - 0.9163*** 0.7094*** 0.2005** 0.1517*** - - - 
 
Continuing… Regression SDVS NBR DSBA DSSA Adj. R2 
Analysts' Quarterly - - - - 0.3794*** 
and Half year - - - - 0.3625*** 
Insiders One year - - - - 0.8468*** 
Together Two years - - 0.1663* - 0.8186*** 
 
*** = Significance at 1% **= Significance at 5% *= Significance at 10% - = No significant results 
Description of variables: 
 LMBR= Natural logarithm of market to book ratio, LSIZE = natural logarithm of market capitalisation, ABRMOM = abnormal momentum, ABRWL = 
abnormal winner-loser, NPR = Net Purchase Ratio, SDNIB = strong dummy number of insiders buying, SDNIS = strong dummy number of insiders selling, 
SDVB = strong dummy volume bought, SDVS = strong dummy volume sold, NBR = Net Buy Recommendations, DSBA = strong dummy buy 
recommendations, DSSA = strong dummy sell recommendations 
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4.4. Small Cap 
4.4.1. Results of the informativeness of insider trading and analysts’ 
recommendations on small cap stocks 
The adjusted R-square implicates that the current variables in the regressions have a greater impact on 
the abnormal return in a longer time perspective, just as implicated on mid and large cap stocks. In a 
majority of the regressions, the control variables market-to-book and market capitalisation are significant 
at a one per cent level, which indicates that firm characteristics is an important factor to consider when 
investing in stocks on small cap.  
 
No trace of informativeness of analysts’ recommendations are detected when running analysts’ 
recommendations alone, but when running the regressions including variables capturing informativeness 
of both insiders and analysts, net buy recommendations (NBR) is significant at a ten per cent level in the 
half year and one year horizon (see table 4.4.2.3.). Testing the informativeness of insider trading, 
however, show some significance both when run alone and together with variables capturing analysts’ 
recommendations. The dummies SDNIB and SDVS are significant at a five per cents level in the one 
year horizon when running the regression of insider trading alone (see table 4.4.2.2.), indicating that 
investors should consider insider trading to a small extent. The results are not strengthened in the 
regression run on both insider trading and analysts’ recommendations together however, which weakens 
the robustness. On the contrary, the regression run jointly shows significance in SDNIS and SDVB at a 
ten per cent level for two years, indicating that insider trading contain some information, but the high 
significance level imply a low validity in the results. 
 
In total, significance is detected in all insider variables, but not within the same time horizon and hence 
not within the same regression. This could potentially be an indication that when investing in stocks 
listed on small cap, it could be useful to incorporate the signals of insider trading, but with cautiousness.  
Barely any signs of informativeness can be found of analysts’ recommendations, concluding that analysts’ 
recommendations are not informative when investing in small cap stocks. The complete test results can 
be found in Appendix A.5.3. 
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4.4.2. Table of summarised significant test results for small cap stocks 
 
 
4.4.2.1. Regression of analysts’ recommendations 
 SMALL Regression LMBR LSIZE ABRMOM ABRWL NBR DSBA DSSA Adj. R2 
Analysts' Quarterly 0.1149*** - 0.4859*** - - - - 0.6054*** 
Recom. Half year  -0.1648** 0.3735*** -  -0.1791** - - - 0.5082*** 
Alone One year  -0.2511*** 0.3625*** 0.9030***  -0.1338** - - - 0.7912*** 
  Two years - 0.3623*** - 0.3802** - - - 0.7889*** 
 
4.4.2.2. Regression of insider trading 
SMALL Regression LMBR LSIZE ABRMOM ABRWL NPR SDNIB SDNIS SDVB SDVS Adj. R2 
Insider Quarterly 0,0863** - 0,4705*** - - - - - - 0.5089*** 
Trading Half year -0,2682*** 0,3680*** - -0,1583** - - - - - 0.2642*** 
Alone One year -0,2854*** 0,3543*** 1,0954*** -0,1765** - 0,0591** - - -0,1072** 0.6667*** 
 Two years - 0,3100*** - 0,4327*** - - - - - 0.7368*** 
 
4.4.2.3. Regression of analysts’ recommendations and insider trading together 
SMALL Regression LMBR LSIZE ABRMOM ABRWL NPR SDNIB SDNIS SDVB 
Analysts' Quarterly - - 0.4673*** 0.1097* - - - - 
and Half year -0.5580*** 0.5098*** - - 0.0625* - - - 
Insiders One year -0.5880*** 0.4108*** 1.0038*** - 0.0503* - - - 
Together Two years - 0.2900*** - - - - 0.3015* 0.1508** 
 
 Continuing… Regression SDVS NBR DSBA DSSA Adj. R2 
Analysts'  Quarterly - - - - 0.6842*** 
and Half year - 0.0699* - - 0.6716*** 
Insiders One year - - - - 0.8437*** 
Together Two years - - - - 0.8832*** 
 
*** = Significance at 1% **= Significance at 5% *= Significance at 10% - = No significant results 
Description of variables: 
 LMBR= Natural logarithm of market to book ratio, LSIZE = natural logarithm of market capitalisation, ABRMOM = abnormal momentum, ABRWL = 
abnormal winner-loser, NPR = Net Purchase Ratio, SDNIB = strong dummy number of insiders buying, SDNIS = strong dummy number of insiders selling, 
SDVB = strong dummy volume bought, SDVS = strong dummy volume sold, NBR = Net Buy Recommendations, DSBA = strong dummy buy 
recommendations, DSSA = strong dummy sell recommendations 
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4.5. Answers to survey 
4.5.1 Results from questionnaire answered by analysts 
The results from the questionnaire (Appendix A.3.1.) sent out to analysts reveal that quarterly reports 
constitute a large portion of the foundation analysts build their stock recommendations upon. As much 
as 40 per cent of the analysts report that quarterly reports provide a quite large foundation, whereas 
31,43 per cent report it to provide a great foundation for the stock recommendations. Analysing the 
additional comments, it can be concluded that several sources of information together compose the 
foundation for analysts’ recommendations. Apart from the quarterly reports, meetings with management 
and the general industry outlook seem to be most important to analysts (Appendix A.3.1. Q1). These 
findings are in line with the answers on the same question in the questionnaire sent out by Hallvarsson 
and Halvarson (2013). 
 
When it comes to the new and eased regulation of quarterly reports, a majority of the analysts expect it 
will have a little to no impact at all on their ability of making accurate recommendations. The additional 
comments uncover that this is explained by them assuming that the firms they follow will continue to 
report quarterly just as before. One should not ignore the seven analysts reporting that they expect the 
eased regulation will impact their ability to make accurate recommendations negatively and that it will 
have a negative effect on the transparency (Appendix A.3.1. Q2).  
 
On the question concerning whether analysts consider insider trading when forming their stock 
recommendation the answers are diverse. The conclusion is that some analysts consider insider trading 
slightly but most do not at all. The additional comments reveal that it could be informative depending on 
which insider that is selling and the volume traded. On the other hand, another comment point out the 
difficulty of interpreting insider trades (Appendix A.3.1. Q3). 
 
The questionnaire indicates that analysts mainly base their stock recommendations on fundamental 
analyses. No analyst answers that they use technical analysis, but one analyst replies “multiples, relative 
valuation”, which could possible indicate a technical analysis or ad hoc. Growth prospects, event triggers, 
earnings outlook and industry or macro economic outlook are also factors commonly mentioned 
(Appendix A.3.1. Q4).  
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Most analysts have a time horizon of around one year when forming recommendations, as a majority of 
respond that they recommend stocks with a horizon of three to 12 months (Appendix A.3.1. Q5). The 
answers also reveal that 54,29 per cent expect analysts to be unwilling to revise an already published 
stock recommendation within a near future of three months. The background to this seem to be a 
shortage of time and the complicity of revising, as one analyst put it, “You don’t want to change too 
often, although it will be done if the share price moves significantly in your estimated direction or the 
case changes completely” (Appendix A.3.1. Q6).  
 
When asking for the analysts’ comments on the theory suggesting that analysts give more positive stock 
recommendations of companies that are also clients to the bank the analysts work for, the answers are 
very spread. At first glance, it appears there ought to be some truth in the theory, as a majority of the 
analysts are not denying the statement completely (Appendix A.3.1. Q7). Nevertheless, the additional 
comments reveal that although analysts respond that they expect it is the case to a small or great extent, 
they then commented “no”. This complicates the analysis of the answers to this question, but the 
conclusion is that there is no belief among analysts that the theory applies in reality.  
 
A majority of the analysts see themselves as better or a lot better than the average analyst in giving 
raccurate recommendations, indicating overconfidence. Some reinforce their answers with ratings and 
investor votes, whereas a few claim that if they do not think they are better, then they should not do their 
job (Appendix A.3.1. Q8). Important to acknowledge is the comment by one analyst asking whether the 
question aims to measure confirmation bias. It reveals that he or she answers the questions with a mind-
set on what the answers will result in and what he or she think is a “suitable" answer. If plenty of analysts 
have this result-think in mind when answering the questions, the answers risk to be biased. However, the 
analysts have no reason to lie, as all answers are given anonymously. Therefore, it is argued that even 
though some might have an undesirable mind-set, they would still answer the questions honestly. 
 
The questionnaire reveals that most analysts tend to favour stocks on large cap, 69,70 per cent, stocks 
within the same industry, 57,58 per cent and liquid stocks, 36,36 per cent (Appendix A.3.1. Q9). It also 
proves that a majority of the analysts assume a more risky stock in terms of the Fama French Three Factor 
Model to yield an abnormal return, although one analyst point out that model to be “old school”. Yet, 
24,24 per cent of them use other ways to measure the risk of a stock (Appendix A.3.1. Q10). The 
behaviour of analysts on the Swedish market corresponds to previous observations that analysts favour 
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following large, liquid and so called “glamour stocks” (Gilbert, Tourani-Rad and Wisniewski, 2005; 
Jegadeesh et al., 2004; Lang and Lundholm, 1996). 
 
4.5.2. Results from questionnaire answered by insiders 
The questionnaire (Appendix A.4.1.) is primarily sent out to insiders within the management team, as it is 
very hard to find contact information to board members and large shareholders. Management team 
members are requested to forward the questionnaire to board members and large shareholders, but the 
results indicate the request to be ignored. Hence, insiders of the management team including Chief 
Executive Officers and Chief Financial Officers, are dominating participants in this part of the survey  
 (Appendix A.4.1. Q1.). 
 
The questionnaire is answered by insiders of firms listed on all market caps with the distribution of 24,22 
per cent of the insiders responding work for a firm listed on large cap, 38,51 per cent for a firm listed on 
mid cap and 37,27 per cent on a firm listed on small cap (Appendix A.4.1. Q2.). This spread matches the 
one of total firms listed on each market cap (table 4.5.2.1.), thus it is not likely to expect any bias in the 
answers due misrepresentative answer distribution.  
 
Table. 4.5.2.1. 
Number of listed firms (not stocks) on the respective market caps 
Large Cap 66 26% 
Mid Cap 77 30% 
Small Cap 113 44% 
Sum 256 100% 
 
The answers prove that a great majority, 70,08 per cent, of the insiders do not consider analysts’ stock 
recommendations at all in their decision to trade stocks of their firms, as they have better insight in their 
company than an external analyst (Appendix A.4.1. Q3.). Another insider point out that he or she has a 
longer investment horizon than the analysts’ stock recommendations cover, making it unreasonable to 
follow them. A majority, 57,83 per cent, of the insiders have an investment horizon of more than two 
years, much longer than the three to twelve months horizon of stock recommendations (Appendix A.4.1. 
Q8.).  
 
Most insiders do not expect the new and eased regulations on the quarterly reports to affect analysts’ 
possibilities to make accurate recommendations very much (Appendix A.4.1. Q4.).  In accordance with 
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the analysts’ responses, the comments reveal the background to this is a disbelief in that firms will adopt 
the new regulations, but continue reporting just as before.  On the other hand, insiders do also expect 
the eased regulations to have a negative effect on the informativeness and transparency. The 
questionnaire further reveals that 58,39 per cent of the firms will continue to publish quarterly reports 
just as before and only 3,11 per cent that they will publish quarterly reports, but that they will be less 
informative. No insider answers that they will stop publishing quarterly reports from now on. Important 
to highlight is that 21,12 per cent answered that they do not know, as the question have not been 
discussed within the firm and 17,39 per cent that they are not in a position of such decision and thereby 
do not know (Appendix A.4.1. Q5.). Attention should be directed to the comments revealing that 
Nasdaq OMX Stockholm could face a future change in publicly available information, as the insiders are 
not unfamiliar to review an adoption to the regulation in the future.  
 
The answers in the questionnaire sent out to analysts by Hallvarsson and Halvarson (2013) revealed that 
many analysts fear that smaller firms will utilise the new regulations to a greater extent than larger firms. 
The answers in this survey indicate that this may actually be the case. Even if only a few insiders respond 
that their firms will utilise the regulation, 80 per cent of those are firms listed on small cap and none on 
large cap (table 4.5.2.2.). 
 
Table. 4.5.2.2. 
Answers Small Cap Mid Cap Large Cap Total 
We will continue publishing quarterly reports but they will be less 
informative 4 80% 1 20% 0 0% 5 
We will continue publishing quarterly reports exactly as usual 30 32% 38 40% 26 28% 94 
I don't know, we have not decided on this yet 18 53% 13 38% 3 9% 34 
I don't know because I'm not in a position of such decision 8 29% 10 36% 10 36% 28 
 
 
To investigate any potential problem with herding behaviour among insiders, they are asked to which 
extent they considered friends, family or colleagues when making a decision to buy or sell. The responses 
reveal that of those who do trade their company’s stock, a majority do not consider others. Some seem 
to weight in the trading decisions of friends, family or colleagues, but not enough to prove a general 
herding behaviour in insider trading (Appendix A.4.1. Q6.). Instead, when the insiders were asked to 
freely describe what they base their trading decisions on, a majority trade on their own analyses and long-
term expectations of the company. Numerous insiders comment that they do not trade, but invest in 
their firms. The dominating factors leading insiders to trade, or invest, is their personal financial situation 
and an urge to signal, and/or increase, their commitment to the firm (Appendix A.4.1. Q7.).  
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It is important to clarify insiders’ opinion on the theory of analysts tending to give more favourable stock 
recommendations to firms who are also customers to the bank for which the analysts work for, as 
analysts are assumed not to be too willing to admit such bias. The insiders’ answers support the analysts’ 
responses in this question. Many insiders believe it has little to no impact at all on the stock 
recommendations and experience the different relations with a bank’s departments as independent. 
However some insiders, just as some analysts, point out that it could be the case (Appendix A.4.1. Q9.).  
 
Finally, most insiders find analysts to be good or very good at forming accurate recommendations and 
only 16,27 per cent find them to be bad. Turning to the comments, they reveal that insiders believe 
analysts to accurately interpret the financials but that they do not access the most important inside 
information and might not always understand the company (Appendix A.4.1. Q10.).  
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5. ANALYSIS 
In this section, the results are analysed in the light of theories and earlier research within the area. The 
results are also discussed with regard to the eased regulation on quarterly reports in Sweden. 
5.1.  Fundamentals of the Swedish stock market 
The Swedish market is in this study, as previously mentioned, assumed to be semi strong inefficient. The 
results show that professionals, such as insiders and analysts, do not seem able to beat the market in the 
short run, suggesting the Swedish stock market to be efficiently strong. The results also indicate that 
insider trading could possibly be somewhat informative to investors and that there is an opportunistic 
information gap, which could be exploited to make abnormal profits in the long run. This would not be 
possible if the market was efficient. It should also be acknowledged that the recommendations have 
already reached some investors when published by the magazine Privata Affärer, consequently the 
potential opportunistic news could already be reflected in the stock price if the market is efficiently 
strong. As some responding market reactions can be proved to the news of insider trading and analysts’ 
recommendations, prices are not fully adjusted already, which support the assumption of a semi-strong 
inefficiency of the Swedish market.  
 
Firm characteristics are important factors to consider when investing on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm. 
Recent winners tend to continue being winners in the short run but losers in the long run and vice versa 
for recent losers, reflecting the presence of momentum and winner-loser effects.  Size and market-to-
book are significant in most cases regardless of which size group that is considered. Size has a positive 
effect on the abnormal returns and market-to-book a negative effect in all regressions. The significance 
found in all control variables except size is in line with previous empirical findings, implying the 
additional findings of this study to be reliable.  
 
Investigating the connection between insider trading and analysts’ recommendations, little dependency is 
found. Factors that likely explain the independency are analysts’ and insiders’ different investment 
horizons, insiders’ information advantage and their different expectations of risk and return. The 
findings support Shefrin’s (2007) theory that analysts often expect the relationship between risk and 
return to be positive whereas insiders, just as ordinary investors, expect the relationship to be negative, as 
they are found to rely more on representativeness than analysts. The proved independency of insiders 
and analysts enables this study to reject the first hypothesis “Insiders consider analysts’ recommendations in 
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making their decision to trade” as the null hypothesis is accepted. Accepting the second null hypothesis also 
leads to a rejection of hypothesis two, stating “Analysts consider how insiders trade in making their 
recommendations”. Hence, insider trading and analysts’ recommendations can be seen as two independently 
public information sources that do not affect each other and therefore can be analysed and discussed 
individually as potential substitutes for quarterly reports.  
 
5.2. The informativeness of insider trading 
In line with the discoveries made by Lakonishok and Lee (2001), the market mostly seems ignorant of 
how insiders trade, although their trades contain some information. It is thus not possible to detect an 
overreaction causing post-earnings-announcement-drift to the news of insider trades. This study proves 
that insider trades are not informative for investors to consider when estimating stock movements in the 
near future of a quarter to half a year (see table 5.2.1.). As insiders per se hold important private 
information about their firm’s financial health, they play an important role in making such information 
public to the market through the signalling value of their trades. But the insignificant results suggest that 
insiders on the Swedish market do not to provide any useful information in a short time horizon. This 
implicates that investors and analysts are bound to search for other sources of information, such as 
financial reports, when aiming for short-term profits. This infers that in a short time horizon, there 
should be no risk of insiders crowding out analysts in the future, as insider trades contain no information 
about the short-term stock movements.  
 
Table: 5.2.1. summarizes only the findings significant at five per cent or lower, argued to be significant enough to analyse and draw 
conclusions from. 
Insider informativeness 
 Net Purchase Ratio 
Strong Dummy Nr of 
Insiders Buying 
Strong Dummy Nr of 
Insiders Selling 
Strong Dummy 
Volume Bought 
Strong Dummy 
Volume Sold 
Large Cap 
 
2Y** i.j. 
   
Mid Cap 2Y*** i.j. and 1Y** j.     
Small Cap  1Y** i.  2Y** j.  
i.j. = significant in regression run individually and jointly with variables of analysts’ recommendations 
j. = only significant in regression where variables of insider trading are run jointly with analysts 
i. = only significant in regression where variables of insider trading are run separate 
 
Recalling that the background to the regulatory change is to relax the administrative burden on firms 
listed at Nasdaq OMX Stockholm, it can be questioned whether it really was necessary, when most firms 
seem to continue the publication of quarterly reports. But if firms do utilise the regulation, insider trading 
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might become a more important source of public information as it then would be harder for investors to 
attain information elsewhere. As it would also lengthen the open periods insiders are allowed to trade, 
the informativeness in insider trading may be expected to increase. That would be supported by Wu and 
Zhu’s (2011) finding of insider trading in America being more informative in a less transparent situation.  
 
In a longer time perspective of one to two years, the results show significance for informativeness in 
strong insider buy dummies on all market caps (see table 5.2.1.), implying that when more insiders buy, 
the transactions contain information about the long-term stock performance. The study also establishes 
that regular insider trades, measured through the net purchase ratio (NPR), contain valuable information 
in a longer time perspective. This indicates that investors should be attentive to large amount of stocks 
bought, or many insiders buying, within a quarter when investing with a time horizon of one to two 
years. The significance in insider buys and insignificance in insider sells are supported by previous 
research (Wu and Zhu, 2011; Hsieh, Ng and Wang, 2005; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). The questionnaire 
answered by insiders provides answers to this phenomenon. In line with what both Lakonishok and Lee 
(2001) and Wu and Zhu (2011) suggest, the responses prove that insiders have different reasons to sell, 
but the major reason for a purchase is expectations of a future profit. The detected informativeness in a 
longer time horizon is supported by the survey, indicating that insiders have a longer time horizon when 
investing, bringing logic to the insignificance in the shorter time horizons of abnormal returns. 
 
The informative long-term insider trades in combination with eased regulation could nevertheless 
potentially lead to insiders crowding out analysts in the long run, as insider trading is proved to function 
as a slight substitute to other sources of public information concerning the long-term performance of a 
firm. Arguing in line with Gilbert, Tourani-Rad and Wisniewski (2005), there is a risk that other market 
participants will stop looking at analysts’ recommendations in favour of insider trading. Firms utilising 
the eased regulation of less quarterly reports would speed up such crowding out, as analysts would then 
be at an even greater information disadvantage compared to insiders. 
 
In order for insiders to crowd out analysts, investors must trust insider trading and act in accordance to 
those. Conversely to previous findings (Wu and Zhu, 2011; Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski, 2010; Jeng, 
Metrick and Zeckhauser, 2003; Rozeff and Zaman, 1988; Seyhun, 1986; Lorie and Niederhoffer, 1968), 
this does not seem to be the case in Sweden, as no direct responding stock movement to news of insider 
trades are detected. Numerous of potential explanations exist to why the market does not trust insider 
trading enough to act on them. One could be the uncertainty of insiders motives to trade, causing a 
- Is the transparency of the Swedish stock market at risk? -  
 57 
hesitation among investors concerning whether they should follow insiders trading patterns or not 
(Cohen, Malloy & Pomorski, 2010). The survey in this study uncovers that some insiders buy shares in 
their company simply to show commitment to their firm, which could be seen as an indication that 
insiders on the Swedish market engage in signalling. If investors fear that insiders engage in signalling in 
accordance with Akerlof’s (1970) lemon-cherry-theory to differentiate their firms’ stocks from the “bad” 
stocks, they may be less willing to invest. As investors might then reason as Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski 
(2010), that it is hard to interpret the signals of insider trading because the market does not know if the 
insiders just want to boost the stock price by signalling trust in the financial state of the firm (even if 
such actions are illegal) or if they actually expect a bright future for the firm. None of the responding 
insiders replies that they trade in order to boost stock price and even though it is uncertain whether the 
answering insiders tell the truth or just are reluctant to admit an engagement in such manipulations, the 
answers are regarded sincere and honest. Their answers of basing their trades on expectations of long-
term profits are strengthened by the significant regression results in the long run. It would be quite 
useless for an insider in Sweden to buy stocks with a motive to boost stock price, as the Swedish stock 
market seem ignorant to the news of insider trading, as no direct stock price reaction is found in the 
short-run. Hence, investors have no reason to distrust the signals of insider trading. Especially as 
Swedish insiders not even, as opposed to previous findings (Hsieh, Ng and Wang, 2005), trade to signal 
positive outlooks to compensate for negative analyst recommendation or engage in herding (Cipriani and 
Guarino, 2012). Insiders’ buys are therefore more connected to insiders expecting the long-term future 
of the company to be bright rather than a wish to manipulate the market.  
 
Another explanation to why investors in Sweden do not seem to trust insider trading could be associated 
with the corporate governance system and its effect on the informativeness of insider trades. All earlier 
studies finding evidence of insider trading being informative are conducted on the American market (Wu 
and Zhu, 2011; Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski, 2010; Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser, 2003; Lakonishok 
and Lee, 2001; Rozeff and Zaman, 1988; Seyhun, 1986; Lorie and Niederhoffer, 1968). Evidence of 
insider trading being informative in common law countries, but not in a civil law countries such as 
Sweden and Norway (Eckbo and Smith, 1998), supports the theory of differences in corporate 
governance systems and legal origins having an effect on how the market function and share 
information. One potential explanation could be that common law countries allow managers on the 
board and CEO duality, which increase the superior and private information insiders in those countries 
possess. This would logically enable them to yield a higher abnormal return, leading to their trades 
containing more information to the public. This argument would be supportive by the findings of Ravina 
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and Sapienza (2009) that insiders with more information yield higher returns than those with less. 
Thereby, investors in common law countries have more reasons to trust those insiders.  
 
The reason why the results of insider informativeness are dominantly insignificant can be related to 
several behavioural theories. Rabin & Vayanos (2009), along with Shefrin (2007), find that insiders may 
be victims of the hot-hand-fallacy and the gambler’s fallacy when trading, leading to irrational decision-
making due to wrongly estimated probabilities. Further, the survey performed by Financial Executives 
International and Baruch College, The City University of New York in 2013, show that manager and 
executives (in essence insiders) often are overconfident and affected by representativeness. This entails 
insiders to have an excessive belief in their own knowledge and rules of thumb rather than relying on 
hard facts, leading to biased decisions.  
 
The empirical findings in this study result in an acceptance of the null hypothesis and hence a rejection 
of the third hypothesis “Insider buys are informative” in the short-term horizon of one quarter to half a year 
but acceptance in the time horizon of one to two years. This incurs that insider buys of stocks listed on 
all market caps on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm are not informative when forecasting the short-term 
expected abnormal return in the short-term. Conversely, in the longer time horizon, insider buys contain 
some information about the future abnormal return. The fourth hypothesis “Insider sells are informative” is 
rejected as the null hypothesis is accepted and hence this study concludes that insider sells of stocks 
listed on all market caps of Nasdaq OMX Stockholm to be non-informative. The conclusions are thereby 
largely in line with prior research finding that insiders are unable to generate abnormal returns (Lorie and 
Niederhoffer, 1968; Seyhun, 1986; Rozeff and Zaman, 1988, Lin & Howe, 1990), but that insider buys 
contain more valuable information than insider sells (Wu and Zhu, 2011; Hsieh, Ng and Wang, 2005; 
Lakonishok and Lee, 2001).  
 
Concerning market transparency, the results prove that insider trading is not a very good source of 
information to replace financial reports. Removing the quarterly reports could therefore potentially put 
the transparency of the Swedish stock market at risk. On the other hand, the informativeness of insider 
trades is slightly stronger in trades of small cap and mid cap stocks, implying that, in line with the theory 
of Wu and Zhu (2011), less transparency could make insider trading to become more informative. 
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5.3. The informativeness of analysts’ recommendations 
The only significant signs of informativeness of analyst recommendations are detected in stocks listed on 
large cap, corresponding to the high analyst coverage on large cap, inferred by the answers from this 
study’s questionnaire (Appendix A.3.1.) as well as in previous empirical studies (Gilbert, Tourani-Rad & 
Wisniewski, 2005; Lang & Lundholm, 1996). High analyst coverage further implies a greater pressure on 
management to provide information concerning their performance and financial health, resulting in a 
larger amount of information being shared. As a consequence of all this, firms with higher analyst 
coverage are more transparent. In a traditional point of view, the insignificance seen in analysts’ 
recommendations of stocks listed on mid and small cap could be explained by the fact that these are 
more risky investments than large cap stocks and therefore it is harder for analysts to predict precise 
earnings forecasts. This decreases the analyst coverage and thereby also the transparency of stocks listed 
on mid and small cap. If firms listed on mid cap and small cap do decide to utilise the new and eased 
regulation on quarterly reporting, this vicious cycle will perpetuate and the transparency of mid cap and 
small cap stocks worsen even more in relation to large cap stocks.  
 
Table: 5.3.1. summarizes only the findings significant at five per cent or lower, argued to be significant enough to analyse and 
draw conclusions from. 
Analysts' informativeness 
 
Net Buy Recommendations Dummy Strong Buy Analysts Dummy Strong Sell Analysts 
Large Cap 
 
2Y*** j. Q** i. and Q*** j. 
Mid Cap  
   
Small Cap 
   i.j. = significant in regression run individually and jointly with variables of insider trading 
j. = only significant in regression where variables of analysts’ recommendations are run jointly with insider trading 
i. = only significant in regression where variables of analysts’ recommendations are run separate 
 
On large cap, analysts’ sell recommendations are often followed by a decrease in stock price in the 
quarterly time horizon, which is in line with Stanislawek’s (2012) findings. It can either be explained by 
the stock market reacting stronger when several analysts recommend sell than when several analysts 
recommend buy or by analysts’ sell recommendations containing more accurate information or a 
combination of them both. The low number of 17,53 per cent being sell recommendations of all 
recommendations found on large cap between 2011 and 2013 supports Stanislawek’s (2012) findings. 
Therefore, it is not completely unreasonable to argue that analysts are somewhat unwilling to 
recommend sell. If an analyst against the odds decides to, it could be argued that the sell 
recommendation is based on a more elaborate analysis and thereby becomes more accurate. As opposed 
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to when studying insider trading, the market seems to react directly to analysts’ sell, but not buy, 
recommendations, supporting Shefrin’s theory (2007) that people tend to react stronger to negative news 
than positive news. However, the sell recommendations only show significance in the quarterly abnormal 
return and not in the longer time horizon of half a year to one year, which is the time horizon analysts 
report to have in their recommendations (Appendix A.3.1. Q5). This implies that the significance in the 
variable representing sell recommendations could be a result of the market being more sensitive to bad 
news rather than inferring a high accuracy in the recommendation. Sell recommendations hence seem to 
have self-fulfilling characteristics, leading up to significance and the news of less profitable returns in a 
longer time horizon is directly incorporated into the stock price. For these reasons, it is not possible to 
argue that analysts’ sell recommendations reduce the information asymmetry or the information gap on 
the market.  
 
Turning to the longer investment horizon of two years, the strong significance in the dummy capturing 
strong buy signals suggests that when four or more analysts recommend buy on a large cap stock, or it 
receives a strong buy recommendation, it contains information about the expected abnormal return in 
two years. It supports the findings of Barber et al. (2001) of strong recommendations being more 
informative, but as most analysts have a time horizon of six months to one year in their 
recommendations (Appendix A.3.1. Q5), this finding additionally implies a drift in reaction. It could be 
explained by the theory of Daniel, Hirschleifer and Subrahamanyam (1998), stating that investors 
underreact to public information, causing a drift in stock price reaction. Arguing in line with this, if a 
majority of investors on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm are overconfident22 in their investments and suffer 
from self-attribution biases, they will not react on analysts’ recommendations unless they support the 
private information already received. This could imply that analyst recommendations do contain 
information about the future stock price of a firm, but that investors underreact to the recommendation, 
causing a drift in price movement.  
 
If Swedish investors are overconfident and suffer from self-attribution biases, they would most likely also 
underreact to new quarterly reports, as these are also publicly available information. In the light of the 
new regulation, two reports per annum would in such case be enough, as investors do not incorporate 
new public information to a large extent. It would therefore actually be more beneficial for shareholders 
if management put time into business improvements instead of into quarterly reporting.  
                                                
22 Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahamyan (1998) define an overconfident investor as one who overestimates the precision of private 
information signals but not information signals publicly received by all. When additional public information supports the private 
information, overconfidence rises but disconfirming information only causes confidence to fall modestly, if at all. 
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The dominating insignificance in analysts’ recommendations can be explained by several factors. Shefrin 
(2000) argues in his theory of the recommendation game that analysts do not always mean what they say 
and hence their recommendations can be biased. Some of the underlying factors to his theory find 
support in this study. Firstly, the findings of this study support his argument of analysts incorporating 
information from management in their recommendations and that insiders are selective when sharing 
information with the analysts (Appendix A.3.1. Q1; A.4.1. Q10). It can be assumed that most firms are 
more willing to share positive rather than negative information, thereby the picture the analysts receive 
from the firms is not always reflecting reality, resulting in biased recommendations. Secondly, Shefrin 
(2000), as well as Stanislawek (2012), states that although research departments should be independent 
from other bank departments, analysts working for banks could have an incentive to publish positive 
recommendations if doubtful because of the corporate relationships. The answers in the questionnaire 
(Appendix A.3.1. Q7; A.4.1. Q9) contradicts the reasoning of analysts’ willingness to keep their corporate 
customers satisfied, hence this study do not support this reasoning. Thirdly, Shefrin (2000) highlight that 
it is hard for investors to know whether the recommendations are biased or not, and hence tend to listen 
to the recommendations anyways resulting in an effect on the stock price. This study finds no support 
for investors reacting on analysts, but agrees with Shefrin (2000) that it is hard to know whether the 
analysts’ recommendations are biased or not. The main reason for analysts not being able to 
continuously publish accurate recommendations is although argued in this study to be the information 
disadvantage rather than analysts’ conscious choice to signal positive outlooks.  
 
Several researchers mean that analysts’ recommendations are simply not informative because of their 
valuation methods are based on ad hoc heuristics rather than fundamental analyses (Shefrin, 2007; 
Bradshaw, 2004; Jegadeesh et al., 2004; Cornell, 2001). However, several analysts reply in the 
questionnaire that they use fundamental analysis (Appendix A.3.1. Q4) and it is therefore more likely that 
the insignificance is due to other factors than their valuation method. The insignificance of analysts’ 
recommendations could potentially be explained by the arguments of Daniel, Hirschleifer and 
Subrahamanyam (1998), which are that not only investors suffer from overconfidence and self-
attribution biases, but also analysts. The overconfidence a majority of analysts seem to have according to 
the survey could imply that analysts following Swedish stocks actually do rely more on private 
information and their own ability than on public information. Thereby they may underreact to new 
quarterly reports published, unless those support their already given recommendation. Arguing in line 
with Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahamanyam (1998), the overconfidence could also imply that analysts 
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following Swedish stocks are unlikely to acknowledge any potential forecast errors in their 
recommendations, which would also be supported by them being unwilling to revise an already published 
report (Appendix A.3.1. Q6 and Q8). These biases could result in analysts’ recommendations containing 
less information about future stock prices, supported by the insignificance found in the tests. 
Overconfident analysts suffering from self-attribution biases would in this sense mean that analysts’ 
recommendations is a bad substitute to quarterly reports.  
 
To conclude, analysing the results do not allow rejecting the null hypothesis and hence the fifth 
hypothesis “Analysts’ buy recommendations are informative” is rejected. Thereby this study finds that analysts’ 
recommendations are not informative for any stock listed on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm. The sixth 
hypothesis “Analysts’ sell recommendations are informative” is rejected when it comes to sell recommendations 
of stocks listed on mid and small cap as the null hypothesis in those tests cannot be rejected. However, 
the sixth hypothesis cannot be completely rejected on large cap, as some signs are found that analysts’ 
sell recommendations do contain information about the abnormal return in a quarter. 
 
Even though this study barely finds any evidence of analyst recommendations being informative, it does 
not mean they are useless. Analysts provide the market with professional analyses that gives indication of 
which direction investors can expect the stock prices to move. Analysts also push firms to reveal 
information and therefore they play an important role in the information sharing process and the market 
transparency. But all in all, analysts’ recommendations are not suggested to be a good substitute to the 
public information source of quarterly reports. First of all, both insiders and analysts report that analysts’ 
insight is limited and dependent on what information the management choose to share with them 
(Appendix A.3.1. Q1; A.4.1. Q10). Even if management can manipulate their numbers in their quarterly 
reports as well, the reports are bound to follow a certain standard of financial reporting, which makes it 
easier for investors to compare the different listed firms with each other, a great advantage of quarterly 
reports from a transparency point of view. Especially as the analyst coverage is significantly larger on 
firms listed on large cap, which already makes the transparency of mid and small cap stocks lower. In 
addition, public analysts’ recommendations do not contain much valuable information about the future 
stock price and firms’ performance and hence it would be irrational to base investment decisions solely 
on those.  
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
In the last section, the final conclusions from the analysis and the results are presented and discussed 
with regard to the purpose of this study. Proposals to further research are also given. 
6.1. Conclusion 
The main purpose of this study is to investigate what effects the new, eased regulation will have on 
information sharing on the Swedish stock market. The conclusion is that it will most likely have a 
negative effect on the transparency given that firms do utilise it and reduce their number of reports given 
annually. As neither insider trading nor analysts’ recommendations are considered to be adequate 
substitutes to the quarterly reports, the market will be even more dependent on private information if 
quarterly reports are removed. This means that the information gap and information asymmetries will 
increase and more opportunistic mispricings will be available to those investors that can afford to pay for 
private information.  
 
Although investors have no reason to fear that the regulation will have a large impact on their ability to 
gain public information in the near future, it is important to acknowledge that some insiders do admit 
that their firms will wait and see whether other firms choose to reduce their reporting and perhaps adapt 
as well. Firms are advised to consider an utilisation of the new regulation thoroughly, due to the 
uncertain investment climate and lack of public information this may cause. This advice especially 
concerns firms listed on mid cap and small cap. These firms are reported to be most likely to reduce their 
quarterly reporting but as the analyst coverage is low, the transparency here is already weaker. Since small 
and mid cap stocks additionally are considered riskier for investors, decreasing the public information 
will make investors less willing to invest in those stocks, particularly if they, just as insiders, view the 
relationship between risk and return to be negative. Hence, stocks listed on mid cap and small cap 
utilising the regulation risk facing illiquidity and an increased cost of capital.  
 
The non-informativeness of insider trades and analysts’ recommendations in the short run mean that 
investors will barely have any access to public information if a reduction in available reports become 
reality in the future. Originating from this could be a reluctance among investors to make shorter 
investments, as they do not know whether financial reports will be available or if there is any information 
in looking at how insiders trade or what analysts recommend. As the investor protection already is lower 
in Sweden due its civil law origin, quarterly reports are argued to be an important source of public 
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information and the market is advised to continue with their quarterly reports even though the regulation 
is eased.   
 
6.2. Proposals to further research 
As seen by the replies in the survey, many insiders and analysts are sceptical to that firms really will adapt 
to the new eased regulation on quarterly reports and hence do not think the regulation will effect the 
market. As it is yet too soon to study the effects fewer quarterly reports available have on the 
transparency, a proposal to further research is a to perform a replicating study of this one in a few years. 
By doing so, it will be possible to state whether firms have utilised the regulation and if the 
informativeness in insider trading and analysts’ recommendation has changed due to this.  
 
Another proposal to further research is to investigate the differences in informativeness between public 
and private information on the Swedish stock market. This study investigates informativeness of analysts’ 
recommendations having reached the whole market, defined as public information. Recommendations 
only given to private clients at a cost is expected to be more significant and opportunistic for investors, 
how much more is although yet uncertain. It might also have an effect on the information content in 
insider trades depending which insider that is trading. There is hence a research gap in investigating 
insider trades in Sweden by classifying the insiders into different groups.  
 
Finally, this study includes recommendations from all analysts regardless if they work for investment 
banks or newspapers. In order to more properly define whether investment bank analysts are prone to 
publish positive recommendations, a proposal to further research is to replicate this study, but split 
analysts into groups with regards to the “independency” of their employer. That research gap could be 
important to fill, especially with regards to the eased regulation. 
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A. APPENDIX 
 
A.1. Legal briefing, Sweden vs. America 
Legal question Sweden America 
Who is an insider? Member or alternative member of the 
board, managing director or deputy 
manager, auditor or deputy auditor, a 
general partner in parent company, holder 
or senior executive with non-public 
information (all concerns parent company 
too) and equity holder of 10% or more of 
share capital or voting rights 
Officers and directors, brokers with insight 
and owners of 10% and more of the 
company’s equity securities 
Persons considered closely related to an 
insider: 
Spouse or cohabitant of the notified, minor 
children, closely related parties, legal 
person etc. 
Family members, friends, business 
associates, legal persons etc.  
An insider reports to: Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) 
Changes in holdings should be 
reported: 
Within 5 calendar days Within 2 business days 
Trading is prohibited: 30 days before report becomes public, the 
report day included 
No insider may trade during period of 2 
weeks prior end of fiscal quarter until two 
trading days following public disclosure of 
financial results for quarter or year 
Punishment if breaching insider 
trading laws: 
Fees or prison of max 6 months if smaller 
crime, more serious prison 6 months to 4 
years 
Prison up to 20 years, criminal fines up to 5 
million dollar, civil fines up to three times 
the profit gained or loss avoided.  
 
  
 
 
73 
A.2.  Sample list of firms included in thesis 
Company name Market 
Insider trading 
registered 
Recommendations 
found on firm 
Data retrieved from 
Datastream 
 AarhusKarlshamn Large cap x x x 
 ABB Ltd Large cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Alfa Laval Large cap x x x 
 ASSA ABLOY B Large cap x x x 
 AstraZeneca Large cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Atlas Copco A Large cap x x x 
 Atlas Copco B Large cap x x x 
 Atrium Ljungberg B Large cap x x x 
 Autoliv SDB Large cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Axfood Large cap x x x 
 Axis Large cap x x x 
 BillerudKorsnäs Large cap x x x 
 Boliden Large cap x x x 
 Castellum Large cap x x x 
 Electrolux A Large cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Electrolux B Large cap x x x 
 Elekta B Large cap x x x 
 EnQuest PLC Large cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Ericsson A Large cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Ericsson B Large cap x x x 
 Fabege Large cap x x x 
 Getinge B Large cap x x x 
 Handelsbanken A Large cap x Information missing x 
 Handelsbanken B Large cap x x x 
 Hennes & Mauritz B Large cap x x x 
 Hexagon B Large cap x x x 
 HEXPOL B Large cap x x x 
 Holmen A Large cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Holmen B Large cap x x x 
 Hufvudstaden A Large cap x x x 
 Hufvudstaden C Large cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Husqvarna A Large cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Husqvarna B Large cap x x x 
 ICA Gruppen Large cap x x x 
 Industrivärden A Large cap x x x 
 Industrivärden C Large cap x x x 
 Intrum Justitia Large cap x x x 
 Investor A Large cap x Information missing x 
 Investor B Large cap x x x 
 JM Large cap x x x 
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Company name Market 
Insider trading 
registered 
Recommendations 
found on firm 
Data retrieved from 
Datastream 
Kinnevik A Large cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Kinnevik B Large cap x x x 
 Latour B Large cap x x x 
 Lundbergföretagen B Large cap x x x 
Lundin Mining Corporation SDB Large cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Lundin Petroleum Large cap x x x 
 Meda A Large cap x x x 
 Melker Schörling Large cap x x x 
Millicom International Cellular SDB Large cap Information missing x x 
 Modern Times Group A Large cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Modern Times Group B Large cap x x x 
 NCC A Large cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 NCC B Large cap x x x 
 NIBE Industrier B Large cap x x x 
 Nordea Bank Large cap x x x 
 Oriflame SDB Large cap Information missing x x 
 Peab B Large cap x x x 
 Ratos A Large cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Ratos B Large cap x x x 
 Ratos pref Large cap Preference shares are excluded in this study 
 SAAB B Large cap x x x 
 Sandvik Large cap x x x 
 SCA A Large cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 SCA B Large cap x x x 
 SCANIA A Large cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 SCANIA B Large cap x x x 
 SEB A Large cap x x x 
 SEB C Large cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Securitas B Large cap x x x 
 Skanska B Large cap x x x 
 SKF A Large cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 SKF B Large cap x x x 
 SSAB A Large cap x x x 
 SSAB B Large cap x x x 
 Stora Enso A Large cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Stora Enso R Large cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Swedbank A Large cap x x x 
 Swedish Match Large cap x x x 
 Swedish Orphan Biovitrum Large cap x x x 
 Tele2 A Large cap x x x 
 Tele2 B Large cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 TeliaSonera Large cap x x x 
 Tieto Oyj Large cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Trelleborg B Large cap x x x 
 Volvo A Large cap x x Information missing 
 Volvo B Large cap x x x 
 Wallenstam B Large cap x x x 
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Company name Market 
Insider trading 
registered 
Recommendations 
found on firm 
Data retrieved from 
Datastream 
Active Biotech Mid Cap x x x 
 Addtech B Mid Cap x x x 
 Aerocrine B Mid Cap x x x 
 Arcam Mid Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Avanza Bank Holding Mid Cap x x x 
 B&B TOOLS B Mid Cap x x x 
 Beijer Alma B Mid Cap x x x 
 Beijer B Mid Cap x Information missing Information missing 
 Betsson B Mid Cap x x x 
 Bilia A Mid Cap x x x 
 BioGaia B Mid Cap x x x 
 Black Earth Farming SDB Mid Cap x x x 
 BlackPearl Resources SDB Mid Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Bufab Holding Mid Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Bure Equity Mid Cap x x x 
 Byggmax Group Mid Cap x x x 
 Catena Mid Cap x Information missing x 
 Cavotec Mid Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 CDON Group Mid Cap x x x 
 Clas Ohlson B Mid Cap x x x 
 Cloetta B Mid Cap x x x 
 Concentric Mid Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Corem Property Group Mid Cap x x x 
 Corem Property Group Pref Mid Cap Preference shares are excluded in this study 
 Creades A Mid Cap Information missing x x 
 Diös Fastigheter Mid Cap x x x 
 Duni Mid Cap x x x 
 East Capital Explorer Mid Cap x x x 
 Eniro Mid Cap x x x 
 Eniro pref Mid Cap Preference shares are excluded in this study 
 Fagerhult Mid Cap x x x 
 Fast Partner Mid Cap x x x 
 Fast Partner Pref Mid Cap Preference shares are excluded in this study 
 Fast. Balder B Mid Cap x Information missing x 
 Fast. Balder pref Mid Cap Preference shares are excluded in this study 
 Fenix Outdoor B Mid Cap x x x 
 Fingerprint Cards B Mid Cap x x x 
 Gunnebo Mid Cap x x x 
 Haldex Mid Cap x x x 
 HEBA B Mid Cap x Information missing x 
 Hemfosa Fastigheter Mid Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 HiQ International Mid Cap x x x 
Industrial & Financial systems A Mid Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
Industrial & Financial systems B Mid Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Indutrade Mid Cap Information missing x x 
 ITAB Shop Concept B Mid Cap x x x 
 KappAhl Mid Cap x x x 
 Klövern Mid Cap x x x 
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Company name Market 
Insider trading 
registered 
Recommendations 
found on firm 
Data retrieved from 
Datastream 
Klövern pref Mid Cap Preference shares are excluded in this study 
 Kungsleden Mid Cap x x x 
 Lagercrantz Group B Mid Cap x x x 
 Lindab International Mid Cap x x x 
 Loomis B Mid Cap x x x 
 Medivir B Mid Cap x x x 
 Mekonomen Mid Cap x x x 
 Nederman Holding Mid Cap x x x 
 Net Entertainment NE B Mid Cap x x x 
 New Wave B Mid Cap x x x 
 Nobia Mid Cap x x x 
 Nolato B Mid Cap x x x 
 Nordnet B Mid Cap x x x 
 OEM International B Mid Cap x x x 
 Opus Group Mid Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Orexo Mid Cap x x x 
Platzer Fastigheter Holding B Mid Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Proffice B Mid Cap x x x 
 Recipharm Mid Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Rezidor Hotel Group Mid Cap x x x 
 Sagax A Mid Cap x x Information missing 
 Sagax B Mid Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Sagax pref Mid Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Sanitec Oyj Mid Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 SAS Mid Cap x x x 
 SAS PREF Mid Cap Preference shares are excluded in this study 
 SECTRA B Mid Cap x x x 
 Semafo Mid Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 SkiStar B Mid Cap x x x 
 SWECO A Mid Cap x Information missing x 
 SWECO B Mid Cap x x x 
 Swedol B Mid Cap x x x 
 Systemair Mid Cap x x x 
 Tethys Oil Mid Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Transmode Mid Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Tribona Mid Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Unibet Group Mid Cap Information missing x x 
 Victoria Park A Mid Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Victoria Park Pref Mid Cap Preference shares are excluded in this study 
Vostok Nafta Investment SDB Mid Cap Information missing x x 
 Wihlborgs Fastigheter Mid Cap x x x 
 ÅF B Mid Cap x x x 
 Öresund Mid Cap x x x  
 
 
  
 
 
77  
Company name Market 
Insider trading 
registered 
Recommendations 
found on firm 
Data retrieved from 
Datastream 
Acando B Small Cap x x x 
 ACAP Invest A Small Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 ACAP Invest B Small Cap x Information missing x 
 Addnode Group B Small Cap x x x 
 Allenex Small Cap x x x 
 AllTele Small Cap x x x 
 Anoto Group Small Cap x Information missing x 
 Arctic Paper Small Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Arise Small Cap x x x 
 Aspiro Small Cap x Information missing x 
 Availo Small Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Avega Group B Small Cap x x x 
 BE Group Small Cap x x x 
 Beijer Electronics Small Cap x x x 
 Bergs Timber B Small Cap x Information missing x 
 BioInvent International Small Cap x x x 
 Biotage Small Cap x x x 
 Björn Borg Small Cap x x x 
 Bong Small Cap x x x 
 Boule Diagnostics Small Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 BTS Group B Small Cap x x x 
 CellaVision Small Cap x x x 
 Cision Small Cap x x x 
 Concordia Maritime B Small Cap Information missing x x 
 Connecta Small Cap x x x 
 Consilium B Small Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 CTT Systems Small Cap x x x 
 Cybercom Group Small Cap x x x 
 Dedicare B Small Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 DGC One Small Cap x x x 
 DORO Small Cap x x x 
 Duroc B Small Cap x x x 
 Elanders B Small Cap x x x 
 Electra Gruppen Small Cap x x x 
 Elos B Small Cap x x x 
 Endomines Small Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Enea Small Cap x x x 
 Etrion Small Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 eWork Scandinavia Small Cap x x x 
 Feelgood Svenska Small Cap x x x 
 FinnvedenBulten Small Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 FormPipe Software Small Cap x x x 
 Geveko B Small Cap x Information missing x 
 Global Health Partner Small Cap x x x 
 Havsfrun Investment B Small Cap x Information missing x 
 Hemtex Small Cap x x x 
 HMS Networks Small Cap x x x 
 I.A.R Systems Group Small Cap x Information missing x 
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Company name Market 
Insider trading 
registered 
Recommendations 
found on firm 
Data retrieved from 
Datastream 
Image Systems Small Cap x Information missing x 
 Intellecta B Small Cap x Information missing x 
 KABE B Small Cap x x x 
 Karo Bio Small Cap x x x 
 Karolinska Development B Small Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 KnowIT Small Cap x x x 
 Lammhults Design Group B Small Cap x x x 
 Malmbergs Elektriska B Small Cap Information missing x x 
 Micro Systemation B Small Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Micronic Mydata AB Small Cap x x x 
 Midsona A Small Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Midsona B Small Cap x Information missing x 
 Midway A Small Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Midway B Small Cap x x x 
 Moberg Pharma Small Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 MQ Holding Small Cap x x x 
 MSC Konsult B Small Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 MultiQ International Small Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
NAXS Nordic Access Buyout Fund Small Cap x Information missing x 
 Net Insight B Small Cap x x x 
 NeuroVive Pharmaceutical Small Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Nordic Mines Small Cap x x x 
Nordic Service Partners Holdings B Small Cap x Information missing x 
 NOTE Small Cap x x x 
 Novestra Small Cap x Information missing x 
 NOVOTEK B Small Cap x x x 
 Oasmia Pharmaceutical Small Cap x x x 
 Odd Molly International Small Cap x x x 
 Opcon Small Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Ortivus A Small Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Ortivus B Small Cap x x x 
 PA Resources Small Cap x x x 
 PartnerTech Small Cap x x x 
 Poolia B Small Cap x x x 
 Precise Biometrics Small Cap x x x 
 Prevas B Small Cap x x x 
 Pricer B Small Cap x x x 
 Proact IT Group Small Cap x x x 
 Probi Small Cap x x x 
 Profilgruppen B Small Cap x Information missing x 
 RaySearch Laboratories B Small Cap x x x 
 ReadSoft B Small Cap x x x 
 Rederi AB Transatlantic Small Cap x Information missing x 
 Rejlers Small Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 RNB RETAIL AND BRANDS Small Cap x x x 
 Rottneros Small Cap x x x 
 Rörvik Timber B Small Cap x Information missing x 
 Seamless Distribution Small Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
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A.2.1 List of all recommendations and insider trading included  
Table 1 - Number of recommendations given by analysts presented in “Privata Affärer”, 2011-2013: 
Large cap Number of Ratio of total 
Buy recommendations 1 856 47,84% 
Sell recommendations 680 17,53% 
Hold recommendations 1 344 34,64% 
Total 3 880 100,00% 
   Mid cap Number of Ratio of total 
Buy recommendations 588 53,65% 
Sell recommendations 188 17,15% 
Hold recommendations 320 29,20% 
Total 1 096 100,00% 
   Small cap Number of Ratio of total 
Buy recommendations 243 57,31% 
Sell recommendations 63 14,86% 
Hold recommendations 118 27,83% 
Total 424 100,00% 
   Total Number of Ratio of total 
Buy recommendations 2 687 49,76% 
Company name Market 
Insider trading 
registered 
Recommendations 
found on firm 
Data retrieved from 
Datastream 
Semcon Small Cap x x x 
 Sensys Traffic Small Cap x x x 
 Shelton Petroleum B Small Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 SinterCast Small Cap x Information missing x 
 Softronic B Small Cap x Information missing x 
 Stockwik Förvaltning Small Cap x Information missing x 
 Studsvik Small Cap x x x 
 Svedbergs B Small Cap x x x 
 Svolder A Small Cap Information missing x x 
 Svolder B Small Cap x Information missing x 
 Traction B Small Cap x Information missing x 
 TradeDoubler Small Cap x x x 
 Transcom WorldWide SDB A Small Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Transcom WorldWide SDB B Small Cap Information missing x x 
 Trigon Agri Small Cap Information missing x x 
 Uniflex B Small Cap x x x 
 VBG GROUP B Small Cap x x x 
 Venue Retail Group B Small Cap x x x 
 Vitec Software Group B Small Cap Excluded because of lack of availiable data 
 Vitrolife Small Cap x x x 
 XANO Industri B Small Cap x x x 
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Sell recommendations 931 17,24% 
Hold recommendations 1 782 33,00% 
Total 5 400 100,00% 
 
Table 2 - Amount of insider trading recorded by the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority, 2011-2013: 
Large cap Number of Ratio of total 
Number of insiders buying 1 011 66,21% 
Number of insiders selling 516 33,79% 
Total number of insiders trading 1 527 100,00% 
   Volume bought (number of stocks) 236 273 812 58,43% 
Volume sold (number of stocks) 168 068 017 41,57% 
Total volume traded (number of stocks) 404 341 829 100,00% 
   Mid cap Number of Ratio of total 
Number of insiders buying 822 66,72% 
Number of insiders selling 410 33,28% 
Total number of insiders trading 1 232 100,00% 
   Volume bought (number of stocks) 70 965 741 52,61% 
Volume sold (number of stocks) 63 927 741 47,39% 
Total volume traded (number of stocks) 134 893 482 100,00% 
   Small cap Number of Ratio of total 
Number of insiders buying 890 76,72% 
Number of insiders selling 270 23,28% 
Total number of insiders trading 1 160 100,00% 
   Volume bought (number of stocks) 194 969 758 60,30% 
Volume sold (number of stocks) 128 347 841 39,70% 
Total volume traded (number of stocks) 323 317 599 100,00% 
   Total 
 
  
Number of insiders buying 2 723 69,48% 
Number of insiders selling 1 196 30,52% 
Total number of insiders trading 3 919 100,00% 
   Volume bought (number of stocks) 502 209 311 58,22% 
Volume sold (number of stocks) 360 343 599 41,78% 
Total volume traded (number of stocks) 862 552 910 100,00% 
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A.2.2.  Number of recommendations per analyst source 
A.2.2.1. Large Cap 
Banks Newspapers/Non-bank 
ABG Sundal Collier 53 Affärsvärlden 82 
Arctic Securities 3 Aktiespararen 16 
Baird 8 Börsveckan 85 
Bank of America/Merrill Lynch 144 Dagens Industri 19 
Barclays 66 Placeringsguiden 6 
Berenberg  70 Privata Affärer 10 
Bernstein  12 Standard & Poor 52 
Bryan Garnier 1 Veckans Affärer 21 
Canaccord 2 Total recommendations from newspapers 291 
Carnegie 68 Total recommendations large cap 3880 
Citi Group 97 Percentage of newspaper sources large cap 7,50% 
Collins Stewart 2 
  Commerzbank 4 
  Cowen 1 
  Credit Suisse 130 
  Danske Bank 160 
  Deutsche Bank 183 
  DNB 48 
  Equita SIM 1 
  Erik Penser Bankaktiebolag 6 
  Espirito Santo 5 
  Evli Bank 13 
  Exane BNP Paribas 84 
  GMP 1 
  Goldmans Sachs 254 
  Handelsbanken 308 
  HSBC Investment Banking 93 
  ING Financial Markets 3 
  Jefferies 13 
  JP Morgan Chase 140 
  Keefe, Bruyette & Woods 6 
  Kepler Cheuvreux 87 
  Macquaire 24 
  Mainfirst Bank 1 
  Mediobanca 3 
  Morgan Stanley 126 
  Naxitis 13 
  Nomura 91 
  Nordea 393 
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Oddo Securities 8 
  Pareto Öhman 80 
  Pohjola Bank 9 
  Redburn 1 
  Remium 1 
  Royal Bank of Canada 18 
  Royal Bank of Scotland 15 
  Sanford Bernstein 1 
  Santander 4 
  SEB 238 
  Société Générale 93 
  Swedbank 203 
  Sydbank 2 
  Transcom 1 
  UBS 190 
  Unicredit 2 
  WestLB 1 
  William Blair 1 
  Zacks Investment Research 1 
  Ålandsbanken 3 
  
Total recommendations from banks 3589 
  
Total recommendations large cap 3880 
  
Percentage of bank sources large cap 92,50% 
  
A.2.2.2. Mid Cap 
Banks Newspapers/Non-banks 
ABG Sundal Collier 19 Affärsvärlden 68 
ABN 2 Aktiespararen 18 
Avanza 1 Börsveckan 84 
Barclays 1 Dagens Industri 19 
Canaccord Genuity 4 Placeringsguiden 5 
Carnegie 39 Privata Affärer 8 
Citigroup 9 Veckans Affärer 18 
Credit Suisse 4 Total recommendations from newspapers 220 
Danske Markets 65 Total recommendations mid cap 1096 
Deutsche Bank 12 Percentage of newspaper sources mid cap 20,07% 
DNB 5 
  Exane BNP Paribas 3 
  Goldman Sachs 18 
  Guggenheim Securities 1 
  Handelsbanken Capital Markets 234 
  HSBC 5 
  Jefferies 4 
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JP Morgan 2 
  Macquarie Research 2 
  Morgan Stanley 1 
  Natixis 2 
  Nomura 4 
  Nordea Markets 180 
  Oddo 1 
  Pareto Öhman 49 
  RBC Capital Markets 3 
  Remium 2 
  Royal Bank of Scotland 4 
  SEB Markets 127 
  Société Générale 1 
  Swedbank Markets 54 
  TD Securities 2 
  Terra Markets 1 
  UBS 14 
  Ålandsbanken 1 
  
Total recommendations from banks 876 
  
Total recommendations mid cap 1096 
  
Percentage of bank sources mid cap 79,93% 
   
A.2.2.3 Small Cap 
Banks Newspapers/Non-banks 
ABG Sundal Collier 8 Affärsvärlden 55 
Carnegie 15 Aktiespararen 10 
Credit Suisse 4 Börsveckan 84 
Danske Markets 12 Dagens Industri 4 
DNB Markets 4 Placeringsguiden 6 
Goldman Sachs 1 Privata Affärer 4 
Handelsbanken Capital Markets 46 Veckans Affärer 17 
Helvea 1 Total recommendations from newspapers 180 
Nordea Markets 76 Total recommendations small cap 424 
Pareto Öhman 7 Percentage of newspaper sources small cap 42,45% 
Remium 1 
  SEB Markets 42 
  Swedbank Markets 21 
  Ålandsbanken 3 
  Öhman 3 
  
Total recommendations from banks 244 
  
Total recommendations small cap 424 
  
Percentage of bank sources small cap  57,55% 
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A.3. Questionnaire to analysts 
1. To what extent do quarterly reports provide the foundation of the stock recommendations you make? 
2. How much do you believe the new regulations imposed on the 1st of January on quarterly reports, meaning that firms on OMX 
Stockholm now only need to provide quarterly reports twice a year, will affect your possibility to make reliable 
recommendations? 
3. To what extent do you consider the signals of insiders' trading when forming your stock recommendation? 
4. What do you mainly base your stock recommendations on? 
5. What time horizon do you apply when making your stock recommendations? 
6. To what extent do you believe that analysts are unwilling do revise an already published stock recommendation within a near 
future of 3 months? 
7. It is argued in several theories that analysts in general tend to publish significantly more positive recommendations on stocks of 
companies that are also corporate clients to the banks the analysts work for. This because a conflict of interest leads analysts to 
sometimes give biased recommendations in order to keep the client satisfied on behalf of a less truthful recommendation to the 
market. To what extent do you believe that this is actually the case? 
8. In relation to the average analyst, how good do you consider yourself to be at valuing and predicting the future of a company 
and giving accurate stock recommendations? 
9. What type of stocks do you tend to favour following? 
10. Do you expect a riskier stock or security to yield higher abnormal return than a safer one? 
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A.3.1 Analysts’ answers to questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Answered: 
What other sources of information do you consider valuable in order to form forecasts, analyses and 
recommendations? 
Great Extent annual report, company meetings, industry reports 
Quite Small Extent Annual reports, industry reports, other companies annual reports 
Quite Large Extent Annual reports, peers reports, talking with management. 
Great Extent Chanel checking, speaking to (unlisted) peers and pertinent sector organisations 
Quite Large Extent Direct management communication  Direct and indirect market trends 
Quite Small Extent Industry growth trends, economic outlook, competitors, suppliers, customers. 
Quite Small Extent industry news, feedback from potential customers. When q report is released it is shortly old news 
Quite Large Extent macro/industry/independent organizations 
Quite Large Extent Market forecasts and analysis, official statistics 
Quite Large Extent Meetin management. Presentations from conferences. Market analysis. 
Great Extent Meeting company representatives  Macroeconomic forecasts and discussions 
Great Extent meetings with management  ad hoc presentations  industry data 
Quite Large Extent 
Since I cover banks: central bank financial stability reports, reports from the FSA in each country etc, statistical 
reports on eg credit growth etc. 
Quite Large Extent talking to management, talking to peers etc 
Quite Small Extent Too many to list 
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Answered: Comments: 
Very Little All companies that I cover will continue to provide 4 quarterly reports (major swedish banks) 
Very Much Cet. par. decreased forecast accuracy and increased share price volatility (risk premium) 
Very Much having only reports twice a year, makes it a lot more difficult to follow short term ternds 
Not at All I don't expect my companies to drop reporting. 
Not at All 
I doubt that any company will change the numbers of reports issued every years. I do only cover large companies 
Very Little I think the companies that I follow will not change its reporting pattern. 
Very Much It is strongly negative without exception. 
Very Much Its great for analysts and negative for disclosure and transparency 
Little Less information to base numerical forecasts and analysis on 
Very Little Near-term transparency 
Little Perhaphs better recomendations, but less visibility on numbers. 
Not at All the companies I cover will continue issuing quarterly reports 
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Answered: Comments: 
Quite Large Extent A Chairman of the Board or CEO selling is often a signal to take profit 
Quite Large Extent For short-term tactical buying/Selling, not for long-term value calls 
Small Extent 
Hard to know all insider trading given the ISK accounts. Also need to distinigush between options that are given 
and real insider trading. 
Not at All 
Limited inisder transaction in my stock universe. Smaller transaction do not matter, only major ones by the 
major/controlling shareholder. 
Not at All That would be illegal! 
Not at All Very difficult to read anything into this. 
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Answer 1 How do you mean ? 
Answer 2 Medium term value 
Answer 3 Meetin management. Presentations from conferences. Market analysis. 
Answer 4 Fundamental analysis and investor feedback. 
Answer 5 Valuation, strategy, business and industry outlook 
Answer 6 Growth prospects vs valuation. 
Answer 7 valuation  earnings momentum  market sentiment 
Answer 8 
Earnings forecasts and consensus expectations (identifying triggers that may not be full priced in the share price) 
Answer 9 
fundamental analysis, making valuations of the company and try to see where in the business cycle we are 
Answer 10 fundamental forecast of tangible book value and a qualitative view on the company. 
Answer 11 fundamental value of the share, operationall momentum. 
Answer 12 It varies depending on the situation. 
Answer 13 fundamental research, top down and bottom up 
Answer 14 
The company's outlook. In what direction are trends pointing and whether I believe it is likely to continue or not. 
Answer 15 Multiples, relative valuation 
Answer 16 Price potential in short-/mid term (6 months) 
Answer 17 
expected future underlying company performance, based on industry research and talk w clients, customers, end 
users etc 
Answer 18 
Valuation and market trends, potential share price triggers and how I deviate from market consensus 
Answer 19 -- 
Answer 20 Valuation and my estimates compared to consensus estimates (i.e. are consensus estimates wrong) 
Answer 21 valuation, scope for earnings growth, timing and share price triggers 
Answer 22 valuation, scope for earnings growth, timing and share price triggers 
Answer 23 upcoming events, hard and soft triggers 
Answer 24 Estimated earnings for the company over the next 12-24 months. 
Answer 25 Fundamentals  Valuation  Macro Risk 
Answer 26 Valuation  Growth in terms of sales and earnings 
Answer 27 Competitive and demand analysis for the next 1-3 years 
Answer 28 
Analysis where the conclusion is that a stock is fundamentally undervalued, overvalued or fairly valued, meaning 
there is upside or downside to the share price. 
Answer 29 own analysis - company, industry, market, valuation 
Answer 30 Vinstpotential vs aktiekurs... 
Answer 31 Earnings outlook and valuation 
Answer 32 weighing in as many factors as possible 
Answer 33 Long term views 
Answer 34 Forecast profit and cash flow the coming 3 years 
Answer 35 Fundamental analysis, relative valuation, etc. 
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Answered: Comments: 
12 - 24 Months 12 months 
3 - 12 Months 12 months 
12 - 24 Months 12months 
3 - 12 Months 6 months 
3 - 12 Months 6-12 months 
3 - 12 Months 6-12m 
3 - 12 Months Carnegie has a 6-12m recommendation view 
12 - 24 Months It depends on the specific case 
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Answered: Comments: 
Quite Small Extent Analyst stock recommendations are published but can be changed relatively quickly  Additionally, the 
communication to clients can be changed to reflect if the near term outlook differs from the required 12 month 
recommendation time horizon 
Quite Small Extent Depends on circumstances but an unexpected event or news could trigger a change in the long-term view. 
Quite Large Extent It is neither our key purpose nor is it practical to call every short term movement in the share price. Analyst 
recommendations will often be wrong - there are lead times needed to write reports to justify any recommendation 
change and many ratings are also sector relative. It is also not our overriding aim to get our recommendations right 
all the time - of course we try to but our main purpose is to add value to our clients so they pay us. Most clients 
value our knowledge and analysis  to help them make their own investment decisions over our recommendations. 
Not at All Ratings are pragmatic and can change every week technically 
Small Extent You dont want to change too often, although it will be done if the share price moves significantly in your estimated 
direction or the case changes completely 
Quite Large Extent You need lots of new info to do this. Especially as the investment horizon is longer than 3m. 
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Answered: Comments: 
Quite Small Extent bear in mind - there's more trading business on a Buy rating than a Sell! Equity markets are for positive people, 
pessimists trade bonds! 
Not at All Definitely not. The internal barriers between research and IBD are total. 
Quite Small Extent Large companies are very professional leading to small confilicts of interest. Smaller companies could see larger 
confilitcs of interest. 
Quite Small Extent Maybe valid in some cases. Should be more common within smaller stocks than larger. 
Quite Large Extent no 
Quite Large Extent no 
Small Extent No 
Small Extent No 
Small Extent No 
Quite Large Extent No as I work for Redburn the largest independent broker in Europe 
Small Extent No, banking business is separate, Chinese wall. No pressure from this side at all at major banks... It's a myth! 
Great Extent No. 
Small Extent No. In all banks I have worked for there have been fully functioning chinese walls and therefore no pressure for 
any bias. 
Small Extent Only true for Goldman Sachs. 
Quite Large Extent Our company is an independent research house, which is very successful exactly because of this reason. No 
conflict of interest means more sincere recommendations for investors. 
Not at All Research and investment banking are completely seperate. Research analysts work very independently from the 
bank that they work for, and tend to have worked at several banks. 
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Answered: Comments: 
Better than average (based on statistics, e.g. Bloomberg ANR) 
Better than average Are you trying to measure confrimation bias? This question I find very odd. 
Better than average everybody believes he/she is better than average...otherwise no point in doing this... 
A lot better than average I was ranked No1 analyst in Nordic region in Global Survey. 
Better than average isn't everyone? ;) 
Better than average Nice question. The truth lies in investor votes I am top 5 out of 50 consistently with the largest. So I can back my 
claim. 
A lot better than average Of course, otherwise I should not be doing this job! 
Better than average Only slightly better than average! 
Same as average This is completely subjective and a bit irrelevant. Almost every analyst will tell you that his/her recommendations 
are better than average. 
Better than average You can track this in Bloomberg, where they rate your recomendations vs actual performance. 
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Comments: 
--- 
Beta is a waste of time fama and French is old school. I consider, competitive intensity, indebtedness, brand, 
management, operational leverage, customer, channel and country mix to be the true indicators of risk. The share 
price is an output not an input. 
Depends on the market appetite for risk and sentiment over a given time period. 
Depends on the market appetite for risk and sentiment over a given time period. 
It depends on industry, company and general market conditions 
Not necessarily. 
not possible to answer this one 
This question is unclear. If it means do I need a higher absolute or relative return for a higher risk stock to 
recommend buying it then yes. It would be foolish to ignore risk. 
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A.4. Questionnaire to insiders 
1. What is your position within the firm? 
2. My company is listed on? 
3. To what extent do stock recommendations provide the foundation for your decision to buy/sell stocks of your firm? 
4. How much do you believe the new regulations imposed on the 1st of January on quarterly reports, meaning that firms on OMX 
Stockholm only have to provide quarterly reports twice a year instead of four times a year, will affect analysts possibilities to 
make reliable recommendations? 
5. How does your company plan to adjust to the new, eased regulations of quarterly reports? 
6. To what extent do you consider how friends/family/colleagues trade when making your decision to buy/sell stocks of your 
firm? 
7. What do you mainly base your decision to trade on? 
8. What time horizon do you apply when trading? 
9. To what extent do you believe that it is common for analysts to favour giving positive recommendations on stocks of firms that 
are clients to the bank the analysts work for? 
10. On average how good do you believe analysts are at giving proper and truthful recommendations? 
 
A.4.1 Insiders answers to questionnaire 
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Position Company Answered: Comments: 
Position 
Company 
listed on: Answered: Comments: 
CEO 
Large Cap Not at all Analyst reports have a 6-12 month horison. When I buy shares in my company I have a much longer investment horison. 
CEO 
Mid Cap Not at all 
As a company insider and CEO I am significantly more informed about the business 
than any stock analysts. The main input from the analysts is the valuation models they 
provide and applying my own insides into this model, I can make my own valuation of 
the right share price. 
Other position in 
management 
team 
Large Cap Not at all I avoid share trading to limit risk for insider trading given the large amount of information I have in my role.. 
CEO Small Cap Not at all I do not trade 
Other position in 
management 
team 
Large Cap Not at all I do not trade in my company 
CFO 
  Not at all I do not trade in my own company - I only purchase stock as part of my incentive program. 
Other position in 
management 
team Large Cap Not at all 
I have much better insight into opportunities and threats for my company than any 
external analysts 
CEO Mid Cap Not at all Normally have I more info than the external analysts 
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listed on: 
CFO Large Cap Little Because I don´t beleave that the companies will change their reportig, 
CFO Mid Cap Little companies will continue the old way the new regulations are meaningless 
Chairman of the 
Board Mid Cap Very little 
Have you read the NASDAQ OMX guidelines on reporting? There will be very few 
changes in the Swedish market. 
Other position in 
management 
team 
Large Cap Very little I believe most companies will continue to report four times a year and also provide guidance to the investor community. 
CFO Large Cap Little I believe that most companies on large cap will continue to report as before. 
CFO Mid Cap Little I expect most companies to continue with 4 reports anyway. 
CEO Small Cap Little 
I think few companies will follow and if they would information is sufficient anyway. 
There are very few analysts for smaller companies 
CFO Small Cap Not at all I think very few compan ies will go for this 
CEO Small Cap Much If companies start to report less than each quarter, I think that insider problems will increase and accordingly harm the confidence in your company. 
CEO Mid Cap Much 
It is impossible to apply the answer across all companies, for companies with a stable 
business and other sources provide insights into their progress this will have little 
impact, for companies in a volatile business and in inflextion points in their business 
half year reports will be too infrequent. 
Other Large Cap Not at all Jag är övertygad om att aktiemarknaden kommer att även fortsättningsvis få relevant information om bolagen på kvartalsbasis. 
Other position in 
management 
team 
Mid Cap Much Lower liquidity, lower insight. 
CEO Large Cap Not at all Most companies will not change their reporting. 
Other position in 
management 
team 
Large Cap Much 
My perception is that very few insiders depend on analysts' report when picking stocks 
to invest in. If you are an insider, you would typically have as much -  if not even higher 
higher - knowledge about the stock market than coudl be derived from an analyst 
report.  Less frequent reporting is considered beneficial for all companies, as it will 
reduce the focus on delviering quarterly resulta, and instead shift focus to more long 
term results. 
Other position in 
management 
team 
Large Cap Very little no large caps will change to 6 month reporting 
CFO Mid Cap Very little 
Since our business i cyclical over the year and two quarters are more important, it may 
be regarded as more difficult to make estimations. However, since there is 
communication on a running basis I do not beleive it will have any major impact. 
Other position in 
management 
team 
Mid Cap Little The analysts that follow us are very informed about our industry; however, they may lose insight into the current business status. 
CFO Mid Cap Little The companies will continue to publish quarterly reports 
CFO Small Cap Much The gap beetween insiders and the general public will increase. Less public info will have  a negative effect on the transparancy. 
Other position in 
management 
team 
Large Cap Very little 
The quarterly numbers say very little about the longterm prospects of any company. If 
the analysts use basic corporate finance tools as a basis for their valuations (cash flow 
NPV) you know that typically more than 80% of the value of any company is beyond 
the 5 year horizon. 
CFO Small Cap Much Över tid kommer kunskap och insikt att tunnas ut vilket medför trubbigare analyser 
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Position Company listed on: Answered: Comments: 
CEO Large Cap We will continue publishing quarterly 
reports exactly as usual 
At present we have no change but we will review this as we go forward 
CFO Mid Cap 
We will continue publishing quarterly 
reports but they will be less 
informative 
At the beginning we will report the group as we have done before.   But I 
think we will exclude the parent company for instance (so the report will 
be a little less informative but the most important things will be 
included). 
Other Small Cap 
We will continue publishing quarterly 
reports exactly as usual 
For now we will continue to publish reports as usual. but in the furure it 
may change. we will of course see how the market react and how other 
companies do this in the future. 
CEO Small Cap We will continue publishing quarterly reports exactly as usual For Q1 2014 and after that we will look at it again 
CEO Small Cap We will continue publishing quarterly reports exactly as usual Important for confidence and we have all the numbers. 
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Position Company listed on: Answered: Comments: 
CEO Large Cap I don't trade on stocks of the company 
I work for 
As long as I work for the company I will be a buyer and not a 
seller of our stock. 
CFO Small Cap I don't trade on stocks of the company I work for Do not trade 
Other position in 
management team Large Cap Not at all Family is also considered insiders 
Other position in 
management team Large Cap 
I don't trade on stocks of the company 
I work for 
I cannot trade in my position. I can of course sell and buy, but 
very infrequently. Any move by any of us in the mgmt team 
would of course be seen as a signal by the stock market. 
Other position in 
management team Small Cap Not at all I trade very seldom in our company since I'm an insider. 
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Summary of all answers: 
What do you mainly base your decision to trade on? Number of answers % 
No answer 19 11,45% 
Facts 2 1,20% 
Feelings/Gutfeeling 5 3,01% 
Personal financial situation 15 9,04% 
I don't trade 12 7,23% 
My own analysis 28 16,87% 
I don't trade, I invest long-term 18 10,84% 
To signal commitment to my company 4 2,41% 
I don't trade 11 6,63% 
My own long-term belief in the company 20 12,05% 
I trade through incentive programmes 5 3,01% 
Being in the same position as the shareholders adds commitment 7 4,22% 
When the stock is undervalued 2 1,20% 
Other 18 10,84% 
SUM 166   
 
All answers: 
Position 
Company 
listed on: What do you mainly base your decision to trade on? 
Other position in 
management team Large Cap . 
Other position in 
management team Large Cap Annual accumulation of shares in the company I work for. 
Other position in 
management team Large Cap Cash need 
Other Large Cap Depends on the time horizon of the trade. The shorter the time the more psychology. 
Other Large Cap Det var flera år sedan jag gjorde några affärer i aktien senast - jag har köpt på mig aktier tidigare som jag valt att behålla - dvs ligga still med. 
Other position in 
management team Large Cap Don't trade. 
CEO Large Cap Feeling for company, business cycle, overall macro economic trends 
CFO Large Cap General trends 
CEO Large Cap How much the shares are worth in relation to my salary. I aim for having a certain percentage of my net worth in company stocks. Second criterion is incentive systems that we have. 
Other position in 
management team Large Cap I buy when I perceive the market is undervaluing the shares 
Other position in 
management team Large Cap 
I do not "trade" stocks in my company, I buy and sell stocks based on recommendations in our incentive 
programs. I buy or sell when I believe it is appropriate, generally soon after the publication of our quarterly 
reports. 
CEO Large Cap I don´t trade 
Other position in 
management team Large Cap I don´t trade, I own 
Chairman of the Board Large Cap I dont trade in the companies I control 
CFO Large Cap I have a senior position. 
Other position in 
management team Large Cap I only do long term investments in the company since I have great trust in our future performance. 
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Other position in 
management team Large Cap I own some shares but I don't trade 
CEO Large Cap I spend 10% of my gross annual salary on buying shares every year. 
Other position in 
management team Large Cap I would only trade (=sell) if leaving the company. 
Other position in 
management team Large Cap If I trade it is based on my own analysis 
CEO Large Cap long term as, in principle, will not sell the stock I have bought 
Other position in 
management team Large Cap Long term committment to the company I work for. 
Other position in 
management team 
Large Cap Lots of general information 
Other position in 
management team Large Cap My own analysis of stocks 
CFO Large Cap My own likvidity position 
CFO Large Cap My own long-term belief in the company 
Other position in 
management team Large Cap My own opinion 
Other position in 
management team Large Cap N/a 
Other position in 
management team Large Cap No answer 
Other position in 
management team Large Cap Own analysis. 
Other position in 
management team Large Cap Own beliefs and pilot school 
Other Large Cap Own judgement with information from reports and PM's. 
CEO Large Cap Personal view but fully aware of ALL insider requirements 
CEO Large Cap Public information. 
CFO Large Cap See *6 
CFO Large Cap that I believe a greate future for the company 
Other position in 
management team Large Cap To the extent personal money is available 
Other position in 
management team Large Cap 
When our stock develops better than competition. We have an incentive system that triggers a payout that 
we buy stocks for and keep them > 3 years 
CFO Large Cap xx 
Other Mid Cap - 
CFO Mid Cap . 
Chairman of the Board Mid Cap A majority of individuals building/creating companies do not trade in equities, they invest long term. Naturally they will have to sell or buy at some point in time but that has nothing to do with trading. 
CEO Mid Cap Allocation of assets 
CEO Mid Cap Analysis 
CEO Mid Cap assumption on value 
CFO Mid Cap Being a shareholder for the company you work for creates involvement/engagement. 
Other position in 
management team Mid Cap Broker recommendation 
Other position in Mid Cap Company future 
  
 
 
103 
management team 
CEO Mid Cap Facts 
CEO Mid Cap Future potentials which I like! 
CFO Mid Cap Generally I do not trade in stock of the company I work for. Only in the case there is an incentive program that requires me to own shares 
Other position in 
management team 
Mid Cap Gutfeeling 
Other position in 
management team Mid Cap Hur jag ser på framtiden 
CFO Mid Cap I buy only and shortly after reports are public. in addition, I buy in the share programme the AGM has issued. 
CEO Mid Cap I do not trade in the company I work for under normal circumstances 
CEO Mid Cap I don't trade, if then I buy and hold 
CFO Mid Cap I don´t "trade" and if I would sell it would be because I needed the money. 
CEO Mid Cap I don´t trade, if I buy I will keep the shares for years 
Other position in 
management team Mid Cap I dont trade the stock other than throught the share program. 
Other position in 
management team Mid Cap I have only purchased and retained shares through an LTI program. I have sold shares to pay taxes. 
CFO Mid Cap I only accumulate stocks long term and time of purchase is based on remuneration from the company. 
Other position in 
management team Mid Cap Information from the business 
Other position in 
management team Mid Cap Judgement of long term business fundamentals 
CFO Mid Cap Long term possibility 
Other position in 
management team Mid Cap Long term potenital 
CEO Mid Cap Long term potential 
CFO Mid Cap Long term think.  Private economy - do I have money to buy for. Do I need liquidity for something else etc... 
CEO Mid Cap Long term value play 
Other position in 
management team Mid Cap long term. 
CFO Mid Cap Long-term industry and company performance. 
Other position in 
management team 
Mid Cap longterm performance 
CEO Mid Cap macro analyses and current development for our entities 
CEO Mid Cap Management 
CFO Mid Cap Market analysis 
CEO Mid Cap My belief in the company future and I believe strongly that company executives needs to carry a sizeable 
part of their weatlh in their own company- being the pilot i.e. I bought most of my shares whan appointed. 
CEO Mid Cap My financial situation 
CEO Mid Cap my own long term view of the company 
Other position in 
management team 
Mid Cap My privat financial situation 
  
 
 
104 
CFO Mid Cap My total financial exposure on my firm, my financial resources and my private needs. 
Other position in 
management team Mid Cap N/A 
CEO Mid Cap n/a 
CFO Mid Cap no comment 
CFO Mid Cap Not trading, just collecting shares in the company I work for. 
Other position in 
management team Mid Cap 
Our own stock?  I believe in the company long term and consider it to be a quality stock going forward. I 
invest each quarter. 
CFO Mid Cap Overall opinion on the company's ability to create value. 
CFO Mid Cap Own judgement 
CEO Mid Cap Personal reasons 
CFO Mid Cap Plotical. To show a belief in the company 
CEO Mid Cap Private economy 
CFO Mid Cap Private financial situation. 
CFO Mid Cap Stock market being a good investment alternative compared to other investments 
Other position in 
management team Mid Cap Stock recommendations and private economy 
Other position in 
management team Mid Cap The performance of the company 
Other position in 
management team Mid Cap To show commitment to my company. 
Other position in 
management team Mid Cap 
Truly believe you should buy shares if you part of executive management team(pilot model) and basis always 
long term growth 
Other position in 
management team 
Mid Cap Valuation multiples and profit outlook 
Other Mid Cap Value 
CFO Mid Cap We have a share savings plan where part of salary is invested in shares quarterly 
Other position in 
management team Mid Cap Whether or not I need money for something else.  Long term placement. 
Other position in 
management team Mid Cap x 
Other position in 
management team Mid Cap zzz 
Other position in 
management team Small Cap - 
Other position in 
management team Small Cap . 
CFO Small Cap Ad hoc. 
CFO Small Cap Alernative investments. 
CFO Small Cap Basic strenght of compoany. Strategy and long term plans 
CEO Small Cap Being a shareholder in my company adds to my commitment to the company. I don't plan on selling 
CFO Small Cap bolaget felvärderat på börsen, stora åtgärder  igångsatta i bolaget för att komma tillrätta med  lönsamheten 
CEO Small Cap Business usp and Market analysis 
Other Small Cap combination of fundamental analysis, historical valuation and peer valuation 
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CEO Small Cap correct timing and profit 
CFO Small Cap Do not trade 
CEO Small Cap Employed or not 
Other position in 
management team Small Cap Estimated value increase 
CEO Small Cap facts 
Other position in 
management team Small Cap Feelings about our own business 
CEO Small Cap I am an insider so I do not trade 
CEO Small Cap I base it on the business model and my colleagues ability to achive our goals. 
CFO Small Cap I do not trade 
CFO Small Cap I don't trade 
CFO Small Cap I don't trade... 
CEO Small Cap I have to adapt to thestock market regulations and can only trade in "silent" periods. As a CEO that's almost never. 
CEO Small Cap I hold the shares long term 
CEO Small Cap I invest in a company. I do not trade. 
CEO Small Cap I work for a company I believe in and therefore I hold stock long-term without active trading 
Other position in 
management team Small Cap if it is an reasonable investment or not 
CFO Small Cap Jag vill ha ett aktivt ägande i det bolag jag arbetar 
CEO Small Cap Knowledge and supply of Money. 
Other position in 
management team Small Cap Long term aspects only. 
Other position in 
management team Small Cap long term direction of company 
Other position in 
management team Small Cap Long term interest 
Other position in 
management team 
Small Cap Long term stability 
CEO Small Cap Longterm investment outlook 
Other position in 
management team Small Cap Market analysis & Financial reports 
Other position in 
management team Small Cap Min egen bedömning av bolaget. 
Other position in 
management team Small Cap My longtern feeling and trust for the company in it´s marketplace 
Other Small Cap My own analysis and of course a belief in the company I work for over time 
CFO Small Cap My own analyze 
Other position in 
management team Small Cap My own evaluation and opinion 
Other position in 
management team Small Cap My own financial status, and the company business prospects. 
Other position in 
management team Small Cap My own industry knowledge 
CEO Small Cap My own judgement 
CEO Small Cap my own view of the company and its strategic position. 
CEO Small Cap N/A 
CFO Small Cap N/A 
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CFO Small Cap n/a 
Chairman of the Board Small Cap na 
Other position in 
management team Small Cap no answer 
CFO Small Cap Performance 
Other position in 
management team Small Cap Personal cash-flow situation 
CEO Small Cap Personal financial situation, insider regulations 
CFO Small Cap Private financial situation, trading rules and with consideration of shareholders. 
Other position in 
management team Small Cap rights issues 
CFO Small Cap Same as all other investments 
CFO Small Cap see above 
Other position in 
management team Small Cap Show my dedication 
CEO Small Cap Showing my thrust of the Company to the organisation 
CFO Small Cap Thoughts about the company´s future 
CFO Small Cap to be in same postion as our shareholders 
Other position in 
management team Small Cap What I think about the CEOs I have met. 
CEO Small Cap When business is stable and growing with our expectations 
CFO   I do not trade in my own company 
CFO   I shall understand the bussiness and the valuation shall be right. 
Other position in 
management team   My thoughts of the outcome of the ongoing and planned actions within the company 
CFO   n/a 
CFO   Potential upside 
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Position 
Company 
listed on: Answered: Comments: 
CFO Mid Cap 
I don't trade on stocks of 
the company I work for As CFO I cannot sell unless specific circumstances occur. 
CEO Mid Cap I don't trade on stocks of the company I work for B-S question. You have to differentiate between buying and selling. 
CEO Small Cap More than 24 months 
How do you define trade. Trading could by many be perceived as 
short term!? This impact how to answer on this question. I have 
bought stocks one time, for roughly four years ago, based on that it 
is "more than 24 months", on the other hand, the answer could 
also be "I don´t trade on stocks of the Company I work for" 
CEO Small Cap 
I don't trade on stocks of 
the company I work for I buy shares but don't sell as long as I work for the company 
CFO Small Cap I don't trade on stocks of the company I work for I do not trade. Current holdings is long term, not for trading 
CEO Small Cap I don't trade on stocks of the company I work for 
I don't make any changes in my holding, it there as long as I work 
for the company. 
CFO Mid Cap More than 24 months I have had my shares for more than 5 years. 
CFO   More than 24 months n/a but had to give an answer. 
Other position in 
management team Large Cap More than 24 months 
See above, I do not consider my transactions "trading" stocks in 
my company. 
CFO Mid Cap I don't trade on stocks of the company I work for See answer to question 7. 
CFO   More than 24 months Since I do not trade, the question is unapplicable 
CEO Mid Cap More than 24 months When buying, my intend is to keep the stocks while I have an executive position. 
Other position in 
management team Large Cap More than 24 months 
Will not sell until I leave the company. Too much signal effect to 
the market. 
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Position Company listed on: Answered: Comments: 
CFO Mid Cap Quite small extent 
I do not think that own customers are favored. More so volatile 
companies with a large amount of day-traders that generates 
brokerage fees. 
CEO Mid Cap Not at all 
I find the discussions with the banks analysts are disconnected to 
the discussion with our bank contacts. The main favor is probably 
a pressure on the analyst to make an analysis. You can turn the 
argument around and say, most companies tend to select banks 
with a positive recommendation for equity transactions. 
Other Small Cap Small extent 
It hugely depend on the relation.If the are going to IPO the 
company it will off course be a bullish buy analysis but otherwise 
the impact is very very small i would say. 
Other position in 
management team Mid Cap Small extent May dictate more just which stocks to cover. 
Other position in 
management team Large Cap Quite large extent 
The pressure is for sure there no matter how independent the 
analyst departments pretend to be. 
CFO Large Cap Not at all TRhey are supposed to be independent! 
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Position Company listed on: Answered: Comments: 
Other Mid Cap Bad Analyst know the numbers but they don't know the stock market. 
Other position in 
management team Large Cap Very Bad 
Analysts try to assess the result, based on info from the companies. 
However in reality, they do not have access to the most important 
information, so their work is a pure guess. On the otehr hand, I 
myself also guess when I anlayse companies. 
Other position in 
management team 
Small Cap Good However not at all accurate for prediction of price 
CFO Small Cap Good I beleive they are truthful but I´m not sure they always understand the details of the companies the analyze 
Other Small Cap Good I can only make a statement from my own experience from the company I work in 
Other position in 
management team Large Cap Bad 
It depends on time perspective:  - Very short term 
(weeks/months): Bad  - Medium term (6-18 months): Quite good  - 
Long term: Very bad 
CEO Large Cap Good 
Some spend a lot of time analyzing the company and get are very 
good. However a number do not spend enough time to understand 
the company 
CEO Mid Cap Good There are large swings in their knowledge, clearly sector specialists 
are better than generalists. 
CEO Small Cap Quite Good They do their job as best they can 
Other position in 
management team Large Cap Good To the best of their knowledge, which is not always correct... 
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A.5. Regressions 
A.5.1. Large Cap 
A.5.1.1. Analysts’ recommendations alone 
R1 
Dependent Variable: ARR   
Method: Panel Least Squares 
  
Periods included: 12   
Cross-sections included: 61 
  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 581  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -0,7157 0,4923 -1,4537 0,1466 
NBR -0,0073 0,0089 -0,8223 0,4113 
ABRMOM 0,4127 0,0478 8,6416 0,0000 
ABRWL 0,0326 0,0329 0,9909 0,3222 
LSIZE 0,0410 0,0287 1,4254 0,1547 
LMBR 0,0065 0,0230 0,2836 0,7768 
DSSA -0,0228 0,0115 -1,9771 0,0486 
DSBA 0,0197 0,0105 1,8752 0,0613 
R-squared 0,5234     Mean dependent var 0,0094 
Adjusted R-squared 0,4493     S.D. dependent var 0,1085 
F-statistic 7,0674     Durbin-Watson stat 2,9629 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
T1 –Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  ARR ABRMOM ABRWL DSBA DSSA LMBR LSIZE NBR 
Mean 0,0094 0,0253 0,0510 0,2513 0,1291 0,7230 17,3051 0,3273 
Median 0,0124 0,0135 0,0218 0,0000 0,0000 0,7130 17,1293 0,3333 
Maximum 0,9927 1,0389 1,7551 1,0000 1,0000 2,9317 19,9470 1,0000 
Minimum -0,3788 -0,4267 -0,5447 0,0000 0,0000 -0,9416 14,0294 -1,0000 
Std, Dev, 0,1085 0,1661 0,2565 0,4341 0,3356 0,7050 1,1315 0,4854 
Skewness 1,2713 1,2243 1,5425 1,1468 2,2124 0,3848 0,0167 -0,4601 
Kurtosis 14,3106 7,8499 8,7836 2,3151 5,8949 2,9132 3,0627 2,8902 
Jarque-Bera 3253,4780 714,5520 1040,1630 138,7004 676,8633 14,5219 0,1224 20,7915 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0007 0,9406 0,0000 
Sum 5,4626 14,7180 29,6114 146,0000 75,0000 420,0348 10054,2600 190,1446 
Sum Sq, Dev, 6,8238 15,9940 38,1628 109,3115 65,3184 288,2758 742,5988 136,6675 
Observations 581 581 581 581 581 581 581 581 
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R2 
Dependent Variable: ARHY   
Method: Panel Least Squares 
  
Periods included: 11   
Cross-sections included: 61 
  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 542  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -7,1370 0,9166 -7,7861 0,0000 
NBR 0,0069 0,0139 0,4979 0,6188 
ABRMOM -0,2073 0,0510 -4,0617 0,0001 
ABRWL 0,0498 0,0520 0,9574 0,3389 
LSIZE 0,4337 0,0545 7,9554 0,0000 
LMBR -0,4804 0,0666 -7,2116 0,0000 
DSSA -0,0178 0,0157 -1,1353 0,2568 
DSBA 0,0149 0,0149 0,9983 0,3187 
R-squared 0,5632     Mean dependent var 0,0202 
Adjusted R-squared 0,4907     S.D. dependent var 0,1571 
F-statistic 7,7697     Durbin-Watson stat 1,5205 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
T2–Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  ABRMOM ABRWL DSBA DSSA LMBR LSIZE NBR ARHY 
Mean 0,0252 0,0488 0,2491 0,1292 0,7093 17,2855 0,3263 0,0202 
Median 0,0151 0,0162 0,0000 0,0000 0,6881 17,1293 0,3333 0,0073 
Maximum 1,0389 1,7551 1,0000 1,0000 2,7259 19,9470 1,0000 1,0389 
Minimum -0,4267 -0,5447 0,0000 0,0000 -0,9416 14,0294 -1,0000 -0,3992 
Std, Dev, 0,1669 0,2551 0,4329 0,3357 0,7016 1,1260 0,4901 0,1571 
Skewness 1,2429 1,6299 1,1604 2,2116 0,3971 0,0280 -0,4687 1,1776 
Kurtosis 8,0586 9,4004 2,3465 5,8912 2,8700 3,0393 2,8903 8,1654 
Jarque-Bera 717,4435 1165,0900 131,2789 630,6050 14,6251 0,1059 20,1128 727,8221 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0007 0,9484 0,0000 0,0000 
Sum 13,6357 26,4383 135,0000 70,0000 384,4438 9368,7320 176,8338 10,9717 
Sum Sq, Dev, 15,0759 35,2033 101,3745 60,9594 266,3125 685,8719 129,9550 13,3463 
Observations 542 542 542 542 542 542 542 542 
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R3 
Dependent Variable: AR1Y   
Method: Panel Least Squares 
  
Periods included: 11   
Cross-sections included: 61 
  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 542  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -8,5066 1,0797 -7,8788 0,0000 
NBR 0,0080 0,0151 0,5308 0,5958 
ABRMOM 0,8264 0,0622 13,2875 0,0000 
ABRWL 0,0473 0,0628 0,7540 0,4512 
LSIZE 0,5139 0,0646 7,9509 0,0000 
LMBR -0,5007 0,0831 -6,0229 0,0000 
DSSA -0,0200 0,0159 -1,2552 0,2100 
DSBA 0,0096 0,0166 0,5797 0,5624 
R-squared 0,7953     Mean dependent var 0,0460 
Adjusted R-squared 0,7614     S.D. dependent var 0,2543 
F-statistic 23,4182     Durbin-Watson stat 1,6071 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
T3–Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  ABRMOM ABRWL DSBA DSSA LMBR LSIZE NBR AR1Y 
 Mean 0,0252 0,0488 0,2491 0,1292 0,7093 17,2855 0,3263 0,0460 
 Median 0,0151 0,0162 0,0000 0,0000 0,6881 17,1293 0,3333 0,0129 
 Maximum 1,0389 1,7551 1,0000 1,0000 2,7259 19,9470 1,0000 1,7551 
 Minimum -0,4267 -0,5447 0,0000 0,0000 -0,9416 14,0294 -1,0000 -0,5447 
 Std, Dev, 0,1669 0,2551 0,4329 0,3357 0,7016 1,1260 0,4901 0,2543 
 Skewness 1,2429 1,6299 1,1604 2,2116 0,3971 0,0280 -0,4687 1,6424 
 Kurtosis 8,0586 9,4004 2,3465 5,8912 2,8700 3,0393 2,8903 9,3143 
 Jarque-Bera 717,4435 1165,0900 131,2789 630,6050 14,6251 0,1059 20,1128 1144,0680 
 Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0007 0,9484 0,0000 0,0000 
 Sum 13,6357 26,4383 135,0000 70,0000 384,4438 9368,7320 176,8338 24,9174 
 Sum Sq, Dev, 15,0759 35,2033 101,3745 60,9594 266,3125 685,8719 129,9550 34,9793 
 Observations 542 542 542 542 542 542 542 542 
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R4 
Dependent Variable: AR2Y   
Method: Panel Least Squares 
  
Periods included: 9   
Cross-sections included: 61 
  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 445  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -9,5347 2,2688 -4,2025 0,0000 
NBR 0,0027 0,0352 0,0764 0,9392 
ABRMOM -0,1642 0,2101 -0,7813 0,4351 
ABRWL 0,8205 0,1646 4,9856 0,0000 
LSIZE 0,5593 0,1304 4,2900 0,0000 
LMBR -0,1158 0,2002 -0,5786 0,5632 
DSSA -0,0043 0,0320 -0,1354 0,8923 
DSBA 0,0449 0,0365 1,2296 0,2196 
R-squared 0,7718     Mean dependent var 0,1119 
Adjusted R-squared 0,7254     S.D. dependent var 0,4715 
F-statistic 16,6397     Durbin-Watson stat 1,1777 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
T4–Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  ABRMOM ABRWL DSBA DSSA LMBR LSIZE NBR AR2Y 
Mean 0,0150 0,0405 0,2584 0,1438 0,6922 17,3165 0,2745 0,1119 
Median 0,0060 0,0086 0,0000 0,0000 0,6627 17,1657 0,2857 0,0457 
Maximum 1,0389 1,7551 1,0000 1,0000 2,7259 19,9470 1,0000 3,7171 
Minimum -0,3992 -0,5447 0,0000 0,0000 -0,9416 14,0294 -1,0000 -0,6882 
Std, Dev, 0,1577 0,2462 0,4383 0,3513 0,7119 1,1230 0,4799 0,4715 
Skewness 1,2619 1,7973 1,1037 2,0301 0,3757 0,0322 -0,4627 2,8411 
Kurtosis 8,8019 10,7322 2,2181 5,1211 2,8659 3,0785 3,0453 17,0493 
Jarque-Bera 742,2634 1348,1220 101,6759 389,0690 10,8009 0,1912 15,9196 4258,4780 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0045 0,9088 0,0003 0,0000 
Sum 6,6530 18,0190 115,0000 64,0000 308,0292 7705,8350 122,1617 49,7801 
Sum Sq, Dev, 11,0375 26,9209 85,2809 54,7955 225,0099 559,9740 102,2420 98,7150 
Observations 445 445 445 445 445 445 445 445 
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A.5.1.2. Insider trading alone 
R1 
Dependent Variable: ARR  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Periods included: 12   
Cross-sections included: 59   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 386  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0,0345 0,6344 0,0543 0,9567 
LMBR 0,0405 0,0364 1,1139 0,2662 
LSIZE -0,0041 0,0367 -0,1110 0,9117 
NPR -0,0080 0,0068 -1,1804 0,2388 
ABRWL 0,0999 0,0380 2,6255 0,0091 
ABRMOM 0,4299 0,0514 8,3630 0,0000 
SDNIB -0,0131 0,0112 -1,1652 0,2448 
SDNIS -0,0033 0,0150 -0,2216 0,8248 
SDVB 0,0194 0,0121 1,6001 0,1106 
SDVS 0,0218 0,0139 1,5685 0,1178 
R-squared 0,6643     Mean dependent var 0,0082 
Adjusted R-squared 0,5789     S.D. dependent var 0,1108 
F-statistic 7,7868     Durbin-Watson stat 2,8468 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
T1–Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  ARR ABRMOM ABRWL LMBR LSIZE NPR SDNIB SDNIS SDVB SDVS 
Mean 0,0083 0,0262 0,0530 0,6647 17,5108 0,3279 0,1705 0,1189 0,2145 0,1214 
Median 0,0038 0,0147 0,0356 0,6152 17,4148 1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Maximum 0,9927 1,0389 1,7551 2,6885 19,9470 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 2,0000 1,0000 
Minimum -0,3788 -0,4267 -0,5164 -0,6539 15,2030 -1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Std, Dev, 0,1107 0,1571 0,2456 0,7085 1,0996 0,8612 0,3766 0,3240 0,4172 0,3271 
Skewness 1,8053 1,1445 1,5822 0,5009 0,2838 -0,6775 1,7519 2,3554 1,4980 2,3178 
Kurtosis 18,6620 8,3233 10,1696 2,9296 2,0274 1,6301 4,0692 6,5479 3,5695 6,3723 
Jarque-Bera 4165,6750 541,4344 990,3444 16,2661 20,4462 59,8683 216,4017 560,8218 149,9597 529,8896 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0003 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Sum 3,1963 10,1472 20,5279 257,2260 6776,6630 126,8783 66,0000 46,0000 83,0000 47,0000 
Sum Sq, Dev, 4,7302 9,5322 23,2759 193,7549 466,7378 286,3012 54,7442 40,5323 67,1990 41,2920 
Observations 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 
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R2 
Dependent Variable: ARHY  
Method: Panel Least Squares 
  
Periods included: 11   
Cross-sections included: 59 
  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 366  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -8,4234 0,7633 -11,0352 0,0000 
LMBR -0,5032 0,0489 -10,2933 0,0000 
LSIZE 0,5011 0,0441 11,3718 0,0000 
NPR -0,0010 0,0099 -0,0971 0,9227 
ABRWL 0,0472 0,0473 0,9983 0,3190 
ABRMOM -0,1530 0,0592 -2,5853 0,0102 
SDNIB 0,0157 0,0188 0,8361 0,4038 
SDNIS -0,0078 0,0235 -0,3335 0,7390 
SDVB -0,0046 0,0196 -0,2374 0,8125 
SDVS 0,0075 0,0243 0,3108 0,7562 
R-squared 0,5981     Mean dependent var 0,0138 
Adjusted R-squared 0,4907     S.D. dependent var 0,1510 
F-statistic 5,5663     Durbin-Watson stat 1,4276 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
T2–Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  ARHY ABRMOM ABRWL LMBR LSIZE NPR SDNIB SDNIS SDVB SDVS 
Mean 0,0262 0,0500 0,6549 17,4946 0,3529 0,1749 0,1093 0,2213 0,1175 0,0138 
Median 0,0174 0,0303 0,6043 17,4065 1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0066 
Maximum 1,0389 1,7551 2,6885 19,9470 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 2,0000 1,0000 1,0389 
Minimum -0,4267 -0,5164 -0,6539 15,2030 -1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 -0,3992 
Std, Dev, 0,1571 0,2446 0,7107 1,0998 0,8519 0,3804 0,3124 0,4222 0,3224 0,1510 
Skewness 1,1376 1,6563 0,5226 0,2736 -0,7387 1,7119 2,5045 1,4515 2,3759 1,2202 
Kurtosis 8,5475 10,7864 2,9506 2,0035 1,7219 3,9307 7,2727 3,4349 6,6448 9,3760 
Jarque-Bera 548,2431 1091,9230 16,6952 19,7095 58,1937 191,9797 661,0381 131,4035 546,9147 710,7820 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0002 0,0001 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Sum 9,5993 18,2998 239,6927 6403,0110 129,1696 64,0000 40,0000 81,0000 43,0000 5,0625 
Sum Sq, Dev, 9,0092 21,8320 184,3753 441,4709 264,8920 52,8087 35,6284 65,0738 37,9481 8,3174 
Observations 366 366 366 366 366 366 366 366 366 366 
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R3 
Dependent Variable: AR1Y  
Method: Panel Least Squares 
  
Periods included: 11   
Cross-sections included: 59 
  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 366  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -9,4854 1,5989 -5,9324 0,0000 
LMBR -0,5677 0,1329 -4,2702 0,0000 
LSIZE 0,5641 0,0949 5,9438 0,0000 
NPR -0,0010 0,0112 -0,0911 0,9274 
ABRWL 0,0690 0,0806 0,8558 0,3928 
ABRMOM 0,8971 0,1033 8,6839 0,0000 
SDNIB 0,0165 0,0201 0,8206 0,4126 
SDNIS -0,0120 0,0234 -0,5128 0,6085 
SDVB -0,0004 0,0186 -0,0191 0,9848 
SDVS 0,0072 0,0234 0,3100 0,7568 
R-squared 0,7999     Mean dependent var 0,0396 
Adjusted R-squared 0,7464     S.D. dependent var 0,2437 
F-statistic 14,9516     Durbin-Watson stat 1,2808 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
T3–Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  AR1Y ABRMOM ABRWL LMBR LSIZE NPR SDNIB SDNIS SDVB SDVS 
Mean 0,0262 0,0500 0,6549 17,4946 0,3529 0,1749 0,1093 0,2213 0,1175 0,0396 
Median 0,0174 0,0303 0,6043 17,4065 1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0186 
Maximum 1,0389 1,7551 2,6885 19,9470 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 2,0000 1,0000 1,7551 
Minimum -0,4267 -0,5164 -0,6539 15,2030 -1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 -0,5022 
Std, Dev, 0,1571 0,2446 0,7107 1,0998 0,8519 0,3804 0,3124 0,4222 0,3224 0,2437 
Skewness 1,1376 1,6563 0,5226 0,2736 -0,7387 1,7119 2,5045 1,4515 2,3759 1,9065 
Kurtosis 8,5475 10,7864 2,9506 2,0035 1,7219 3,9307 7,2727 3,4349 6,6448 12,0943 
Jarque-Bera 548,2431 1091,9230 16,6952 19,7095 58,1937 191,9797 661,0381 131,4035 546,9147 1482,9770 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0002 0,0001 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Sum 9,5993 18,2998 239,6927 6403,0110 129,1696 64,0000 40,0000 81,0000 43,0000 14,5084 
Sum Sq, Dev, 9,0092 21,8320 184,3753 441,4709 264,8920 52,8087 35,6284 65,0738 37,9481 21,6774 
Observations 366 366 366 366 366 366 366 366 366 366 
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R4 
Dependent Variable: AR2Y  
Method: Panel Least Squares 
  
Periods included: 9   
Cross-sections included: 58 
  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 288  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -12,5949 3,3405 -3,7704 0,0002 
LMBR 0,0852 0,1962 0,4343 0,6645 
LSIZE 0,7187 0,1896 3,7907 0,0002 
NPR -0,0422 0,0301 -1,4011 0,1626 
ABRWL 0,9360 0,2105 4,4474 0,0000 
ABRMOM -0,3654 0,2440 -1,4972 0,1358 
SDNIB 0,1067 0,0449 2,3779 0,0183 
SDNIS -0,0193 0,0574 -0,3369 0,7366 
SDVB 0,0751 0,0419 1,7926 0,0745 
SDVS -0,0511 0,0409 -1,2495 0,2129 
R-squared 0,7917     Mean dependent var 0,1038 
Adjusted R-squared 0,7193     S.D. dependent var 0,4530 
F-statistic 10,9405     Durbin-Watson stat 1,4052 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
T4–Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  AR2Y ABRMOM ABRWL LMBR LSIZE NPR SDNIB SDNIS SDVB SDVS 
Mean 0,0099 0,0366 0,6413 17,5311 0,2737 0,1597 0,1076 0,2153 0,1285 0,1038 
Median 0,0019 0,0107 0,6016 17,4148 0,9995 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0547 
Maximum 1,0389 1,7551 2,6885 19,9470 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 2,0000 1,0000 3,7171 
Minimum -0,3992 -0,5022 -0,6539 15,2030 -1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 -0,6360 
Std, Dev, 0,1515 0,2399 0,7225 1,1086 0,8756 0,3670 0,3105 0,4201 0,3352 0,4530 
Skewness 1,3735 1,9111 0,4958 0,2730 -0,5525 1,8577 2,5320 1,5259 2,2206 3,1440 
Kurtosis 10,4025 12,8572 2,9039 1,9490 1,4751 4,4510 7,4109 3,7475 5,9312 21,7935 
Jarque-Bera 748,1171 1341,2870 11,9119 16,8314 42,5560 190,9089 541,2026 118,4610 339,8001 4712,7840 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0026 0,0002 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Sum 2,8498 10,5510 184,6806 5048,9570 78,8352 46,0000 31,0000 62,0000 37,0000 29,8913 
Sum Sq, Dev, 6,5887 16,5119 149,8356 352,7339 220,0308 38,6528 27,6632 50,6528 32,2465 58,9017 
Observations 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 
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A.5.1.3. Insider trading and analysts’ recommendations together 
R1 
Dependent Variable: ARR   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Periods included: 12   
Cross-sections included: 56   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 330  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -0,3688 0,6504 -0,5670 0,5712 
LMBR 0,0245 0,0374 0,6555 0,5128 
LSIZE 0,0196 0,0377 0,5195 0,6039 
ABRMOM 0,4402 0,0550 8,0087 0,0000 
ABRWL 0,1051 0,0372 2,8248 0,0051 
NPR -0,0032 0,0077 -0,4207 0,6743 
SDNIB -0,0078 0,0126 -0,6146 0,5394 
SDNIS -0,0030 0,0159 -0,1914 0,8484 
SDVB 0,0210 0,0157 1,3414 0,1810 
SDVS 0,0337 0,0160 2,1135 0,0355 
NBR -0,0103 0,0120 -0,8595 0,3909 
DSBA 0,0097 0,0139 0,6961 0,4870 
DSSA -0,0408 0,0150 -2,7199 0,0070 
R-squared 0,6956     Mean dependent var 0,0074 
Adjusted R-squared 0,6009     S.D. dependent var 0,1151 
F-statistic 7,3519     Durbin-Watson stat 2,8330 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
T1–Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  ARR ABRWL 
ABRMO
M DSBA DSSA LMBR LSIZE NBR NPR SDNIB SDNIS SDVB SDVS 
Mean 0,0074 0,0582 0,0254 0,2758 0,1424 0,7179 17,4840 0,3465 0,3045 0,1758 0,1273 0,2000 0,1182 
Median 0,0032 0,0320 0,0141 0,0000 0,0000 0,7130 17,2981 0,3750 1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Maximum 0,9927 1,7551 1,0389 1,0000 1,0000 2,6885 19,9470 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 2,0000 1,0000 
Minimum -0,3788 -0,5164 -0,4267 0,0000 0,0000 -0,6539 15,2030 -1,0000 -1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Std, Dev, 0,1151 0,2551 0,1622 0,4476 0,3500 0,6996 1,1034 0,4734 0,8687 0,3812 0,3338 0,4081 0,3233 
Skewness 1,9200 1,6343 1,2319 1,0036 2,0463 0,4670 0,3789 -0,5554 -0,6200 1,7038 2,2367 1,6336 2,3655 
Kurtosis 18,6515 9,9364 8,4548 2,0071 5,1874 2,9521 2,1193 3,0738 1,5493 3,9029 6,0030 4,0808 6,5956 
Jarque-Bera 3571,0630 
808,453
7 492,5907 
68,946
7 
296,091
6 12,0241 18,5633 17,0380 50,0796 
170,868
1 
399,159
3 
162,835
0 
485,516
4 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0024 0,0001 0,0002 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Sum 2,4313 19,2221 8,3720 91,0000 47,0000 
236,907
9 
5769,720
0 
114,351
8 
100,471
8 58,0000 42,0000 66,0000 39,0000 
Sum Sq, 
Dev, 4,3579 21,4141 8,6568 
65,906
1 40,3061 
161,038
4 400,5849 73,7254 
248,279
1 47,8061 36,6546 54,8000 34,3909 
Observation
s 330 330 330 330 330 330 330 330 330 330 330 330 330 
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R2 
Dependent Variable: ARHY   
Method: Panel Least Squares 
  
Periods included: 11   
Cross-sections included: 55 
  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 310  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -8,1523 0,8253 -9,8785 0,0000 
LMBR -0,4961 0,0536 -9,2609 0,0000 
LSIZE 0,4874 0,0477 10,2121 0,0000 
ABRMOM -0,1281 0,0660 -1,9423 0,0533 
ABRWL 0,0103 0,0531 0,1946 0,8459 
NPR -0,0038 0,0112 -0,3386 0,7352 
SDNIB 0,0115 0,0211 0,5462 0,5854 
SDNIS -0,0003 0,0263 -0,0101 0,9919 
SDVB -0,0023 0,0238 -0,0948 0,9246 
SDVS -0,0131 0,0282 -0,4641 0,6430 
NBR 0,0405 0,0189 2,1409 0,0333 
DSBA 0,0112 0,0205 0,5454 0,5860 
DSSA -0,0076 0,0234 -0,3236 0,7466 
R-squared 0,6191     Mean dependent var 0,0209 
Adjusted R-squared 0,4949     S.D. dependent var 0,1556 
F-statistic 4,9829     Durbin-Watson stat 1,4179 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
T2–Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  ARHY ABRWL 
ABRMO
M DSBA DSSA LMBR LSIZE NBR NPR SDNIB SDNIS SDVB SDVS 
Mean 0,0551 0,0251 0,2710 0,1484 0,7070 17,4637 0,3337 0,3347 0,1806 0,1161 0,2065 0,1129 0,0209 
Median 0,0288 0,0158 0,0000 0,0000 0,6881 17,2525 0,3333 1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0153 
Maximum 1,7551 1,0389 1,0000 1,0000 2,6885 19,9470 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 2,0000 1,0000 1,0389 
Minimum -0,5164 -0,4267 0,0000 0,0000 -0,6539 15,2030 -1,0000 -1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 -0,3992 
Std, Dev, 0,2543 0,1623 0,4452 0,3561 0,7032 1,1016 0,4812 0,8585 0,3853 0,3209 0,4133 0,3170 0,1556 
Skewness 1,7198 1,2347 1,0306 1,9782 0,4895 0,3729 -0,5132 -0,6918 1,6602 2,3964 1,5874 2,4463 1,2930 
Kurtosis 10,5799 8,7179 2,0622 4,9134 2,9633 2,1076 2,9687 1,6483 3,7562 6,7425 3,9364 6,9844 9,3263 
Jarque-Bera 894,9406 
501,058
7 66,2390 
249,478
8 12,3965 17,4709 13,6186 48,3292 
149,789
0 
477,610
3 
141,519
9 
514,254
2 
603,331
0 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0020 0,0002 0,0011 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Sum 17,0858 7,7779 84,0000 46,0000 219,1761 
5413,754
0 
103,460
7 
103,763
1 56,0000 36,0000 64,0000 35,0000 6,4822 
Sum Sq, 
Dev, 19,9826 8,1389 61,2387 39,1742 
152,817
9 374,9948 71,5424 
227,717
7 45,8839 31,8194 52,7871 31,0484 7,4844 
Observation
s 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 
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R3 
Dependent Variable: AR1Y   
Method: Panel Least Squares 
  
Periods included: 11   
Cross-sections included: 55 
  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 310  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -9,3241 1,6811 -5,5466 0,0000 
LMBR -0,5691 0,1471 -3,8694 0,0001 
LSIZE 0,5575 0,1006 5,5402 0,0000 
ABRMOM 0,9326 0,1062 8,7843 0,0000 
ABRWL 0,0275 0,0873 0,3155 0,7526 
NPR -0,0060 0,0117 -0,5149 0,6071 
SDNIB 0,0169 0,0230 0,7326 0,4645 
SDNIS -0,0070 0,0260 -0,2701 0,7873 
SDVB -0,0083 0,0224 -0,3724 0,7099 
SDVS -0,0137 0,0274 -0,5005 0,6172 
NBR 0,0524 0,0217 2,4189 0,0163 
DSBA -0,0068 0,0254 -0,2661 0,7904 
DSSA -0,0030 0,0222 -0,1330 0,8943 
R-squared 0,8129     Mean dependent var 0,0465 
Adjusted R-squared 0,7518     S.D. dependent var 0,2539 
F-statistic 13,3176     Durbin-Watson stat 1,2841 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
T3–Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  AR1Y ABRWL 
ABRMO
M DSBA DSSA LMBR LSIZE NBR NPR SDNIB SDNIS SDVB SDVS 
Mean 0,0551 0,0251 0,2710 0,1484 0,7070 17,4637 0,3337 0,3347 0,1806 0,1161 0,2065 0,1129 0,0465 
Median 0,0288 0,0158 0,0000 0,0000 0,6881 17,2525 0,3333 1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0152 
Maximum 1,7551 1,0389 1,0000 1,0000 2,6885 19,9470 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 2,0000 1,0000 1,7551 
Minimum -0,5164 -0,4267 0,0000 0,0000 -0,6539 15,2030 -1,0000 -1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 -0,5022 
Std, Dev, 0,2543 0,1623 0,4452 0,3561 0,7032 1,1016 0,4812 0,8585 0,3853 0,3209 0,4133 0,3170 0,2539 
Skewness 1,7198 1,2347 1,0306 1,9782 0,4895 0,3729 -0,5132 -0,6918 1,6602 2,3964 1,5874 2,4463 1,9743 
Kurtosis 10,5799 8,7179 2,0622 4,9134 2,9633 2,1076 2,9687 1,6483 3,7562 6,7425 3,9364 6,9844 11,7791 
Jarque-Bera 894,9406 
501,058
7 66,2390 
249,478
8 12,3965 17,4709 13,6186 48,3292 
149,789
0 
477,610
3 
141,519
9 
514,254
2 
1196,909
0 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0020 0,0002 0,0011 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Sum 17,0858 7,7779 84,0000 46,0000 219,1761 
5413,754
0 
103,460
7 
103,763
1 56,0000 36,0000 64,0000 35,0000 14,4151 
Sum Sq, 
Dev, 19,9826 8,1389 61,2387 39,1742 
152,817
9 374,9948 71,5424 
227,717
7 45,8839 31,8194 52,7871 31,0484 19,9150 
Observation
s 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 
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R4 
Dependent Variable: AR2Y   
Method: Panel Least Squares 
  
Periods included: 9   
Cross-sections included: 54 
  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 251  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -12,0228 3,1884 -3,7708 0,0002 
LMBR 0,1864 0,2106 0,8849 0,3774 
LSIZE 0,6809 0,1807 3,7680 0,0002 
ABRMOM -0,3076 0,2356 -1,3059 0,1933 
ABRWL 0,8087 0,2017 4,0086 0,0001 
NPR -0,0341 0,0296 -1,1528 0,2506 
SDNIB 0,1241 0,0510 2,4360 0,0158 
SDNIS 0,0176 0,0579 0,3044 0,7612 
SDVB 0,0614 0,0463 1,3246 0,1870 
SDVS -0,0637 0,0495 -1,2870 0,1998 
NBR 0,0416 0,0488 0,8530 0,3948 
DSBA 0,1359 0,0504 2,6956 0,0077 
DSSA 0,0248 0,0431 0,5753 0,5658 
R-squared 0,8084     Mean dependent var 0,1213 
Adjusted R-squared 0,7294     S.D. dependent var 0,4714 
F-statistic 10,2327     Durbin-Watson stat 1,5382 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
T4–Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  AR2Y ABRWL 
ABRMO
M DSBA DSSA LMBR LSIZE NBR NPR SDNIB SDNIS SDVB SDVS 
Mean 0,0432 0,0114 0,2789 0,1594 0,6915 17,4938 0,3024 0,2746 0,1633 0,1076 0,1992 0,1195 0,1213 
Median 0,0068 0,0042 0,0000 0,0000 0,6575 17,3239 0,3333 1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0567 
Maximum 1,7551 1,0389 1,0000 1,0000 2,6885 19,9470 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 2,0000 1,0000 3,7171 
Minimum -0,5022 -0,3992 0,0000 0,0000 -0,6539 15,2030 -1,0000 -1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 -0,6161 
Std, Dev, 0,2483 0,1555 0,4493 0,3667 0,7159 1,1068 0,4709 0,8766 0,3704 0,3105 0,4101 0,3251 0,4714 
Skewness 1,9772 1,4536 0,9861 1,8613 0,4781 0,3814 -0,5610 -0,5514 1,8213 2,5331 1,6793 2,3457 3,1575 
Kurtosis 12,5168 10,5521 1,9725 4,4646 2,9621 2,0438 3,1941 1,4688 4,3172 7,4168 4,3421 6,5024 20,7830 
Jarque-Bera 1110,7500 
684,880
8 51,7234 
167,367
5 9,5759 15,6495 
13,561
7 37,2419 
156,914
2 
472,462
9 
136,810
3 
358,475
6 
3724,364
0 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0083 0,0004 0,0011 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Sum 10,8439 2,8528 70,0000 40,0000 173,5539 
4390,950
0 
75,895
8 68,9234 41,0000 27,0000 50,0000 30,0000 30,4576 
Sum Sq, 
Dev, 15,4079 6,0424 50,4781 33,6255 
128,111
0 306,2445 
55,430
9 
192,086
6 34,3028 24,0956 42,0398 26,4143 55,5498 
Observation
s 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 
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A.5.1.4. Insider trading depending analysts’ recommendations  
R1 
Dependent Variable: NPR   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Periods included: 12   
Cross-sections included: 56   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 330  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 3,8246 5,1545 0,7420 0,4588 
LMBR -0,6915 0,2983 -2,3184 0,0212 
LSIZE -0,1712 0,2973 -0,5760 0,5652 
NBR 0,1618 0,1156 1,3997 0,1628 
ABRMOM -0,7955 0,4007 -1,9853 0,0482 
ABRWL -0,0266 0,3058 -0,0870 0,9307 
DSSA 0,1199 0,1583 0,7577 0,4493 
DSBA -0,2951 0,1238 -2,3840 0,0179 
R-squared 0,4527     Mean dependent var 0,3045 
Adjusted R-squared 0,2966     S.D. dependent var 0,8687 
F-statistic 2,9007     Durbin-Watson stat 2,4421 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
T1–Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  ABRMOM ABRWL DSBA DSSA LMBR LSIZE NBR NPR SDNIB SDNIS SDVB SDVS 
Mean 0,0254 0,0582 0,2758 0,1424 0,7179 17,4840 0,3465 0,3045 0,1758 0,1273 0,2000 0,1182 
Median 0,0141 0,0320 0,0000 0,0000 0,7130 17,2981 0,3750 1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Maximum 1,0389 1,7551 1,0000 1,0000 2,6885 19,9470 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 2,0000 1,0000 
Minimum -0,4267 -0,5164 0,0000 0,0000 -0,6539 15,2030 -1,0000 -1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Std, Dev, 0,1622 0,2551 0,4476 0,3500 0,6996 1,1034 0,4734 0,8687 0,3812 0,3338 0,4081 0,3233 
Skewness 1,2319 1,6343 1,0036 2,0463 0,4670 0,3789 -0,5554 -0,6200 1,7038 2,2367 1,6336 2,3655 
Kurtosis 8,4548 9,9364 2,0071 5,1874 2,9521 2,1193 3,0738 1,5493 3,9029 6,0030 4,0808 6,5956 
Jarque-Bera 492,5907 808,4537 68,9467 296,0916 12,0241 18,5633 17,0380 50,0796 170,8681 399,1593 162,8350 485,5164 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0024 0,0001 0,0002 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Sum 8,3720 19,2221 91,0000 47,0000 236,9079 5769,7200 114,3518 100,4718 58,0000 42,0000 66,0000 39,0000 
Sum Sq, Dev, 8,6568 21,4141 65,9061 40,3061 161,0384 400,5849 73,7254 248,2791 47,8061 36,6546 54,8000 34,3909 
Observations 330 330 330 330 330 330 330 330 330 330 330 330 
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A.5.1.5. Analysts’ recommendations depending on insider trading 
R1 
Dependent Variable: NBR   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Periods included: 12   
Cross-sections included: 56   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 330  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 1,5089 2,6584 0,5676 0,5708 
LMBR 0,0440 0,1732 0,2542 0,7996 
LSIZE -0,0678 0,1537 -0,4409 0,6597 
NPR 0,0172 0,0381 0,4500 0,6531 
ABRMOM 0,4141 0,2106 1,9659 0,0504 
ABRWL -0,0435 0,1893 -0,2301 0,8182 
SDNIB -0,0370 0,0829 -0,4455 0,6564 
SDNIS -0,0793 0,0797 -0,9947 0,3208 
SDVB -0,0296 0,1062 -0,2789 0,7806 
SDVS 0,0017 0,0881 0,0196 0,9844 
R-squared 0,4052     Mean dependent var 0,3465 
Adjusted R-squared 0,2296     S.D. dependent var 0,4734 
F-statistic 2,3075     Durbin-Watson stat 2,4269 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
T1–Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  ABRMOM ABRWL DSBA DSSA LMBR LSIZE NBR NPR SDNIB SDNIS SDVB SDVS 
Mean 0,0254 0,0582 0,2758 0,1424 0,7179 17,4840 0,3465 0,3045 0,1758 0,1273 0,2000 0,1182 
Median 0,0141 0,0320 0,0000 0,0000 0,7130 17,2981 0,3750 1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Maximum 1,0389 1,7551 1,0000 1,0000 2,6885 19,9470 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 2,0000 1,0000 
Minimum -0,4267 -0,5164 0,0000 0,0000 -0,6539 15,2030 -1,0000 -1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Std, Dev, 0,1622 0,2551 0,4476 0,3500 0,6996 1,1034 0,4734 0,8687 0,3812 0,3338 0,4081 0,3233 
Skewness 1,2319 1,6343 1,0036 2,0463 0,4670 0,3789 -0,5554 -0,6200 1,7038 2,2367 1,6336 2,3655 
Kurtosis 8,4548 9,9364 2,0071 5,1874 2,9521 2,1193 3,0738 1,5493 3,9029 6,0030 4,0808 6,5956 
Jarque-Bera 492,5907 808,4537 68,9467 296,0916 12,0241 18,5633 17,0380 50,0796 170,8681 399,1593 162,8350 485,5164 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0024 0,0001 0,0002 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Sum 8,3720 19,2221 91,0000 47,0000 236,9079 5769,7200 114,3518 100,4718 58,0000 42,0000 66,0000 39,0000 
Sum Sq, Dev, 8,6568 21,4141 65,9061 40,3061 161,0384 400,5849 73,7254 248,2791 47,8061 36,6546 54,8000 34,3909 
Observations 330 330 330 330 330 330 330 330 330 330 330 330 
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A.5.1.6. Correlation matrix 
  NBR LMBR LSIZE NPR ABRMOM ABRWL SDNIB SDNIS SDVB SDVS DSBA DSSA 
NBR 1,0000 0,0308 -0,0319 0,0225 0,2543 0,2503 0,0224 0,0008 -0,0024 -0,0143 0,2440 -0,2990 
LMBR 0,0308 1,0000 0,1799 -0,2080 0,1883 0,2283 -0,1690 0,0599 -0,1043 -0,0132 0,1381 0,1761 
LSIZE -0,0319 0,1799 1,0000 -0,1362 -0,0268 -0,0446 -0,0303 0,0453 0,0582 0,0658 0,3907 0,2365 
NPR 0,0225 -0,2080 -0,1362 1,0000 -0,1798 -0,1311 0,1708 -0,3768 0,2057 -0,3734 -0,2070 -0,0657 
ABRMOM 0,2543 0,1883 -0,0268 -0,1798 1,0000 0,7434 -0,0633 0,1075 -0,0800 -0,0104 0,0529 -0,0483 
ABRWL 0,2503 0,2283 -0,0446 -0,1311 0,7434 1,0000 0,0145 0,0796 -0,0607 -0,0003 0,1013 -0,0775 
SDNIB 0,0224 -0,1690 -0,0303 0,1708 -0,0633 0,0145 1,0000 0,0625 0,2227 0,0282 -0,0533 -0,0971 
SDNIS 0,0008 0,0599 0,0453 -0,3768 0,1075 0,0796 0,0625 1,0000 -0,0089 0,2263 0,0492 0,0265 
SDVB -0,0024 -0,1043 0,0582 0,2057 -0,0800 -0,0607 0,2227 -0,0089 1,0000 0,2350 -0,0532 -0,0511 
SDVS -0,0143 -0,0132 0,0658 -0,3734 -0,0104 -0,0003 0,0282 0,2263 0,2350 1,0000 0,0472 0,0388 
DSBA 0,2440 0,1381 0,3907 -0,2070 0,0529 0,1013 -0,0533 0,0492 -0,0532 0,0472 1,0000 0,1948 
DSSA -0,2990 0,1761 0,2365 -0,0657 -0,0483 -0,0775 -0,0971 0,0265 -0,0511 0,0388 0,1948 1,0000 
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A.6.1. Mid Cap 
A.6.1.1. Analysts’ recommendations alone 
R1 
Dependent Variable: ARR 
  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Periods included: 12 
  
Cross-sections included: 59   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 425 
 
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0,0633 0,6058 0,1045 0,9168 
NBR 0,0144 0,0122 1,1842 0,2372 
ABRMOM 0,3843 0,0547 7,0217 0,0000 
ABRWL 0,1003 0,0314 3,1970 0,0015 
LSIZE -0,0077 0,0416 -0,1838 0,8543 
LMBR 0,0446 0,0421 1,0608 0,2895 
DSSA 0,0577 0,0457 1,2621 0,2078 
DSBA 0,0091 0,0200 0,4516 0,6518 
R-squared 0,5353     Mean dependent var 0,0111 
Adjusted R-squared 0,4338     S.D. dependent var 0,1730 
F-statistic 5,2746     Durbin-Watson stat 2,7578 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
T1 –Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  DSBA DSSA ABRMOM ABRWL NBR LMBR LSIZE ARHY 
Mean 0,0111 0,2094 0,0729 0,0219 0,0714 0,4121 0,7745 14,9466 
Median 0,0065 0,0000 0,0000 0,0005 0,0148 0,5000 0,8109 14,9230 
Maximum 1,2553 1,0000 1,0000 4,6907 13,2588 3,0000 3,0856 16,2545 
Minimum -0,6877 0,0000 0,0000 -0,8849 -1,0368 -1,0000 -1,6094 12,9436 
Std, Dev, 0,1730 0,4074 0,2603 0,3369 0,7680 0,6797 0,7737 0,6726 
Skewness 1,2439 1,4283 3,2846 6,8714 12,5714 -0,2576 0,0918 -0,2220 
Kurtosis 11,5033 3,0402 11,7884 90,5236 209,1893 3,3894 3,7080 2,6023 
Jarque-Bera 1390,0190 144,5400 2131,8830 138997,2000 764046,8000 7,3870 9,4729 6,2907 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0249 0,0088 0,0431 
Sum 4,7297 89,0000 31,0000 9,3210 30,3598 175,1449 329,1833 6352,3170 
Sum Sq, Dev, 12,6836 70,3624 28,7388 48,1360 250,1101 195,8656 253,8307 191,7910 
Observations 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 
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R2  
Dependent Variable: ARHY   
Method: Panel Least Squares 
  
Periods included: 12   
Cross-sections included: 59 
  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 397  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -6,5070 1,4075 -4,6231 0,0000 
NBR -0,0107 0,0224 -0,4784 0,6327 
ABRMOM 0,0344 0,0553 0,6215 0,5347 
ABRWL -0,0045 0,0306 -0,1480 0,8825 
LSIZE 0,4670 0,0949 4,9190 0,0000 
LMBR -0,6124 0,0995 -6,1573 0,0000 
DSSA -0,0307 0,0496 -0,6192 0,5362 
DSBA 0,0190 0,0313 0,6066 0,5445 
R-squared 0,4946     Mean dependent var 0,0050 
Adjusted R-squared 0,3746     S.D. dependent var 0,2626 
F-statistic 4,1209     Durbin-Watson stat 1,6085 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
T2 –Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  DSBA DSSA ABRMOM ABRWL NBR LMBR LSIZE ARHY 
Mean 0,2141 0,0781 0,0206 0,0720 0,4109 0,7482 14,9306 0,0050 
Median 0,0000 0,0000 -0,0009 0,0128 0,5000 0,7885 14,8942 -0,0277 
Maximum 1,0000 1,0000 4,6907 13,2588 3,0000 3,0856 16,2545 1,8061 
Minimum 0,0000 0,0000 -0,8849 -1,0368 -1,0000 -1,6094 12,9436 -0,6301 
Std, Dev, 0,4107 0,2686 0,3402 0,7868 0,6871 0,7696 0,6729 0,2626 
Skewness 1,3939 3,1450 7,0607 12,5170 -0,2231 0,0883 -0,2062 2,0802 
Kurtosis 2,9430 10,8912 92,9392 203,3246 3,3623 3,7159 2,5934 13,5200 
Jarque-Bera 128,6171 1684,5180 137105,0000 674182,6000 5,4638 8,9929 5,5492 2117,0030 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0651 0,0111 0,0624 0,0000 
Sum 85,0000 31,0000 8,1940 28,6020 163,1449 297,0395 5927,4420 1,9678 
Sum Sq, Dev, 66,8010 28,5794 45,8370 245,1534 186,9586 234,5628 179,3199 27,3162 
Observations 397 397 397 397 397 397 397 397 
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R3 
Dependent Variable: AR1Y   
Method: Panel Least Squares 
  
Periods included: 12   
Cross-sections included: 59 
  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 397  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -8,0028 0,9142 -8,7539 0,0000 
NBR 0,0016 0,0227 0,0704 0,9439 
ABRMOM 1,2219 0,0460 26,5538 0,0000 
ABRWL -0,1352 0,0296 -4,5660 0,0000 
LSIZE 0,5621 0,0615 9,1340 0,0000 
LMBR -0,4831 0,0635 -7,6107 0,0000 
DSSA -0,0739 0,0562 -1,3141 0,1897 
DSBA 0,0214 0,0345 0,6205 0,5354 
R-squared 0,8589     Mean dependent var 0,0433 
Adjusted R-squared 0,8253     S.D. dependent var 0,5465 
F-statistic 25,6207     Durbin-Watson stat 1,8938 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
T3 –Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  DSBA DSSA ABRMOM ABRWL NBR LMBR LSIZE AR1Y 
 Mean 0,2141 0,0781 0,0206 0,0720 0,4109 0,7482 14,9306 0,0433 
 Median 0,0000 0,0000 -0,0009 0,0128 0,5000 0,7885 14,8942 0,0076 
 Maximum 1,0000 1,0000 4,6907 13,2588 3,0000 3,0856 16,2545 7,4087 
 Minimum 0,0000 0,0000 -0,8849 -1,0368 -1,0000 -1,6094 12,9436 -0,9814 
 Std, Dev, 0,4107 0,2686 0,3402 0,7868 0,6871 0,7696 0,6729 0,5465 
 Skewness 1,3939 3,1450 7,0607 12,5170 -0,2231 0,0883 -0,2062 6,9713 
 Kurtosis 2,9430 10,8912 92,9392 203,3246 3,3623 3,7159 2,5934 87,5594 
 Jarque-Bera 128,6171 1684,5180 137105,0000 674182,6000 5,4638 8,9929 5,5492 121493,3000 
 Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0651 0,0111 0,0624 0,0000 
 Sum 85,0000 31,0000 8,1940 28,6020 163,1449 297,0395 5927,4420 17,1848 
 Sum Sq, Dev, 66,8010 28,5794 45,8370 245,1534 186,9586 234,5628 179,3199 118,2725 
 Observations 397 397 397 397 397 397 397 397 
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R4 
Dependent Variable: AR2Y   
Method: Panel Least Squares 
  
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 58 
  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 340  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -15,2216 4,4972 -3,3847 0,0008 
NBR 0,0083 0,0411 0,2028 0,8394 
ABRMOM 0,2626 0,1598 1,6431 0,1015 
ABRWL 0,1441 0,1055 1,3655 0,1732 
LSIZE 1,0343 0,3019 3,4257 0,0007 
LMBR -0,2879 0,1839 -1,5653 0,1187 
DSSA -0,0667 0,0890 -0,7491 0,4544 
DSBA 0,0428 0,0844 0,5073 0,6123 
R-squared 0,7909     Mean dependent var 0,0776 
Adjusted R-squared 0,7335     S.D. dependent var 0,7516 
F-statistic 13,7799     Durbin-Watson stat 1,0470 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
T4 –Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  DSBA DSSA ABRMOM ABRWL NBR LMBR LSIZE AR2Y 
Mean 0,2235 0,0794 0,0253 0,0693 0,4073 0,7233 14,9694 0,0776 
Median 0,0000 0,0000 -0,0106 0,0064 0,5000 0,7816 14,9612 -0,0037 
Maximum 1,0000 1,0000 4,6907 13,2588 3,0000 3,0856 16,2545 7,1969 
Minimum 0,0000 0,0000 -0,5816 -0,8225 -1,0000 -1,6094 12,9436 -1,2558 
Std, Dev, 0,4172 0,2708 0,3521 0,8352 0,6630 0,7723 0,6583 0,7516 
Skewness 1,3272 3,1111 7,4913 12,2427 -0,2834 0,0202 -0,2322 5,1497 
Kurtosis 2,7616 10,6789 94,0254 187,2992 3,1759 3,6452 2,7129 42,2983 
Jarque-Bera 100,6273 1383,8030 120559,7000 489681,0000 4,9905 5,9201 4,2239 23381,1800 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0825 0,0518 0,1210 0,0000 
Sum 76,0000 27,0000 8,5894 23,5686 138,4783 245,9338 5089,6040 26,3978 
Sum Sq, Dev, 59,0118 24,8559 42,0193 236,4597 149,0320 202,1910 146,9139 191,5144 
Observations 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 
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A.6.1.2. Insider trading alone 
R1 
Dependent Variable: ARR  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Periods included: 12   
Cross-sections included: 60   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 416  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -0,4571 0,4614 -0,9907 0,3225 
LMBR -0,0201 0,0490 -0,4110 0,6813 
LSIZE 0,0320 0,0318 1,0070 0,3146 
NPR -0,0131 0,0100 -1,3153 0,1893 
ABRWL -0,0165 0,0206 -0,8015 0,4234 
ABRMOM 0,3731 0,0685 5,4426 0,0000 
SDNIB -0,0387 0,0234 -1,6523 0,0994 
SDNIS -0,0626 0,0563 -1,1116 0,2671 
SDVB 0,0384 0,0363 1,0574 0,2911 
SDVS 0,0021 0,0290 0,0723 0,9424 
R-squared 0,6694     Mean dependent var 0,0101 
Adjusted R-squared 0,5916     S.D. dependent var 0,2260 
F-statistic 8,6112     Durbin-Watson stat 2,9970 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
T1 –Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  ABRMOM ABRWL LSIZE LMBR NPR SDNIB SDNIS SDVB SDVS ARR 
Mean 0,0364 0,0917 14,8861 0,7276 0,2708 0,1370 0,0793 0,1827 0,1034 0,0101 
Median 0,0029 0,0298 14,8938 0,7839 1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 -0,0078 
Maximum 7,6612 13,2588 16,2545 3,0856 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 3,3181 
Minimum -0,5816 -0,8225 12,9131 -1,6094 -1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 -0,4960 
Std, Dev, 0,4868 0,7781 0,6507 0,7610 0,8958 0,3443 0,2706 0,3869 0,3048 0,2260 
Skewness 11,4191 12,3662 -0,3215 0,0932 -0,5481 2,1112 3,1132 1,6423 2,6057 7,8741 
Kurtosis 165,8488 201,7842 2,8251 3,4724 1,4212 5,4570 10,6922 3,6972 7,7897 112,8439 
Jarque-Bera 468716,3000 695531,9000 7,6959 4,4706 64,0337 413,6605 1697,6120 195,4327 868,4005 213437,1000 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0213 0,1070 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Sum 15,1219 38,1264 6192,5960 302,6871 112,6601 57,0000 33,0000 76,0000 43,0000 4,2066 
Sum Sq, Dev, 98,3263 251,2665 175,7388 240,3085 333,0069 49,1899 30,3822 62,1154 38,5553 21,1905 
Observations 416 416 416 416 416 416 416 416 416 416 
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R2 
Dependent Variable: ARHY  
Method: Panel Least Squares 
  
Periods included: 12   
Cross-sections included: 60 
  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 393  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -7,2779 2,6254 -2,7721 0,0059 
LMBR -0,5999 0,2067 -2,9024 0,0040 
LSIZE 0,5206 0,1832 2,8424 0,0048 
NPR 0,0031 0,0303 0,1016 0,9192 
ABRWL -0,0772 0,0697 -1,1080 0,2687 
ABRMOM -0,0776 0,1130 -0,6868 0,4927 
SDNIB -0,0278 0,0949 -0,2931 0,7697 
SDNIS -0,0357 0,0761 -0,4695 0,6390 
SDVB 0,2159 0,1575 1,3704 0,1716 
SDVS -0,1105 0,0686 -1,6125 0,1079 
R-squared 0,3351     Mean dependent var 0,0465 
Adjusted R-squared 0,1673     S.D. dependent var 0,5141 
F-statistic 1,9968     Durbin-Watson stat 1,6827 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
 
T2 –Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  ABRMOM ABRWL LSIZE LMBR NPR SDNIB SDNIS SDVB SDVS ARHY 
Mean 0,0359 0,0916 14,8674 0,7189 0,2890 0,1399 0,0763 0,1908 0,0941 0,0465 
Median 0,0020 0,0305 14,8933 0,7655 1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 -0,0009 
Maximum 7,6612 13,2588 16,2545 3,0856 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 7,6612 
Minimum -0,5816 -0,8225 12,9131 -1,6094 -1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 -0,5816 
Std, Dev, 0,4957 0,7954 0,6509 0,7681 0,8901 0,3474 0,2659 0,3935 0,2924 0,5141 
Skewness 11,4163 12,2500 -0,3251 0,1300 -0,5913 2,0756 3,1910 1,5735 2,7795 10,4110 
Kurtosis 163,2302 195,6654 2,8098 3,4674 1,4728 5,3082 11,1826 3,4758 8,7256 140,8707 
Jarque-Bera 428943,7000 617668,5000 7,5172 4,6842 61,0975 369,4263 1763,3620 165,8759 1042,8290 318360,8000 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0233 0,0961 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Sum 14,1255 36,0005 5842,9030 282,5186 113,5896 55,0000 30,0000 75,0000 37,0000 18,2701 
Sum Sq, Dev, 96,3189 248,0039 166,0994 231,2900 310,5486 47,3028 27,7099 60,6870 33,5165 103,6155 
Observations 393 393 393 393 393 393 393 393 393 393 
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R3 
Dependent Variable: ARHY  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Periods included: 12   
Cross-sections included: 60   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 393  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -7,2779 2,6254 -2,7721 0,0059 
LMBR -0,5999 0,2067 -2,9024 0,0040 
LSIZE 0,5206 0,1832 2,8424 0,0048 
NPR 0,0031 0,0303 0,1016 0,9192 
ABRWL -0,0772 0,0697 -1,1080 0,2687 
ABRMOM -0,0776 0,1130 -0,6868 0,4927 
SDNIB -0,0278 0,0949 -0,2931 0,7697 
SDNIS -0,0357 0,0761 -0,4695 0,6390 
SDVB 0,2159 0,1575 1,3704 0,1716 
SDVS -0,1105 0,0686 -1,6125 0,1079 
R-squared 0,3351     Mean dependent var 0,0465 
Adjusted R-squared 0,1673     S.D. dependent var 0,5141 
F-statistic 1,9968     Durbin-Watson stat 1,6827 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
 
T3 –Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  ABRMOM ABRWL LSIZE LMBR NPR SDNIB SDNIS SDVB SDVS AR1Y 
Mean 0,0359 0,0916 14,8674 0,7189 0,2890 0,1399 0,0763 0,1908 0,0941 0,0940 
Median 0,0020 0,0305 14,8933 0,7655 1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0094 
Maximum 7,6612 13,2588 16,2545 3,0856 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 13,2588 
Minimum -0,5816 -0,8225 12,9131 -1,6094 -1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 -0,8168 
Std, Dev, 0,4957 0,7954 0,6509 0,7681 0,8901 0,3474 0,2659 0,3935 0,2924 0,8825 
Skewness 11,4163 12,2500 -0,3251 0,1300 -0,5913 2,0756 3,1910 1,5735 2,7795 10,4942 
Kurtosis 163,2302 195,6654 2,8098 3,4674 1,4728 5,3082 11,1826 3,4758 8,7256 141,4032 
Jarque-Bera 428943,7000 617668,5000 7,5172 4,6842 61,0975 369,4263 1763,3620 165,8759 1042,8290 320883,7000 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0233 0,0961 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Sum 14,1255 36,0005 5842,9030 282,5186 113,5896 55,0000 30,0000 75,0000 37,0000 36,9449 
Sum Sq, Dev, 96,3189 248,0039 166,0994 231,2900 310,5486 47,3028 27,7099 60,6870 33,5165 305,2578 
Observations 393 393 393 393 393 393 393 393 393 393 
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R4 
Dependent Variable: AR2Y  
Method: Panel Least Squares 
  
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 59 
  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 315  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -14,1225 2,2441 -6,2933 0,0000 
LMBR -0,3845 0,1567 -2,4535 0,0149 
LSIZE 0,9652 0,1506 6,4082 0,0000 
NPR 0,1196 0,0442 2,7043 0,0073 
ABRWL 0,3184 0,0466 6,8375 0,0000 
ABRMOM 0,5444 0,0682 7,9854 0,0000 
SDNIB 0,0312 0,1037 0,3005 0,7640 
SDNIS 0,0911 0,1422 0,6409 0,5222 
SDVB -0,0111 0,0943 -0,1182 0,9060 
SDVS 0,0505 0,1184 0,4267 0,6700 
R-squared 0,8024     Mean dependent var 0,1283 
Adjusted R-squared 0,7393     S.D. dependent var 0,8866 
F-statistic 12,7136     Durbin-Watson stat 1,7028 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
T4 –Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  ABRMOM ABRWL LSIZE LMBR NPR SDNIB SDNIS SDVB SDVS AR2Y 
Mean 0,0099 0,0366 0,6413 17,5311 0,2737 0,1597 0,1076 0,2153 0,1285 0,1038 
Median 0,0019 0,0107 0,6016 17,4148 0,9995 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0547 
Maximum 1,0389 1,7551 2,6885 19,9470 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 2,0000 1,0000 3,7171 
Minimum -0,3992 -0,5022 -0,6539 15,2030 -1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 -0,6360 
Std, Dev, 0,1515 0,2399 0,7225 1,1086 0,8756 0,3670 0,3105 0,4201 0,3352 0,4530 
Skewness 1,3735 1,9111 0,4958 0,2730 -0,5525 1,8577 2,5320 1,5259 2,2206 3,1440 
Kurtosis 10,4025 12,8572 2,9039 1,9490 1,4751 4,4510 7,4109 3,7475 5,9312 21,7935 
Jarque-Bera 748,1171 1341,2870 11,9119 16,8314 42,5560 190,9089 541,2026 118,4610 339,8001 4712,7840 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0026 0,0002 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Sum 2,8498 10,5510 184,6806 5048,9570 78,8352 46,0000 31,0000 62,0000 37,0000 29,8913 
Sum Sq, Dev, 6,5887 16,5119 149,8356 352,7339 220,0308 38,6528 27,6632 50,6528 32,2465 58,9017 
Observations 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 
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A.6.1.3. Insider trading and analysts’ recommendations together 
R1 
Dependent Variable: ARR   
Method: Panel Least Squares 
  
Periods included: 12   Cross-sections included: 54   Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 256  White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0,1311 0,7477 0,1753 0,8610 
LMBR 0,0414 0,0586 0,7061 0,4810 
LSIZE -0,0125 0,0510 -0,2444 0,8072 
ABRMOM 0,3042 0,0533 5,7110 0,0000 
ABRWL 0,1046 0,0276 3,7919 0,0002 
NPR -0,0200 0,0132 -1,5190 0,1305 
SDNIB -0,0071 0,0322 -0,2200 0,8261 
SDNIS -0,0199 0,0427 -0,4653 0,6423 
SDVB 0,0150 0,0389 0,3855 0,7003 
SDVS 0,0378 0,0315 1,2009 0,2314 
NBR 0,0271 0,0171 1,5835 0,1151 
DSBA -0,0130 0,0284 -0,4574 0,6480 
DSSA 0,0579 0,0641 0,9037 0,3674 
R-squared 0,5644     Mean dependent var 0,0077 
Adjusted R-squared 0,3794     S.D. dependent var 0,1548 
F-statistic 3,0514     Durbin-Watson stat 2,3242 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
T1 –Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  ABRMOM ABRWL LSIZE LMBR NPR SDNIB SDNIS SDVB SDVS NBR DSSA DSBA ARR 
Mean 0,0288 0,1125 15,0308 0,7661 0,2574 0,1328 0,1016 0,1758 0,1211 0,3987 0,0703 0,1875 0,0077 
Median -0,0022 0,0130 15,0041 0,8020 0,9984 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,5000 0,0000 0,0000 -0,0062 
Maximum 4,6907 13,2588 16,2545 3,0856 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 2,0000 1,0000 1,0000 0,7583 
Minimum -0,5816 -0,8225 13,6259 -1,6094 -1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 -1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 -0,4960 
Std, Dev, 0,3628 0,9495 0,6081 0,7916 0,8940 0,3400 0,3027 0,3814 0,3269 0,6564 0,2562 0,3911 0,1548 
Skewness 8,5508 10,9531 -0,1325 0,1784 -0,5191 2,1639 2,6380 1,7036 2,3229 -0,5672 3,3612 1,6013 0,8042 
Kurtosis 108,2889 147,1704 2,1363 3,3846 1,4017 5,6826 7,9592 3,9022 6,3958 2,6533 12,2979 3,5641 6,2835 
Jarque-Bera 121367,7000 226826,4000 8,7054 2,9358 38,7456 276,5484 559,2579 132,5070 353,2279 15,0086 1404,1760 112,7960 142,5957 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0129 0,2304 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0006 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Sum 7,3685 28,7924 3847,8820 196,1176 65,8903 34,0000 26,0000 45,0000 31,0000 102,0699 18,0000 48,0000 1,9656 
Sum Sq, Dev, 33,5583 229,8995 94,2915 159,8084 203,8009 29,4844 23,3594 37,0898 27,2461 109,8847 16,7344 39,0000 6,1095 
Observations 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 
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R2 
Dependent Variable: ARHY   
Method: Panel Least Squares 
  
Periods included: 12   
Cross-sections included: 53 
  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 239  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -6,4367 1,1629 -5,5348 0,0000 
LMBR -0,6194 0,0866 -7,1534 0,0000 
LSIZE 0,4594 0,0775 5,9292 0,0000 
ABRMOM 0,1660 0,0689 2,4110 0,0170 
ABRWL 0,0392 0,0388 1,0109 0,3136 
NPR 0,0398 0,0258 1,5441 0,1245 
SDNIB 0,0958 0,0608 1,5752 0,1171 
SDNIS -0,0306 0,0721 -0,4252 0,6712 
SDVB -0,0047 0,0571 -0,0817 0,9350 
SDVS -0,0344 0,0641 -0,5367 0,5922 
NBR -0,0191 0,0313 -0,6097 0,5429 
DSBA 0,0522 0,0463 1,1265 0,2616 
DSSA -0,0268 0,0809 -0,3307 0,7413 
R-squared 0,5634     Mean dependent var 0,0175 
Adjusted R-squared 0,3625     S.D. dependent var 0,2771 
F-statistic 2,8044     Durbin-Watson stat 1,9050 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
T2 –Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  ABRMO
M ABRWL LSIZE LMBR NPR SDNIB SDNIS SDVB SDVS NBR DSSA DSBA ARHY 
Mean 0,0239 0,1065 15,0130 0,7561 0,2963 0,1339 0,0962 0,1883 0,1046 0,3891 0,0753 0,1925 0,0175 
Median -0,0088 0,0075 14,9737 0,7793 1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,5000 0,0000 0,0000 -0,0191 
Maximum 4,6907 13,2588 16,2545 3,0856 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 2,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,8061 
Minimum -0,5816 -0,8225 13,6259 -1,6094 -1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 -1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 -0,5816 
Std, Dev, 0,3656 0,9775 0,6081 0,8071 0,8832 0,3413 0,2955 0,3918 0,3067 0,6600 0,2645 0,3951 0,2771 
Skewness 8,8421 10,7680 -0,1383 0,2304 -0,6106 2,1502 2,7382 1,5947 2,5840 -0,5279 3,2186 1,5601 2,6770 
Kurtosis 112,4663 140,6707 2,1032 3,3125 1,5084 5,6233 8,4978 3,5431 7,6768 2,6261 11,3592 3,4340 15,3771 
Jarque-Bera 122443,6000 
193361,20
00 8,7698 3,0866 37,0085 
252,695
4 
599,658
9 
104,235
9 
483,775
4 12,4932 
1108,498
0 
98,829
8 
1810,985
0 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0125 0,2137 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0019 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Sum 5,7068 25,4540 3588,1080 
180,711
4 70,8198 32,0000 23,0000 45,0000 25,0000 92,9866 18,0000 
46,000
0 4,1833 
Sum Sq, 
Dev, 31,8156 227,4148 88,0063 
155,031
4 
185,637
3 27,7155 20,7866 36,5272 22,3849 
103,674
0 16,6444 
37,146
4 18,2764 
Observatio
ns 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 
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R3 
Dependent Variable: AR1Y   
Method: Panel Least Squares 
  
Periods included: 12   
Cross-sections included: 53 
  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 239  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -8,4113 1,2848 -6,5468 0,0000 
LMBR -0,4516 0,0957 -4,7212 0,0000 
LSIZE 0,5831 0,0856 6,8124 0,0000 
ABRMOM 1,4344 0,0761 18,8575 0,0000 
ABRWL -0,0690 0,0428 -1,6097 0,1094 
NPR 0,0620 0,0285 2,1745 0,0311 
SDNIB 0,1191 0,0672 1,7724 0,0782 
SDNIS 0,0184 0,0796 0,2314 0,8173 
SDVB -0,0428 0,0631 -0,6791 0,4981 
SDVS -0,0267 0,0708 -0,3776 0,7062 
NBR 0,0035 0,0346 0,1014 0,9194 
DSBA 0,0683 0,0512 1,3344 0,1839 
DSSA -0,0629 0,0894 -0,7038 0,4826 
R-squared 0,8951     Mean dependent var 0,0633 
Adjusted R-squared 0,8468     S.D. dependent var 0,6244 
F-statistic 18,5350     Durbin-Watson stat 2,3515 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
T3 –Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  ABRMO
M ABRWL LSIZE LMBR NPR SDNIB SDNIS SDVB SDVS NBR DSSA DSBA AR1Y 
Mean 0,0239 0,1065 15,0130 0,7561 0,2963 0,1339 0,0962 0,1883 0,1046 0,3891 0,0753 0,1925 0,0633 
Median -0,0088 0,0075 14,9737 0,7793 1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,5000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0075 
Maximum 4,6907 13,2588 16,2545 3,0856 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 2,0000 1,0000 1,0000 7,4087 
Minimum -0,5816 -0,8225 13,6259 -1,6094 -1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 -1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 -0,7315 
Std, Dev, 0,3656 0,9775 0,6081 0,8071 0,8832 0,3413 0,2955 0,3918 0,3067 0,6600 0,2645 0,3951 0,6244 
Skewness 8,8421 10,7680 -0,1383 0,2304 -0,6106 2,1502 2,7382 1,5947 2,5840 -0,5279 3,2186 1,5601 7,5045 
Kurtosis 112,4663 140,6707 2,1032 3,3125 1,5084 5,6233 8,4978 3,5431 7,6768 2,6261 11,3592 3,4340 83,6799 
Jarque-Bera 122443,6000 
193361,20
00 8,7698 3,0866 37,0085 
252,695
4 
599,658
9 
104,235
9 
483,775
4 12,4932 
1108,49
80 
98,829
8 
67064,58
00 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0125 0,2137 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0019 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Sum 5,7068 25,4540 3588,1080 
180,711
4 70,8198 32,0000 23,0000 45,0000 25,0000 92,9866 18,0000 
46,000
0 15,1209 
Sum Sq, 
Dev, 31,8156 227,4148 88,0063 
155,031
4 
185,637
3 27,7155 20,7866 36,5272 22,3849 
103,674
0 16,6444 
37,146
4 92,8002 
Observatio
ns 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 
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R4 
Dependent Variable: AR2Y   
Method: Panel Least Squares 
  
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 53 
  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 208  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -13,6007 2,4269 -5,6042 0,0000 
LMBR -0,2852 0,1848 -1,5434 0,1251 
LSIZE 0,9163 0,1611 5,6884 0,0000 
ABRMOM 0,7094 0,1458 4,8661 0,0000 
ABRWL 0,2005 0,0795 2,5228 0,0128 
NPR 0,1517 0,0494 3,0727 0,0026 
SDNIB 0,1099 0,1187 0,9252 0,3565 
SDNIS 0,0176 0,1494 0,1178 0,9064 
SDVB -0,0898 0,1143 -0,7856 0,4335 
SDVS 0,1199 0,1284 0,9337 0,3521 
NBR -0,0104 0,0611 -0,1704 0,8649 
DSBA 0,1663 0,0869 1,9149 0,0576 
DSSA -0,0718 0,1499 -0,4790 0,6327 
R-squared 0,8826     Mean dependent var 0,1051 
Adjusted R-squared 0,8186     S.D. dependent var 0,9037 
F-statistic 13,7953     Durbin-Watson stat 1,4900 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
T4 –Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  ABRMO
M ABRWL LSIZE LMBR NPR SDNIB SDNIS SDVB SDVS NBR DSSA DSBA AR2Y 
Mean 0,0221 0,0956 15,0508 0,7125 0,3062 0,1346 0,0865 0,1779 0,0962 0,3801 0,0769 0,2019 0,1051 
Median -0,0249 -0,0081 15,0041 0,7514 1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,5000 0,0000 0,0000 -0,0744 
Maximum 4,6907 13,2588 16,2545 3,0856 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 2,0000 1,0000 1,0000 7,1969 
Minimum -0,5816 -0,8225 13,6259 -1,6094 -1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 -1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 -0,9666 
Std, Dev, 0,3833 1,0385 0,5940 0,8108 0,8795 0,3421 0,2818 0,3833 0,2955 0,6447 0,2671 0,4024 0,9037 
Skewness 8,8205 10,3535 -0,1264 0,2365 -0,6312 2,1411 2,9411 1,6846 2,7398 -0,5264 3,1754 1,4851 4,7954 
Kurtosis 107,2047 127,4855 2,0747 3,3122 1,5422 5,5841 9,6503 3,8380 8,5064 2,5974 11,0833 3,2054 32,5173 
Jarque-Bera 96805,0700 
138020,300
0 7,9740 2,7836 32,2277 
216,789
9 
683,172
2 
104,469
9 
522,996
8 
11,011
8 
915,838
0 
76,819
2 
8348,219
0 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0186 0,2486 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0041 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Sum 4,6071 19,8755 3130,5560 
148,189
8 63,6842 28,0000 18,0000 37,0000 20,0000 
79,070
0 16,0000 
42,000
0 21,8645 
Sum Sq, 
Dev, 30,4152 223,2316 73,0446 
136,090
9 
160,121
9 24,2308 16,4423 30,4183 18,0769 
86,037
0 14,7692 
33,519
2 169,0427 
Observation
s 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 
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A.6.1.4. Insider trading depending analysts’ recommendations  
R1 
Dependent Variable: NPR   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Periods included: 12   
Cross-sections included: 54   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 256  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 6,3014 3,6837 1,7106 0,0888 
LMBR -0,5370 0,2700 -1,9886 0,0482 
LSIZE -0,3813 0,2461 -1,5494 0,1230 
NBR 0,1855 0,0947 1,9575 0,0518 
ABRMOM 0,0146 0,2083 0,0701 0,9442 
ABRWL 0,2894 0,1176 2,4601 0,0148 
DSSA 0,1537 0,2605 0,5900 0,5559 
DSBA -0,1025 0,1468 -0,6986 0,4857 
R-squared 0,5132     Mean dependent var 0,2574 
Adjusted R-squared 0,3254     S.D. dependent var 0,8940 
F-statistic 2,7323     Durbin-Watson stat 2,2969 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
T1 –Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  ABRMOM ABRWL LSIZE LMBR NPR SDNIB SDNIS SDVB SDVS NBR DSSA DSBA 
Mean 0,0288 0,1125 15,0308 0,7661 0,2574 0,1328 0,1016 0,1758 0,1211 0,3987 0,0703 0,1875 
Median -0,0022 0,0130 15,0041 0,8020 0,9984 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,5000 0,0000 0,0000 
Maximum 4,6907 13,2588 16,2545 3,0856 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 2,0000 1,0000 1,0000 
Minimum -0,5816 -0,8225 13,6259 -1,6094 -1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 -1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Std, Dev, 0,3628 0,9495 0,6081 0,7916 0,8940 0,3400 0,3027 0,3814 0,3269 0,6564 0,2562 0,3911 
Skewness 8,5508 10,9531 -0,1325 0,1784 -0,5191 2,1639 2,6380 1,7036 2,3229 -0,5672 3,3612 1,6013 
Kurtosis 108,2889 147,1704 2,1363 3,3846 1,4017 5,6826 7,9592 3,9022 6,3958 2,6533 12,2979 3,5641 
Jarque-Bera 121367,7000 
226826,400
0 8,7054 2,9358 38,7456 
276,548
4 
559,257
9 
132,507
0 
353,227
9 15,0086 
1404,176
0 
112,796
0 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0129 0,2304 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0006 0,0000 0,0000 
Sum 7,3685 28,7924 3847,8820 
196,117
6 65,8903 34,0000 26,0000 45,0000 31,0000 
102,069
9 18,0000 48,0000 
Sum Sq, 
Dev, 33,5583 229,8995 94,2915 
159,808
4 
203,800
9 29,4844 23,3594 37,0898 27,2461 
109,884
7 16,7344 39,0000 
Observation
s 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 
 
  
 
 
139 
A.6.1.5. Analysts’ recommendations depending on insider trading 
R1 
Dependent Variable: NBR   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Periods included: 12   
Cross-sections included: 54   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 256  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 2,1341 3,0979 0,6889 0,4918 
LMBR -0,0434 0,2251 -0,1929 0,8473 
LSIZE -0,1149 0,2063 -0,5568 0,5783 
NPR 0,0628 0,0725 0,8666 0,3873 
ABRMOM 0,2121 0,1446 1,4671 0,1441 
ABRWL 0,0354 0,0765 0,4631 0,6438 
SDNIB 0,0959 0,1244 0,7714 0,4415 
SDNIS 0,2871 0,1578 1,8192 0,0705 
SDVB 0,0702 0,1084 0,6483 0,5176 
SDVS -0,4651 0,1642 -2,8328 0,0051 
R-squared 0,4390     Mean dependent var 0,3987 
Adjusted R-squared 0,2139     S.D. dependent var 0,6564 
F-statistic 1,9507     Durbin-Watson stat 1,9461 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0002       
 
T1 –Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  ABRMOM ABRWL LSIZE LMBR NPR SDNIB SDNIS SDVB SDVS NBR DSSA DSBA 
Mean 0,0288 0,1125 15,0308 0,7661 0,2574 0,1328 0,1016 0,1758 0,1211 0,3987 0,0703 0,1875 
Median -0,0022 0,0130 15,0041 0,8020 0,9984 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,5000 0,0000 0,0000 
Maximum 4,6907 13,2588 16,2545 3,0856 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 2,0000 1,0000 1,0000 
Minimum -0,5816 -0,8225 13,6259 -1,6094 -1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 -1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Std, Dev, 0,3628 0,9495 0,6081 0,7916 0,8940 0,3400 0,3027 0,3814 0,3269 0,6564 0,2562 0,3911 
Skewness 8,5508 10,9531 -0,1325 0,1784 -0,5191 2,1639 2,6380 1,7036 2,3229 -0,5672 3,3612 1,6013 
Kurtosis 108,2889 147,1704 2,1363 3,3846 1,4017 5,6826 7,9592 3,9022 6,3958 2,6533 12,2979 3,5641 
Jarque-Bera 121367,7000 
226826,400
0 8,7054 2,9358 38,7456 
276,548
4 
559,257
9 
132,507
0 
353,227
9 15,0086 
1404,176
0 
112,796
0 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0129 0,2304 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0006 0,0000 0,0000 
Sum 7,3685 28,7924 3847,8820 
196,117
6 65,8903 34,0000 26,0000 45,0000 31,0000 
102,069
9 18,0000 48,0000 
Sum Sq, 
Dev, 33,5583 229,8995 94,2915 
159,808
4 
203,800
9 29,4844 23,3594 37,0898 27,2461 
109,884
7 16,7344 39,0000 
Observation
s 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 
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A.6.1.6. Correlation matrix 
  NBR LMBR LSIZE NPR ABRMOM ABRWL SDNIB SDNIS SDVB SDVS DSSA DSBA 
NBR 1,0000 0,1458 0,0226 0,0520 -0,0432 -0,1071 0,0486 0,0459 0,0401 -0,0990 -0,2972 0,2172 
LMBR 0,1458 1,0000 0,1384 -0,1783 0,2181 0,3273 -0,0185 0,1314 -0,0996 0,0636 -0,2561 0,1158 
LSIZE 0,0226 0,1384 1,0000 -0,0044 0,0747 0,0403 0,0172 0,0394 -0,0714 -0,0616 -0,0519 0,0584 
NPR 0,0520 -0,1783 -0,0044 1,0000 -0,1186 -0,0113 0,2393 -0,3652 0,2796 -0,4417 0,0750 0,0266 
ABRMOM -0,0432 0,2181 0,0747 -0,1186 1,0000 0,4751 -0,0669 0,1482 -0,0388 0,1525 -0,1138 -0,0580 
ABRWL -0,1071 0,3273 0,0403 -0,0113 0,4751 1,0000 -0,0910 0,0558 0,0979 0,0429 -0,0938 -0,0658 
SDNIB 0,0486 -0,0185 0,0172 0,2393 -0,0669 -0,0910 1,0000 -0,0935 0,3031 -0,0747 -0,0176 0,0479 
SDNIS 0,0459 0,1314 0,0394 -0,3652 0,1482 0,0558 -0,0935 1,0000 -0,0873 0,2319 0,0593 0,0704 
SDVB 0,0401 -0,0996 -0,0714 0,2796 -0,0388 0,0979 0,3031 -0,0873 1,0000 0,0173 -0,0066 -0,0115 
SDVS -0,0990 0,0636 -0,0616 -0,4417 0,1525 0,0429 -0,0747 0,2319 0,0173 1,0000 0,0384 -0,0863 
DSSA -0,2972 -0,2561 -0,0519 0,0750 -0,1138 -0,0938 -0,0176 0,0593 -0,0066 0,0384 1,0000 0,0245 
DSBA 0,2172 0,1158 0,0584 0,0266 -0,0580 -0,0658 0,0479 0,0704 -0,0115 -0,0863 0,0245 1,0000 
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A.7.1. Small Cap 
A.7.1.1. Analysts’ recommendations alone 
R1 
Dependent Variable: ARR 
  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Periods included: 12 
  
Cross-sections included: 65   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 265 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0,0766 0,4285 0,1788 0,8583 
NBR -0,0103 0,0146 -0,7038 0,4824 
ABRMOM 0,4859 0,0521 9,3249 0,0000 
ABRWL 0,0360 0,0423 0,8504 0,3962 
LSIZE -0,0109 0,0326 -0,3336 0,7390 
LMBR 0,1149 0,0364 3,1613 0,0018 
DSSA -0,0122 0,0452 -0,2695 0,7879 
DSBA -0,0174 0,0247 -0,7027 0,4831 
R-squared 0,7280     Mean dependent var -0,0370 
Adjusted R-squared 0,6054     S.D. dependent var 0,1801 
F-statistic 5,9391     Durbin-Watson stat 3,9473 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
T1 –Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  ABRWL ABRMOM LMBR LSIZE DSBA DSSA NBR ARR 
Mean -0,1036 -0,0495 0,5743 13,2189 0,1660 0,0377 0,4686 -0,0370 
Median -0,1258 -0,0700 0,5423 13,3146 0,0000 0,0000 1,0000 -0,0409 
Maximum 1,2938 1,4103 4,3630 14,6314 1,0000 1,0000 3,0000 0,6271 
Minimum -0,9412 -0,8041 -2,3026 11,1115 0,0000 0,0000 -3,0000 -0,7469 
Std, Dev, 0,3518 0,2605 0,8837 0,6671 0,3728 0,1909 0,7472 0,1801 
Skewness 0,7036 0,6493 0,5798 -0,6652 1,7949 4,8517 -1,0284 -0,2583 
Kurtosis 4,1351 6,5779 5,0806 3,3990 4,2218 24,5392 4,5821 5,0012 
Jarque-Bera 36,0923 159,9641 62,6430 21,3017 158,7807 6162,2950 74,3506 47,1659 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Sum -27,4418 -13,1202 152,1886 3503,0160 44,0000 10,0000 124,1667 -9,8051 
Sum Sq, Dev, 32,6803 17,9103 206,1586 117,4792 36,6943 9,6226 147,4024 8,5665 
Observations 265 265 265 265 265 265 265 265 
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R2 
Dependent Variable: ARHY   
Method: Panel Least Squares 
  
Periods included: 11   
Cross-sections included: 64 
  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 249  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -4,9473 0,7858 -6,2957 0,0000 
NBR 0,0227 0,0270 0,8420 0,4010 
ABRMOM -0,0241 0,0977 -0,2466 0,8055 
ABRWL -0,1791 0,0786 -2,2792 0,0239 
LSIZE 0,3735 0,0597 6,2603 0,0000 
LMBR -0,1648 0,0678 -2,4318 0,0161 
DSSA -0,0099 0,0826 -0,1204 0,9043 
DSBA -0,0221 0,0454 -0,4853 0,6281 
R-squared 0,6669     Mean dependent var -0,0767 
Adjusted R-squared 0,5082     S.D. dependent var 0,2934 
F-statistic 4,2036     Durbin-Watson stat 1,3736 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
T2 –Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  ABRWL ABRMOM LMBR LSIZE DSBA DSSA NBR ARHY 
Mean -0,1082 -0,0507 0,5624 13,2166 0,1767 0,0402 0,4572 -0,0767 
Median -0,1258 -0,0733 0,5188 13,2933 0,0000 0,0000 1,0000 -0,0879 
Maximum 1,2938 1,4103 4,3630 14,6314 1,0000 1,0000 3,0000 1,4686 
Minimum -0,9412 -0,8041 -2,3026 11,1115 0,0000 0,0000 -3,0000 -0,9370 
Std, Dev, 0,3502 0,2623 0,8859 0,6691 0,3822 0,1967 0,7605 0,2934 
Skewness 0,7138 0,6831 0,6440 -0,6665 1,6952 4,6842 -1,0026 0,4749 
Kurtosis 4,3051 6,7427 5,2573 3,4442 3,8737 22,9418 4,4731 6,0849 
Jarque-Bera 38,8139 164,7001 70,0727 20,4847 127,1798 5036,4860 64,2313 108,0938 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Sum -26,9512 -12,6174 140,0266 3290,9210 44,0000 10,0000 113,8333 -19,1076 
Sum Sq, Dev, 30,4158 17,0645 194,6301 111,0170 36,2249 9,5984 143,4297 21,3490 
Observations 249 249 249 249 249 249 249 249 
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R3 
Dependent Variable: AR1Y   
Method: Panel Least Squares 
  
Periods included: 11   
Cross-sections included: 64 
  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 249  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -4,7416 0,6576 -7,2103 0,0000 
NBR 0,0075 0,0226 0,3332 0,7394 
ABRMOM 0,9030 0,0818 11,0458 0,0000 
ABRWL -0,1338 0,0658 -2,0348 0,0434 
LSIZE 0,3625 0,0499 7,2609 0,0000 
LMBR -0,2511 0,0567 -4,4279 0,0000 
DSSA -0,0242 0,0691 -0,3499 0,7268 
DSBA 0,0252 0,0380 0,6635 0,5079 
R-squared 0,8586     Mean dependent var -0,1157 
Adjusted R-squared 0,7912     S.D. dependent var 0,3769 
F-statistic 12,7499     Durbin-Watson stat 1,4956 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
T3 –Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  ABRWL ABRMOM LMBR LSIZE DSBA DSSA NBR AR1Y 
 Mean -0,1082 -0,0507 0,5624 13,2166 0,1767 0,0402 0,4572 -0,1157 
 Median -0,1258 -0,0733 0,5188 13,2933 0,0000 0,0000 1,0000 -0,1419 
 Maximum 1,2938 1,4103 4,3630 14,6314 1,0000 1,0000 3,0000 1,1498 
 Minimum -0,9412 -0,8041 -2,3026 11,1115 0,0000 0,0000 -3,0000 -1,0453 
 Std, Dev, 0,3502 0,2623 0,8859 0,6691 0,3822 0,1967 0,7605 0,3769 
 Skewness 0,7138 0,6831 0,6440 -0,6665 1,6952 4,6842 -1,0026 0,4267 
 Kurtosis 4,3051 6,7427 5,2573 3,4442 3,8737 22,9418 4,4731 3,6875 
 Jarque-Bera 38,8139 164,7001 70,0727 20,4847 127,1798 5036,4860 64,2313 12,4577 
 Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0020 
 Sum -26,9512 -12,6174 140,0266 3290,9210 44,0000 10,0000 113,8333 -28,8130 
 Sum Sq, Dev, 30,4158 17,0645 194,6301 111,0170 36,2249 9,5984 143,4297 35,2215 
 Observations 249 249 249 249 249 249 249 249 
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R4 
 
 
T4 –Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  ABRWL ABRMOM LMBR LSIZE DSBA DSSA NBR AR2Y 
Mean -0,1127 -0,0569 0,4944 13,2233 0,1810 0,0452 0,4397 -0,1777 
Median -0,1238 -0,0747 0,4762 13,3146 0,0000 0,0000 1,0000 -0,2552 
Maximum 1,0557 1,4103 4,1738 14,6314 1,0000 1,0000 3,0000 1,4424 
Minimum -0,9412 -0,8041 -2,3026 11,1115 0,0000 0,0000 -3,0000 -1,2412 
Std, Dev, 0,3271 0,2560 0,8455 0,6504 0,3859 0,2083 0,7696 0,4955 
Skewness 0,4815 0,8441 0,4608 -0,5805 1,6571 4,3758 -0,9554 0,8650 
Kurtosis 3,7777 7,8115 4,9722 3,1614 3,7460 20,1474 4,5196 3,7647 
Jarque-Bera 14,1099 239,4217 43,6362 12,6513 106,2686 3412,8170 54,8836 32,9413 
Probability 0,0009 0,0000 0,0000 0,0018 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Sum -24,9061 -12,5666 109,2532 2922,3460 40,0000 10,0000 97,1667 -39,2768 
Sum Sq, Dev, 23,5402 14,4171 157,2777 93,0526 32,7602 9,5475 130,3045 54,0145 
Observations 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 
 
 
Dependent Variable: AR2Y   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Periods included: 9   
Cross-sections included: 64   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 221  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -4,939938 1,293079 -3,820292 0,0002 
NBR 0,009641 0,028732 0,335566 0,7377 
ABRMOM -0,169885 0,149078 -1,139572 0,2564 
ABRWL 0,380206 0,167555 2,269143 0,0248 
LSIZE 0,36231 0,096916 3,738372 0,0003 
LMBR 0,039568 0,09565 0,413675 0,6797 
DSSA -0,052124 0,061485 -0,847745 0,398 
DSBA -0,093727 0,05751 -1,629757 0,1054 
R-squared 0,86375     Mean dependent var -0,177723 
Adjusted R-squared 0,788909     S.D. dependent var 0,4955 
F-statistic 11,54108     Durbin-Watson stat 1,441701 
Prob(F-statistic) 0       
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A.7.1.2. Insider trading alone 
R1 
 
 
T1 –Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  ABRWL ABRMOM LMBR LSIZE SDVS SDVB SDNIS SDNIB NPR ARR 
Mean -0,0932 -0,0437 0,4247 12,8485 0,0889 0,2233 0,0316 0,2095 0,4666 -0,0208 
Median -0,1288 -0,0672 0,3111 12,8979 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 1,0000 -0,0378 
Maximum 3,0382 2,1570 4,3439 14,6314 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,3285 
Minimum -1,1415 -0,9088 -2,3026 10,1297 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 -1,0000 -0,7469 
Std, Dev, 0,4066 0,3048 0,8643 0,8448 0,2849 0,4169 0,1752 0,4073 0,8303 0,2055 
Skewness 1,3408 1,3658 0,8645 -0,3962 2,8883 1,3287 5,3533 1,4278 -1,0523 1,0762 
Kurtosis 10,1225 10,9920 5,2848 2,6110 9,3421 2,7654 29,6577 3,0386 2,2473 9,5233 
Jarque-Bera 1221,1680 1503,9440 173,0861 16,4301 1551,5210 150,0430 17399,2500 171,9520 105,3263 994,8391 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0003 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Sum -47,1654 -22,1340 214,8830 6501,3130 45,0000 113,0000 16,0000 106,0000 236,1172 -10,5348 
Sum Sq, Dev, 83,5077 46,9072 377,2555 360,4379 40,9980 87,7648 15,4941 83,7945 348,1346 21,3252 
Observations 506 506 506 506 506 506 506 506 506 506 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ARR  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Periods included: 12   
Cross-sections included: 86   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 506  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -0,362685 0,402627 -0,900795 0,3682 
LMBR 0,086267 0,036238 2,380565 0,0178 
LSIZE 0,025493 0,031432 0,811054 0,4178 
NPR -0,007186 0,011061 -0,649677 0,5163 
ABRWL -0,066414 0,041333 -1,606803 0,1089 
ABRMOM 0,470514 0,065658 7,16611 0 
SDNIB -0,007094 0,018544 -0,38257 0,7022 
SDNIS 1,36E-06 0,0424 3,20E-05 1 
SDVB -0,011446 0,025095 -0,456079 0,6486 
SDVS -0,005941 0,032815 -0,18106 0,8564 
R-squared 0,61102     Mean dependent var -0,02082 
Adjusted R-squared 0,508912     S.D. dependent var 0,205495 
F-statistic 5,98409     Durbin-Watson stat 2,836023 
Prob(F-statistic) 0       
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R2 
Dependent Variable: ARHY  
Method: Panel Least Squares 
  
Periods included: 11   
Cross-sections included: 86 
  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 476  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -4,6920 0,6406 -7,3238 0,0000 
LMBR -0,2682 0,0647 -4,1435 0,0000 
LSIZE 0,3680 0,0504 7,3049 0,0000 
NPR 0,0182 0,0213 0,8557 0,3927 
ABRWL -0,1583 0,0652 -2,4261 0,0157 
ABRMOM 0,1083 0,0727 1,4885 0,1375 
SDNIB 0,0484 0,0381 1,2714 0,2044 
SDNIS -0,0086 0,0946 -0,0913 0,9273 
SDVB 0,0628 0,0415 1,5133 0,1310 
SDVS -0,0856 0,0622 -1,3763 0,1696 
R-squared 0,4253     Mean dependent var -0,0467 
Adjusted R-squared 0,2642     S.D. dependent var 0,3119 
F-statistic 2,6401     Durbin-Watson stat 1,0550 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
T2 –Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  ABRWL ABRMOM LMBR LSIZE SDVS SDVB SDNIS SDNIB NPR ARHY 
Mean -0,0890 -0,0381 0,4381 12,8431 0,0777 0,2290 0,0336 0,2164 0,4782 -0,0467 
Median -0,1239 -0,0634 0,3329 12,8950 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 1,0000 -0,0683 
Maximum 3,0382 2,1570 4,3439 14,6314 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 2,1570 
Minimum -0,9912 -0,8722 -2,3026 10,1297 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 -1,0000 -0,9628 
Std, Dev, 0,3994 0,3026 0,8640 0,8559 0,2680 0,4206 0,1804 0,4122 0,8250 0,3119 
Skewness 1,4689 1,4398 0,8627 -0,3932 3,1542 1,2900 5,1754 1,3775 -1,0871 1,6944 
Kurtosis 11,0193 11,3805 5,3933 2,5850 10,9492 2,6640 27,7848 2,8975 2,3231 12,3373 
Jarque-Bera 1446,6450 1557,4300 172,6443 15,6789 2042,5460 134,2481 14308,2500 150,7433 102,8365 1956,9460 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0004 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Sum -42,3488 -18,1413 208,5509 6113,3140 37,0000 109,0000 16,0000 103,0000 227,6455 -22,2244 
Sum Sq, Dev, 75,7871 43,5068 354,6250 347,9354 34,1240 84,0399 15,4622 80,7122 323,2971 46,2190 
Observations 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 
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R3 
Dependent Variable: AR1Y  
Method: Panel Least Squares 
  
Periods included: 11   
Cross-sections included: 86 
  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 476  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -4,4951 0,7543 -5,9594 0,0000 
LMBR -0,2854 0,0735 -3,8850 0,0001 
LSIZE 0,3543 0,0601 5,8919 0,0000 
NPR 0,0142 0,0193 0,7366 0,4618 
ABRWL -0,1765 0,0763 -2,3140 0,0212 
ABRMOM 1,0954 0,1013 10,8157 0,0000 
SDNIB 0,0591 0,0299 1,9737 0,0492 
SDNIS -0,0383 0,0764 -0,5008 0,6168 
SDVB 0,0434 0,0374 1,1586 0,2474 
SDVS -0,1072 0,0456 -2,3495 0,0193 
R-squared 0,7397     Mean dependent var -0,0756 
Adjusted R-squared 0,6667     S.D. dependent var 0,4259 
F-statistic 10,1352     Durbin-Watson stat 0,9857 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
T3 –Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  ABRWL ABRMOM LMBR LSIZE SDVS SDVB SDNIS SDNIB NPR AR1Y 
Mean -0,0890 -0,0381 0,4381 12,8431 0,0777 0,2290 0,0336 0,2164 0,4782 -0,0756 
Median -0,1239 -0,0634 0,3329 12,8950 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 1,0000 -0,1054 
Maximum 3,0382 2,1570 4,3439 14,6314 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 3,0382 
Minimum -0,9912 -0,8722 -2,3026 10,1297 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 -1,0000 -1,3024 
Std, Dev, 0,3994 0,3026 0,8640 0,8559 0,2680 0,4206 0,1804 0,4122 0,8250 0,4259 
Skewness 1,4689 1,4398 0,8627 -0,3932 3,1542 1,2900 5,1754 1,3775 -1,0871 1,4916 
Kurtosis 11,0193 11,3805 5,3933 2,5850 10,9492 2,6640 27,7848 2,8975 2,3231 10,4544 
Jarque-Bera 1446,6450 1557,4300 172,6443 15,6789 2042,5460 134,2481 14308,2500 150,7433 102,8365 1278,6100 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0004 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Sum -42,3488 -18,1413 208,5509 6113,3140 37,0000 109,0000 16,0000 103,0000 227,6455 -35,9731 
Sum Sq, Dev, 75,7871 43,5068 354,6250 347,9354 34,1240 84,0399 15,4622 80,7122 323,2971 86,1548 
Observations 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 
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R4 
Dependent Variable: AR2Y  
Method: Panel Least Squares 
  
Periods included: 9   
Cross-sections included: 85 
  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 383  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -4,1200 0,8242 -4,9990 0,0000 
LMBR 0,0002 0,0685 0,0035 0,9972 
LSIZE 0,3100 0,0654 4,7434 0,0000 
NPR -0,0145 0,0256 -0,5653 0,5723 
ABRWL 0,4327 0,0824 5,2492 0,0000 
ABRMOM 0,1035 0,0861 1,2019 0,2304 
SDNIB -0,0058 0,0365 -0,1589 0,8738 
SDNIS -0,0257 0,1447 -0,1773 0,8594 
SDVB 0,0528 0,0472 1,1197 0,2638 
SDVS -0,1058 0,0653 -1,6201 0,1063 
R-squared 0,8064     Mean dependent var -0,1925 
Adjusted R-squared 0,7368     S.D. dependent var 0,4794 
F-statistic 11,5861     Durbin-Watson stat 1,0814 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
T4 –Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  ABRWL ABRMOM LMBR LSIZE SDVS SDVB SDNIS SDNIB NPR AR2Y 
Mean -0,0948 -0,0420 0,3683 12,8336 0,0809 0,2350 0,0313 0,2272 0,5069 -0,1925 
Median -0,1163 -0,0639 0,2624 12,8920 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 1,0000 -0,2701 
Maximum 3,0382 2,1570 4,3439 14,6314 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,7550 
Minimum -0,9912 -0,8066 -2,3026 10,1297 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 -1,0000 -1,3388 
Std, Dev, 0,3886 0,3021 0,8728 0,8440 0,2731 0,4245 0,1744 0,4195 0,8122 0,4794 
Skewness 1,6918 1,8033 0,8839 -0,4314 3,0729 1,2501 5,3804 1,3024 -1,1792 0,7078 
Kurtosis 13,8368 13,5615 5,3807 2,6727 10,4429 2,5627 29,9490 2,6962 2,5329 3,8365 
Jarque-Bera 2056,7760 1987,6450 140,3216 13,5901 1486,8140 102,8052 13437,6400 109,7479 92,2397 43,1429 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0011 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Sum -36,2987 -16,0760 141,0429 4915,2580 31,0000 90,0000 12,0000 87,0000 194,1359 -73,7308 
Sum Sq, Dev, 57,6841 34,8713 290,9765 272,1025 28,4909 68,8512 11,6240 67,2376 251,9683 87,7990 
Observations 383 383 383 383 383 383 383 383 383 383 
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A.7.1.3. Insider trading and analysts’ recommendations together 
R1 
Dependent Variable: ARR   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Periods included: 12   
Cross-sections included: 52   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 134  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0,4019 0,6986 0,5753 0,5673 
LMBR 0,0568 0,0886 0,6410 0,5240 
LSIZE -0,0320 0,0541 -0,5906 0,5570 
ABRMOM 0,4673 0,0868 5,3841 0,0000 
ABRWL 0,1097 0,0638 1,7196 0,0908 
NPR -0,0240 0,0195 -1,2258 0,2251 
SDNIB 0,0242 0,0345 0,7019 0,4855 
SDNIS -0,0510 0,0879 -0,5795 0,5645 
SDVB 0,0049 0,0501 0,0985 0,9219 
SDVS -0,0857 0,0617 -1,3897 0,1698 
NBR 0,0234 0,0225 1,0395 0,3028 
DSBA -0,0477 0,0359 -1,3300 0,1886 
DSSA -0,0274 0,0968 -0,2831 0,7781 
R-squared 0,8599     Mean dependent var -0,0369 
Adjusted R-squared 0,6842     S.D. dependent var 0,1879 
F-statistic 4,8931     Durbin-Watson stat 4,6337 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
T1 –Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  ABRW
L 
ABRMO
M ARR DSBA DSSA LMBR LSIZE SDVS SDVB SDNIS 
SDNI
B NPR NBR 
Mean -0,0864 -0,0474 -0,0369 0,1940 0,0149 0,5176 13,2754 0,1269 0,2090 0,0522 0,2090 0,2795 0,5037 
Median -0,1144 -0,0716 -0,0503 0,0000 0,0000 0,4606 13,3183 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 1,0000 1,0000 
Maximum 1,2938 1,4103 0,6271 1,0000 1,0000 3,2185 14,6314 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 3,0000 
Minimum -0,8819 -0,7436 -0,7469 0,0000 0,0000 -2,3026 11,7906 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 -1,0000 -1,0000 
Std, Dev, 0,3676 0,2797 0,1879 0,3969 0,1217 0,8070 0,5924 0,3341 0,4081 0,2233 0,4081 0,9160 0,6938 
Skewness 0,9322 0,9836 -0,1659 1,5474 8,0009 0,3045 -0,3863 2,2422 1,4317 4,0247 1,4317 -0,5726 -0,3979 
Kurtosis 4,8814 7,9970 5,9294 3,3946 65,0152 4,7336 2,7717 6,0277 3,0499 17,1980 3,0499 1,4187 3,6055 
Jarque-Bera 39,1686 161,0211 48,5288 
54,348
4 
22902,500
0 
18,850
6 3,6242 
163,464
8 
45,794
2 
1487,257
0 
45,794
2 21,2820 5,5824 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0001 0,1633 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0613 
Sum -11,5770 -6,3560 -4,9432 
26,000
0 2,0000 
69,364
1 
1778,904
0 17,0000 
28,000
0 7,0000 
28,000
0 37,4578 
67,500
0 
Sum Sq, 
Dev, 17,9696 10,4052 4,6949 
20,955
2 1,9701 
86,626
1 46,6799 14,8433 
22,149
3 6,6343 
22,149
3 
111,604
9 
64,012
0 
Observation
s 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 
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R2 
Dependent Variable: ARHY   
Method: Panel Least Squares 
  
Periods included: 11   
Cross-sections included: 50 
  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 128  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -6,6052 1,1565 -5,7114 0,0000 
LMBR -0,5580 0,1490 -3,7445 0,0004 
LSIZE 0,5098 0,0898 5,6778 0,0000 
ABRMOM 0,0144 0,1434 0,1004 0,9204 
ABRWL -0,0171 0,1075 -0,1592 0,8741 
NPR 0,0625 0,0325 1,9209 0,0598 
SDNIB 0,0386 0,0579 0,6664 0,5079 
SDNIS 0,0966 0,1479 0,6528 0,5165 
SDVB 0,0263 0,0831 0,3167 0,7526 
SDVS -0,0665 0,1059 -0,6281 0,5325 
NBR 0,0699 0,0383 1,8269 0,0730 
DSBA -0,0951 0,0593 -1,6028 0,1146 
DSSA 0,0388 0,1603 0,2421 0,8096 
R-squared 0,8552     Mean dependent var -0,0859 
Adjusted R-squared 0,6716     S.D. dependent var 0,3034 
F-statistic 4,6583     Durbin-Watson stat 2,0271 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
T2 –Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  ABRW
L 
ABRMO
M DSBA DSSA LMBR LSIZE SDVS SDVB SDNIS 
SDNI
B NPR NBR ARHY 
Mean -0,0800 -0,0402 0,2031 0,0156 0,5323 13,2744 0,1016 0,2109 0,0547 0,2031 0,3062 0,5117 -0,0859 
Median -0,0983 -0,0655 0,0000 0,0000 0,4700 13,3183 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 1,0000 1,0000 -0,0891 
Maximum 1,2938 1,4103 1,0000 1,0000 3,2185 14,6314 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 3,0000 1,4686 
Minimum -0,8819 -0,7436 0,0000 0,0000 -2,3026 11,7906 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 -1,0000 -1,0000 -0,8285 
Std, Dev, 0,3688 0,2828 0,4039 0,1245 0,8100 0,5890 0,3033 0,4096 0,2283 0,4039 0,9073 0,7015 0,3034 
Skewness 0,9264 0,9444 1,4758 7,8113 0,3251 -0,3654 2,6380 1,4171 3,9171 1,4758 -0,6368 -0,4313 0,8268 
Kurtosis 4,9251 7,8967 3,1780 62,0159 4,7317 2,8408 7,9592 3,0081 16,3436 3,1780 1,5032 3,6197 7,8971 
Jarque-Bera 38,0733 146,9068 46,6325 
19877,000
0 
18,247
0 2,9843 
279,628
9 
42,839
1 
1276,933
0 
46,632
5 20,5999 6,0159 
142,485
2 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0001 0,2249 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0494 0,0000 
Sum -10,2434 -5,1468 
26,000
0 2,0000 
68,129
2 
1699,117
0 13,0000 
27,000
0 7,0000 
26,000
0 39,1947 
65,500
0 
-
10,9973 
Sum Sq, 
Dev, 17,2771 10,1537 
20,718
8 1,9688 
83,318
6 44,0623 11,6797 
21,304
7 6,6172 
20,718
8 
104,553
1 
62,496
3 11,6912 
Observation
s 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 
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R3 
Dependent Variable: AR1Y   
Method: Panel Least Squares 
  
Periods included: 11   
Cross-sections included: 50 
  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 128  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -5,2784 0,9985 -5,2865 0,0000 
LMBR -0,5880 0,1287 -4,5702 0,0000 
LSIZE 0,4108 0,0775 5,2995 0,0000 
ABRMOM 1,0038 0,1238 8,1071 0,0000 
ABRWL -0,0544 0,0928 -0,5856 0,5605 
NPR 0,0503 0,0281 1,7898 0,0789 
SDNIB 0,0587 0,0500 1,1734 0,2456 
SDNIS 0,1382 0,1277 1,0821 0,2839 
SDVB 0,0483 0,0717 0,6731 0,5036 
SDVS -0,0786 0,0914 -0,8596 0,3937 
NBR 0,0414 0,0330 1,2514 0,2160 
DSBA -0,0015 0,0512 -0,0286 0,9773 
DSSA -0,0355 0,1384 -0,2563 0,7987 
R-squared 0,9311     Mean dependent var -0,1166 
Adjusted R-squared 0,8437     S.D. dependent var 0,3796 
F-statistic 10,6528     Durbin-Watson stat 1,8456 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
T3 –Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  ABRW
L 
ABRMO
M DSBA DSSA LMBR LSIZE SDVS SDVB SDNIS 
SDNI
B NPR NBR AR1Y 
Mean -0,0800 -0,0402 0,2031 0,0156 0,5323 13,2744 0,1016 0,2109 0,0547 0,2031 0,3062 0,5117 -0,1166 
Median -0,0983 -0,0655 0,0000 0,0000 0,4700 13,3183 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 1,0000 1,0000 -0,1201 
Maximum 1,2938 1,4103 1,0000 1,0000 3,2185 14,6314 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 3,0000 1,1498 
Minimum -0,8819 -0,7436 0,0000 0,0000 -2,3026 11,7906 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 -1,0000 -1,0000 -0,9912 
Std, Dev, 0,3688 0,2828 0,4039 0,1245 0,8100 0,5890 0,3033 0,4096 0,2283 0,4039 0,9073 0,7015 0,3796 
Skewness 0,9264 0,9444 1,4758 7,8113 0,3251 -0,3654 2,6380 1,4171 3,9171 1,4758 -0,6368 -0,4313 0,3855 
Kurtosis 4,9251 7,8967 3,1780 62,0159 4,7317 2,8408 7,9592 3,0081 16,3436 3,1780 1,5032 3,6197 3,7534 
Jarque-Bera 38,0733 146,9068 46,6325 
19877,000
0 
18,247
0 2,9843 
279,628
9 
42,839
1 
1276,933
0 
46,632
5 20,5999 6,0159 6,1975 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0001 0,2249 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0494 0,0451 
Sum -10,2434 -5,1468 
26,000
0 2,0000 
68,129
2 
1699,117
0 13,0000 
27,000
0 7,0000 
26,000
0 39,1947 
65,500
0 
-
14,9244 
Sum Sq, 
Dev, 17,2771 10,1537 
20,718
8 1,9688 
83,318
6 44,0623 11,6797 
21,304
7 6,6172 
20,718
8 
104,553
1 
62,496
3 18,3049 
Observation
s 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 
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R4 
Dependent Variable: AR2Y   
Method: Panel Least Squares 
  
Periods included: 9   
Cross-sections included: 48 
  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 113  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -3,9696 0,8036 -4,9395 0,0000 
LMBR -0,1682 0,1899 -0,8854 0,3806 
LSIZE 0,2900 0,0633 4,5838 0,0000 
ABRMOM 0,1755 0,1271 1,3801 0,1744 
ABRWL 0,1883 0,1697 1,1094 0,2732 
NPR -0,0131 0,0398 -0,3295 0,7433 
SDNIB 0,0741 0,0476 1,5562 0,1267 
SDNIS 0,3015 0,1646 1,8319 0,0736 
SDVB 0,1508 0,0701 2,1503 0,0369 
SDVS -0,1439 0,1568 -0,9179 0,3636 
NBR 0,0056 0,0309 0,1817 0,8566 
DSBA -0,1012 0,0629 -1,6094 0,1145 
DSSA 0,0732 0,1407 0,5205 0,6053 
R-squared 0,9531     Mean dependent var -0,2011 
Adjusted R-squared 0,8832     S.D. dependent var 0,4444 
F-statistic 13,6374     Durbin-Watson stat 1,5518 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000       
 
T4 –Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  ABRW
L 
ABRMO
M DSBA DSSA LMBR LSIZE SDVS SDVB SDNIS 
SDNI
B NPR NBR AR2Y 
Mean -0,1012 -0,0532 0,2212 0,0177 0,4634 13,2573 0,0973 0,2301 0,0531 0,2212 0,3256 0,5118 -0,2011 
Median -0,1048 -0,0733 0,0000 0,0000 0,3853 13,3183 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 1,0000 1,0000 -0,2786 
Maximum 1,0557 1,4103 1,0000 1,0000 3,2185 14,6314 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 3,0000 1,2838 
Minimum -0,8819 -0,7436 0,0000 0,0000 -2,3026 11,7906 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 -1,0000 -1,0000 -0,9480 
Std, Dev, 0,3317 0,2762 0,4169 0,1324 0,8087 0,5914 0,2977 0,4228 0,2252 0,4169 0,9087 0,7006 0,4444 
Skewness 0,6036 1,2510 1,3432 7,3156 0,4467 -0,4312 2,7167 1,2826 3,9862 1,3432 -0,6814 -0,3283 0,6720 
Kurtosis 4,4497 9,3436 2,8041 54,5180 5,2294 2,7685 8,3806 2,6450 16,8894 2,8041 1,5457 3,7131 3,2845 
Jarque-Bera 16,7569 218,9428 34,1578 
13504,340
0 
27,158
7 3,7545 
275,309
5 
31,574
3 
1207,562
0 
34,157
8 
18,701
9 4,4239 8,8853 
Probability 0,0002 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,1530 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0001 0,1095 0,0118 
Sum -11,4314 -6,0101 
25,000
0 2,0000 
52,366
4 
1498,073
0 11,0000 
26,000
0 6,0000 
25,000
0 
36,790
3 
57,833
3 
-
22,7290 
Sum Sq, 
Dev, 12,3241 8,5430 
19,469
0 1,9646 
73,246
6 39,1754 9,9292 
20,017
7 5,6814 
19,469
0 
92,480
1 
54,970
4 22,1181 
Observation
s 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 
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A.7.1.4. Insider trading depending analysts’ recommendations  
R1 
Dependent Variable: NPR   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Periods included: 12   
Cross-sections included: 52   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 134  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -3,905774 4,902564 -0,79668 0,4286 
LMBR -1,221057 0,602285 -2,027376 0,0468 
LSIZE 0,367531 0,379113 0,969451 0,336 
NBR -0,093101 0,163052 -0,570991 0,57 
ABRMOM 0,497955 0,601799 0,827444 0,4111 
ABRWL -0,196469 0,453231 -0,433486 0,6661 
DSSA -1,102887 0,669223 -1,648011 0,1043 
DSBA 0,04258 0,262502 0,162207 0,8717 
R-squared 0,646811     Mean dependent var 0,279536 
Adjusted R-squared 0,266029     S.D. dependent var 0,916043 
F-statistic 1,698639     Durbin-Watson stat 2,959271 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,016655       
 
T1 –Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  ABRWL ABRMOM LMBR LSIZE DSBA DSSA NBR NPR SDNIB SDNIS SDVB SDVS 
Mean -0,0864 -0,0474 0,5176 13,2754 0,1940 0,0149 0,5037 0,2795 0,2090 0,0522 0,2090 0,1269 
Median -0,1144 -0,0716 0,4606 13,3183 0,0000 0,0000 1,0000 1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Maximum 1,2938 1,4103 3,2185 14,6314 1,0000 1,0000 3,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 
Minimum -0,8819 -0,7436 -2,3026 11,7906 0,0000 0,0000 -1,0000 -1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Std, Dev, 0,3676 0,2797 0,8070 0,5924 0,3969 0,1217 0,6938 0,9160 0,4081 0,2233 0,4081 0,3341 
Skewness 0,9322 0,9836 0,3045 -0,3863 1,5474 8,0009 -0,3979 -0,5726 1,4317 4,0247 1,4317 2,2422 
Kurtosis 4,8814 7,9970 4,7336 2,7717 3,3946 65,0152 3,6055 1,4187 3,0499 17,1980 3,0499 6,0277 
Jarque-Bera 39,1686 161,0211 18,8506 3,6242 54,3484 22902,5000 5,5824 21,2820 45,7942 1487,2570 45,7942 163,4648 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0001 0,1633 0,0000 0,0000 0,0613 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Sum -11,5770 -6,3560 69,3641 1778,9040 26,0000 2,0000 67,5000 37,4578 28,0000 7,0000 28,0000 17,0000 
Sum Sq, Dev, 17,9696 10,4052 86,6261 46,6799 20,9552 1,9701 64,0120 111,6049 22,1493 6,6343 22,1493 14,8433 
Observations 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 
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A.7.1.5. Analysts’ recommendations depending on insider trading 
R1 
Dependent Variable: NBR   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Periods included: 12   
Cross-sections included: 52   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 134  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -5,853848 4,170425 -1,403657 0,1654 
LMBR -0,038369 0,538176 -0,071295 0,9434 
LSIZE 0,475029 0,322815 1,471524 0,1462 
NPR -0,056087 0,115629 -0,485063 0,6293 
ABRMOM -0,211531 0,526615 -0,40168 0,6893 
ABRWL 0,180217 0,387543 0,465025 0,6435 
SDNIB -0,010117 0,207908 -0,04866 0,9613 
SDNIS 0,393915 0,516377 0,762843 0,4484 
SDVB 0,521817 0,295306 1,767035 0,0821 
SDVS -0,276291 0,373835 -0,739071 0,4627 
R-squared 0,59896     Mean dependent var 0,503731 
Adjusted R-squared 0,139704     S.D. dependent var 0,693753 
F-statistic 1,304197     Durbin-Watson stat 3,658816 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,143202       
 
T1 –Descriptive statistics, common sample 
  ABRWL ABRMOM LMBR LSIZE DSBA DSSA NBR NPR SDNIB SDNIS SDVB SDVS 
Mean -0,0864 -0,0474 0,5176 13,2754 0,1940 0,0149 0,5037 0,2795 0,2090 0,0522 0,2090 0,1269 
Median -0,1144 -0,0716 0,4606 13,3183 0,0000 0,0000 1,0000 1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Maximum 1,2938 1,4103 3,2185 14,6314 1,0000 1,0000 3,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 
Minimum -0,8819 -0,7436 -2,3026 11,7906 0,0000 0,0000 -1,0000 -1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Std, Dev, 0,3676 0,2797 0,8070 0,5924 0,3969 0,1217 0,6938 0,9160 0,4081 0,2233 0,4081 0,3341 
Skewness 0,9322 0,9836 0,3045 -0,3863 1,5474 8,0009 -0,3979 -0,5726 1,4317 4,0247 1,4317 2,2422 
Kurtosis 4,8814 7,9970 4,7336 2,7717 3,3946 65,0152 3,6055 1,4187 3,0499 17,1980 3,0499 6,0277 
Jarque-Bera 39,1686 161,0211 18,8506 3,6242 54,3484 22902,5000 5,5824 21,2820 45,7942 1487,2570 45,7942 163,4648 
Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0001 0,1633 0,0000 0,0000 0,0613 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Sum -11,5770 -6,3560 69,3641 1778,9040 26,0000 2,0000 67,5000 37,4578 28,0000 7,0000 28,0000 17,0000 
Sum Sq, Dev, 17,9696 10,4052 86,6261 46,6799 20,9552 1,9701 64,0120 111,6049 22,1493 6,6343 22,1493 14,8433 
Observations 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 
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A.7.1.6. Correlation matrix 
  NBR LMBR LSIZE NPR ABRMOM ABRWL SDNIB SDNIS SDVB SDVS DSSA DSBA 
NBR 1 0,1511 0,2443 -0,0725 0,1899 0,2029 0,068 -0,0255 -0,0072 -0,0183 -0,1491 0,3751 
LMBR 0,1511 1 0,1357 -0,1922 0,3719 0,4147 -0,0893 0,2454 -0,3044 0,1694 0,0048 0,0479 
LSIZE 0,2443 0,1357 1 -0,0588 0,2593 0,3282 0,075 0,059 -0,1656 -0,0547 -0,0214 0,2366 
NPR -0,0725 -0,1922 -0,0588 1 -0,2252 -0,2971 0,2992 -0,324 0,2615 -0,4563 -0,1051 -0,0286 
ABRMOM 0,1899 0,3719 0,2593 -0,2252 1 0,7476 -0,1513 0,3251 -0,1454 0,1285 -0,0447 0,1563 
ABRWL 0,2029 0,4147 0,3282 -0,2971 0,7476 1 -0,1522 0,3541 -0,2477 0,1607 -0,0084 0,126 
SDNIB 0,068 -0,0893 0,075 0,2992 -0,1513 -0,1522 1 -0,1207 0,2325 -0,0305 -0,0633 0,0727 
SDNIS -0,0255 0,2454 0,059 -0,324 0,3251 0,3541 -0,1207 1 -0,1207 0,5151 -0,0289 -0,1152 
SDVB -0,0072 -0,3044 -0,1656 0,2615 -0,1454 -0,2477 0,2325 -0,1207 1 0,0798 -0,0633 -0,0201 
SDVS -0,0183 0,1694 -0,0547 -0,4563 0,1285 0,1607 -0,0305 0,5151 0,0798 1 -0,0469 -0,1303 
DSSA -0,1491 0,0048 -0,0214 -0,1051 -0,0447 -0,0084 -0,0633 -0,0289 -0,0633 -0,0469 1 0,0952 
DSBA 0,3751 0,0479 0,2366 -0,0286 0,1563 0,126 0,0727 -0,1152 -0,0201 -0,1303 0,0952 1 
 
Det kan stå företag noterade på 
börsen dyrt att utnyttja de nya 
rapporteringsreglerna 
 
 
LUND 
n ny studie från Lunds 
Universitet visar på att de 
nya, flexibla reglerna 
kring kvartalsrapportering som 
trädde i kraft den 1:a januari 
2014 möjligtvis inte kommer att 
ge eftersträvad effekt, utan 
istället leda till en minskad 
transparens på aktiemarknaden. 
Detta riskerar i sin tur leda till 
en mer illikvid marknad och 
högre kapitalkostnader för 
företagen. 
 
Regleringen som innebär att 
företag noterade på 
Stockholmsbörsen numera inte är 
tvungna att publicera 
kvartalsrapporter i enlighet med 
IAS34 har debatterats flitigt i 
media på senaste. En 
masteruppsats inom Corporate 
Finance på Lunds Universitet har 
undersökt den potentiella risken de 
nya reglerna kan ha på 
marknadstransparensen för privata 
investerare. 
 
Uppsatsen studerar alternativa 
publika informationskällor som 
den generella marknaden har 
tillgång till vid en  avsaknad av 
kvartalsrapporter. Insiderhandel 
registrerad hos Finansinspektionen 
och analytikers rekommendationer 
som ”läckt ut” till marknaden 
motiveras vara två sådana 
alternativ. Studien finner att 
varken insiderhandel eller 
analytikers rekommendationer 
innehåller tillräckligt mycket 
information för att ses som 
substitut till kvartalsrapporterna.  
 
Problematiken kring denna 
upptäckt innebär att om investerare 
inte finner ett informationsvärde i 
alternativa informationskällor och 
kvartalsrapporterna hädanefter blir 
mindre informativa, kan 
investerare komma att bli mindre 
villiga att investera i de bolag som 
inte offentliggör tillräckligt med 
information. Detta leder till en 
minskad likviditet på marknaden, 
vilket kan stå de nuvarande 
aktieägarna dyrt.  
 
Den nya regleringen ämnar 
uppmuntra långsiktighet, minska 
den administrativa bördan för 
ledningen och locka fler bolag till 
börsen. Problematiken med de 
nuvarande reglerna motiveras av 
Magnus Billing, Sverigechef på 
Nasdaq OMX, till Nyhetsbyrån 
Direkt på följande vis.  
 
"Det här vår tolkning av vad 
aktörerna tycker och tänker. Det 
är tydligt att de noterade bolaget 
upplever det som administrativ 
börda ta fram kvartalsrapporten 
och allt som följer med den i form 
presentationer och roadshows. Det 
har utvecklats en praxis som 
innebär mer och mer information" 
 
De företag som planerar att dra 
nytta av de nya reglerna 
uppmuntras att vara aktsamma 
med att fortsätta förse marknaden 
med tillräcklig information. Om de 
inte gör detta, måste valet att 
utnyttja reglerna motiveras av att 
ledningen spenderar den vunna 
tiden så pass effektivt att det 
kompenserar för den ökade 
kostnad som följs av en ovilja på 
marknaden att investera i bolagen. 
 
Studiens enkätundersökning visar, 
i enlighet med den som gjorts av 
Hallvarsson & Halvarsson i 
november 2013, att framförallt 
företag på Mid Cap och Small Cap 
förväntas dra nytta av regleringen. 
Dessa företag har redan idag färre 
antal analytiker som följer dem 
och studien visar att vid en 
minskning av kvartalsrapporter 
kan fler analytiker välja att flytta 
sin bevakning till större företag i 
en ännu större utsträckning än 
idag. Detta kan få som konsekvens 
att investerare får ännu svårare att 
få tag på information om Mid och 
Small Cap företagens utsikter, 
vilket i sin tur kan leda till en ännu 
större ovilja att investera här.  
 
Som följd av detta kan marknaden 
komma att bli mer beroende av 
privat information vilket ökar 
informationsgapet och 
informationsasymmetrin på 
marknaden vilket ger upphov till 
fler opportunistiska 
investeringsmöjligheter för de som 
har råd eller möjlighet att få tag på 
privat information. Transparensen 
är därmed i riskzonen.   
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Här hittar investerare värdefull information 
 
LUND 
tudien finner ytterligare 
resultat av intresse för 
investerare på Nasdaq 
OMX Stockholm. Beroende på 
tidshorisont finns information 
att hämta i insiderhandel och 
analytikers rekommendationer. 
 
Inom den närmsta framtiden har 
investerare ingen anledning att 
frukta någon markant negativ 
effekt utav den nya regleringen, 
eftersom varken insiders eller 
analytiker förväntar sig att företag 
på börsen kommer att förändra 
sina rapporteringsrutiner inom den 
närmsta framtiden. Däremot anger 
ett fåtal företag att de skall vänta 
och se huruvida andra företag på 
börsen kommer reducera sin 
kvartalsrapportering och därefter 
möjligen följa i deras fotspår.  
 
Studien visar att de analytiker 
rekommendationer som ”läckt” till 
marknaden enbart är av värde när 
de avser aktier på Large Cap. 
Marknaden reagerar när analytiker 
rekommenderar sälj, men inga 
större spår av reaktion i aktiepriset 
har noterats för rekommendationer 
för behåll eller köp. Studien finner 
även indikationer på att 
köprekommendationer innehåller 
viss information om aktiepriset två 
år framåt. Investerare kan därmed 
förvänta sig ett direkt aktieprisfall 
vid negativa rekommendationer, 
men utgången är delvis oviss för 
positiva rekommendationer.  
 
Däremot finns det starka tecken på 
att om flera insiders handlar eller 
köper en större mängd aktier inom 
ett kvartal kan investerare rimligen 
förvänta sig positiv framtida 
avkastning som överstiger 
marknadsindex om två år. Detta 
förklaras av att de flesta insiders 
investerar med en tidshorisont om 
två år eller mer. Därmed finns en 
del information att hämta genom 
att studera insider handel. 
 
Investerare med en kortsiktigare 
investeringshorisont kan förvänta 
sig att aktier som genererat hög 
avkastning det senaste halvåret 
sannolikt kommer att generera hög 
avkastning inom det närmsta 
kvartalet. Dock tenderar denna 
trend att vända efter ett tag igen 
och är därmed ingen hållbar 
investeringsstrategi.   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
S 
FAKTA 
Studien baseras på insamlad data 
från Finansinspektionen och 
Privata Affärer från 2011-2013 
och den kompletterande 
enkätundersökningen är utskickad 
till 198 analytiker och 918 insiders 
på stockholmsbörsen.  
 
Studien heter ”Is the transparency 
of the Swedish stock market at 
risk? A study on insider trading 
and analysts’ recommendations” 
och är skriven av Rebecka 
Birgersson och Malin Nilstoft. 
Studien samt svaren från 
enkätundersökningen finns på 
http://www.lu.se/studera/examen-
och-karriar/examensarbete-och-
uppsats 
 
